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ABSTRACT 
 
MARKET SOLUTIONS TO THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING CHALLENGE – A CASE 
STUDY OF BULAWAYO, ZIMBABWE 
The provision of decent, affordable and well-located housing for low-income communities has 
been an intractable problem, especially for developing countries. The empirical puzzle that 
motivated this study is that, despite the adverse macro environment in Zimbabwe, there appears to 
be private-sector developers who are successfully developing housing benefiting the low-income 
group. This is so, despite numerous studies that claim that given the magnitude of the housing 
challenge, a neoliberal doxa in a developing country context as a solution is a fallacy. Working on 
the broad premise that these developments represent a successful adaptation to the structural 
environment, the main question guiding the study was - what accounts for the success of market-
provided low-income housing developments in Zimbabwe despite the environment not being 
conducive for it? The two sub-questions flowing from this main question were firstly, how does 
the structural environment enable and/or constrain private sector low-income developments in 
Zimbabwe? Secondly, what strategies do developers adopt in response to the structural enablers 
and/or constraints to develop low-income housing in Zimbabwe? From these questions, the study 
has two hypotheses – the first hypothesis is that despite the adverse environment there exists in 
Zimbabwe structural enablers that make market solutions to the low-income housing challenge 
possible. The second hypothesis states that developers have specific discernible strategies that they 
employ in response to the adverse operating environment to reduce development costs to levels 
that enable them to provide low-income housing successfully. Using the Structure-Agency model, 
which is a theoretical framework rooted in institutional economics, a conceptual model to study the 
development process was developed and used to theorise the impact of structure on agency in the 
development process. Empirical evidence was gathered using observation, household surveys, and 
semi-structured interviews. This evidence was obtained from five housing schemes, the local 
authority, central government, financiers and the developers of the housing schemes, and then 
processed using NVIVO and SPSS. The study finds that most challenges faced by developers 
emanate from the institutional environment and access to resources. These challenges are namely 
central-local government dynamics fuelled by political undertones, lack of access to land suitable 
for the target group, a bureaucratic and stiff regulatory framework as well as a lack of market-
provided developer and end-user finance. Enabling factors were mainly the withdrawal of the 
government in the provision of housing in line with World-Bank neoliberal orthodoxy and 
incapacitation of the local authority, which eliminated alternative sources of housing for the low-
income group other than market provided housing, thus widening the market base for the 
developers. Strategies used by the developers include developer provided finance to the target 
group, preselling developments, sidestepping the local authority through buying land at the 
periphery of the local authority boundary, sidestepping regulatory barriers through engaging in 
corruption, backward integration to promote efficient resource allocation, and an innovative 
approach to risk management that caters for the low-income group. The study concludes that all 
these strategies have one overriding objective of cost containment. The findings indicate that there 
is potential, appetite and scope for more private-sector engagement. On this basis, it is 
recommended that the key to unlocking this potential lies with the state, as there are several policy 
implications that flow from these findings if the highlighted constraints are to be addressed. The 
study makes a number of key contributions to knowledge on market solutions to the low-income 
housing challenge in the area of theory, methodology, policy and empirical data.  
 
Keywords: low-income housing, market solutions, private-sector developers, Structure-Agency, 
constraints, enablers, strategies, cost minimisation, Bulawayo. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
Numerous researches centred on attracting the private sector into low-income housing 
development has been undertaken due to challenges faced by the public sector, viz., 
limited technical and financial resources, prohibition to engage in commercial 
activities, political pressure to rapidly increase the volume of housing and other such 
challenges (Abdul-Aziz & Kassim, 2011; Babatunde, Opawole, & Akinsiku, 2012; 
Loxley, 2013). Public-sector efforts around the world to be direct providers of low-
income housing have yielded dismal results, with very low output filtering down to 
the target market compared to the overall housing requirements of the urban population 
and serious time and cost overruns (Moss, 2003; Özdemir, 2011; Sivam & 
Karuppannan, 2002).  
 
The private sector, because of the profit motive, is deemed by most studies to possess 
a better skill-set, which enables it to be better able to complete housing development 
projects ahead of schedule due to different work values, tenacity in resolving 
challenges and advanced project risk management structures, which is good for low-
income housing delivery (Loxley, 2013). Indeed, there is empirical evidence that the 
majority of houses added to the market (not necessarily in the low-income housing 
space) are produced by the private sector (Bredenoord & Verkoren, 2010; Sivam & 
Karuppannan, 2002). Proponents for private market engagement in the low-income 
housing development also believe that it represents the optimal mechanism for 
economic development (Pattison, 2009) and brings about employment opportunities 
and spurs the local economy which eventually leads to trickle-down economic benefits 
(Campbell, 2011a; Fawaz, 2009; Nijman, 2008).  
 
However, low-income housing is a difficult sector that is not normally attractive to 
private investors. If private capital is to be mobilized for low-income housing 
development it is imperative that the investor considers sources of revenue inflow, an 
exit strategy for capital recovery and profitability to make the investment justifiable to 
the shareholders (Demirag, Khadaroo, Stapleton, & Stevenson, 2011; NBRI 
Researchers, 1987; Rust, 2007; Stein & Castillo, 2005). This exit strategy is hampered 
by a number of challenges that are present mainly due to the characteristics of the 
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target market - the low-income earners. The low-income bracket in which the target 
market falls automatically cripples their ability to afford high-value commodities such 
as housing (Lea, 2005; Loxley, 2013; Mosha, 2013; Moss, 2001; Sivam & 
Karuppannan, 2002). This necessitates the need for subsidies in various forms, and 
thus hinders the provision of low-income housing from being a sector that can easily 
benefit from private-sector development initiatives.  
 
Closely linked to the above point, involvement of multiple stakeholders in the low-
income housing sector whose objectives and interests are different also compounds 
risk and makes attracting private capital into this sector difficult (Babatunde et al., 
2012; Demirag et al., 2011). This is usually exacerbated by the fact that low-income 
housing is a politically sensitive issue that the state and other players can easily 
manipulate (Cowan & McDermont, 2008; Lea, 2005; Özdemir, 2011; Samaratunga & 
O'Hare, 2014). As a consequence of this political risk, most low-income housing 
projects suffer from policy unpredictability (Altmann, 2011) and are also inflexible in 
terms of housing design as state stakeholders sometimes unnecessarily insist on 
unreasonably high standards that are not backed by the payment capabilities of the 
low-income sector (Abdul-Aziz & Kassim, 2011; Mosha, 2013; W. Moyo, 2014; 
Rakodi & Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1990a)  
 
Most low-income earners are also employed in the informal sector, and as a result, not 
only are their incomes low but for most, the income is unstable or undocumented (Lea, 
2005; Moss, 2001). Thus, their ability to access mortgage facilities, which are 
necessary for home purchase, is inhibited. Adding on to this risk, most of the 
informally employed low-income earners have either no credit history at all or a poor 
credit history, which poses a high risk to the private investor (Lea, 2005; Loxley, 2013; 
Moss, 2001; Stein & Castillo, 2005). As a result, most private property developers 
shun this market, which makes low-income housing development a relatively thin 
market that is thus highly risky. These risks compound credit risk, liquidity risk, and 
cash flow risk (Binns, 2012; Kamete, 1997; Stein & Castillo, 2005). Dependence on 
private capital for low-income housing development which is provided by risk-averse 
shareholders would thus entail finding means and ways of pricing and packaging that 
credit risk in such a manner that the private sector can then determine if this group can 
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be profitably served, whilst maintaining affordability by the target sector ( Demirag et 
al., 2011; Gallimore, Williams, & Woodward, 1997; Lea, 2005; Moss, 2003). 
 
Adding on to this risk is the lack of collateral that can be used to mitigate the above-
mentioned risks. One can argue that real estate investments are the easiest to finance 
as the asset that is being financed can easily be used as collateral. However, with low-
income housing, this is often not the case as the land that in for low-income housing 
may not have a marketable title (Loxley, 2013; Mosha, 2013; NBRI Researchers, 
1987). The private sector has to deal with tenure options that are offered to the target 
group. Thus, the strength of the tenure option can affect perceived risk by the private 
sector, and research has shown that financial institutions are often wary about land 
with an uncertain title as collateral instead of the usual title deed (Kamete, 1997; 
Mosha, 2013).  
 
Due to the challenging conditions that are inherent in the low-income housing sector, 
as noted above, various forms of organizational structures have been pursued in a bid 
to tap into the capabilities of the private sector. The most common structure is the 
public-private-partnership (PPP) framework. However, in low-income countries, PPPs 
have recorded little success because in addition to the above cocktail of challenges, the 
private sector would have to operate within an economically challenging atmosphere, 
which is not conducive for large-scale projects (Centre for Affordable Housing 
Finance in Africa, 2012; Lea, 2005; Moss, 2003; Özdemir, 2011). The challenges 
listed above would thus at first glance pose significant constraints in the provision of 
low-income housing by the private sector, but research has shown that private 
development activity can develop in spite of adverse macro-economic conditions 
(Altmann, 2011; Bredenoord & Verkoren, 2010; Centre for Affordable Housing 
Finance in Africa, 2012). 
 
Zimbabwe has a long history of housing shortages dating back to the pre-independence 
era, which is invariably felt more amongst the low-income group (Chipungu & 
Adebayo, 2013; Chitekwe-Biti, 2009; Gumbo, 2015). As early as 1935, the country 
was already struggling with housing due to the ballooning urban populace coupled 
with an increase in urban poverty (Brown, 2001). As at 2002, the housing backlog was 
estimated to be at more than one million houses (Chirisa, Gaza, & Bandauko, 2014; 
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Chitekwe-Biti, 2009), and this figure has never gone down below the one million mark, 
with studies approximating the shortage at 1.25 million in the years 2010 to 2013 
(Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa [CAHF], 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013; 
Government of Zimbabwe [GoZ], 2013), 1.5 million in 2014 and 2015 (CAHF, 2014, 
2015) whilst Muchadenyika (2015a) and CAHF (2017) slotted it at 1.25 million in 
2015 and 2017 respectively. Official figures estimating the housing shortage, grossly 
understate the figures, as the government relies on housing waiting lists, which are 
ineffective as most people in need of housing are not registered on the waiting lists 
and the rate at which existing applicants renew their application is only 0.4 per cent 
annually (CAHF, 2013; Chitekwe-Biti, 2009). Official reports by the government and 
ZIMSTAT also rely on the 2012 census data, for example, poverty atlas 2015, 2016, 
with the inevitable result being understated figures of urban poverty. A worsening 
economic environment however generally results in an increase in urban poverty, and 
given that Zimbabwe has been facing economic problems for the last 20 years, urban 
poverty rates have been growing. Structural adjustment policies in Zimbabwe which 
were implemented in the period 1991-1995 had severe consequences for the urban 
poor, as removal of consumer subsidies, cuts in government expenditure, and opening 
the private sector to competition resulted in a decline in real wages (Brown, 2001) and 
worsened the economic challenges facing the country (Chirisa, 2014). Limited sources 
of capital, policy uncertainty, a high cost of doing business, high debt burden and cash 
shortages has resulted in the economy spiraling downward and contracting 
significantly resulting in job losses, eroded disposable incomes and an increase in 
poverty, which affects affordability of housing finance and housing itself (CAHF, 
2015, 2016) 
 
The plethora of challenges facing Zimbabwe has resulted in worsening living 
conditions for the urban low-income groups (Chipungu & Adebayo, 2013; Chirisa, 
2014) as a poorly performing economy led to high unemployment rates and a large 
proportion of the population which is employed in the informal sector (Brown, 2001; 
CAHF, 2015). The increase in urbanisation, poverty, unemployment and informal 
sector activity has created new and competing pressures on urban space in Zimbabwe 
(Brown, 2001; Chirisa, 2014) which require innovative solutions.  
 
Attempts by the government to ameliorate the housing problem have proved futile as 
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the backlog continues to soar (Gumbo, 2010). Between 1985 and 2000, the 
Government could only deliver less than 10% of the annual housing target (Chipungu 
& Adebayo, 2013). As at 2005, the relative housing supply to demand was at 0.2% 
(CAHF, 2010). Causes of the gap between planned and actual construction are linked 
to an economic recession, increasing building costs, lack of foreign investment (Potts 
& Mutambirwa, 1991) and inadequate investment by the public sector. Fiscal 
constraints on government expenditure as the principal cause is echoed in all studies 
which touch on the failure of most state-run housing projects and incapacitation of the 
local authorities (Brown, 2001; Chipungu & Adebayo, 2013; Chirisa, 2014; Chitekwe-
Biti, 2009; Davies & Dewar, 1989; Kamete, 1997), and is the reason why government 
has been encouraging alternative housing delivery processes mainly by the private 
sector. This is despite that the fiscal constraints faced by the government imply that 
there are no government guarantees that can be used to encourage financial institutions 
to lend to the low-income group. As at 1997, the guarantee fund, which had been set 
up by the government, had run dry due to reduced government allocations and has 
never been resuscitated since then (Kamete, 1997). Up to 1994, there was a state 
subsidy on mortgages set at 3%, in an effort to protect the low-income borrowers, but 
fiscal constraints also resulted in these not being long-lived.  
 
Barring the sporadic attempts at housing provision in the aftermath on the slum 
clearing project which left over 700 000 people homeless, egged on by a need to 
exonerate the government in the eyes of the international community, the government 
has retreated from direct provision of housing (AfDB, 2007; Chipungu & Adebayo, 
2013). Government is thus encouraging private sector participation in the low-income 
housing sector and has curtailed its role as a direct provider of housing to become an 
enabler and facilitator of private and informal housing process in line with the Global 
Shelter Strategy whose theme is the enabling approach. These calls are entrenched in 
all official government policy documents and strategy papers that acknowledge the 
housing backlog (GoZ, 2002, 2009, 2012, 2013). International finance was made 
available in Zimbabwe by the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the 1980s 
(Kamete, 1997). This attracted private capital into low-income housing production in 
the form of mortgage loans (Chipungu & Adebayo, 2013) but worsening fiscal 
constraints eroded the role that government could play. The reluctance by private 
 6 
 
enterprise, i.e., building societies, to put capital at risk in Zimbabwe is seen through 
very low lending proportions, with 1.55% in 2013, 1.73% in 2014 and 2.59% in 2015 
(CAHF, 2013, 2014, 2015) of total loans made in each fiscal year going towards the 
construction sector. This has been well understood by researchers as the private sector 
is driven by the profit motive (Gumbo, 2010; Kamete, 1997). This reluctance further 
worsens the plight of low-income earners, as the main challenge to housing the urban 
low-income earners is housing finance, which cuts across the whole housing 
development process from the acquisition of land to putting up of the superstructure. 
 
Other issues that add on to the challenge of housing the low-income group in 
Zimbabwe are that low-income housing schemes in Zimbabwe have focused on 
homeownership (Chipungu & Adebayo, 2013). The low-income housing rental market 
has never fully developed due to rent control policies, which drove away most property 
developers (Chirisa, 2014). This thrust, combined with the lack of either public or 
private mortgage finance makes it difficult for the low-income group to afford market 
produced housing solutions. The housing market is also characterised by high 
minimum building standards as entrenched in the Town country and model building 
bylaws (Chirisa, 2014). Critics of the existing model building bylaws state that they 
are very rigid, outdated, and inhibitive to the smooth implementation of infrastructure 
development works in local authority areas (Chirisa, 2014; Chitekwe-Biti, 2009; 
Davies & Dewar, 1989). Cost of building materials is high, there is a shortage of skilled 
labour, and contractors in the market, due to the perceived risk, charge more than 
regional averages (Chirisa, 2014). There is also a shortage of foreign currency which 
is exacerbating the economic crisis in the country (Chipungu & Adebayo, 2013; 
Chitekwe & Mitlin, 2001), and the government is failing to supply the critical 
ingredient to low-income housing programs - serviced land (Chazovachii, 2011; 
Chitekwe-Biti, 2009; Gumbo, 2015; Muchadenyika, 2015a).  
 
The empirical puzzle that motivated this research is that, despite the above challenges 
experienced in Zimbabwe, the low-income housing sector has been dominated by the 
private sector. As early as 1989 Davies and Dewar (1989) noted that the largest 
proportion of new low-income dwellings was being constructed by small private 
contractors, who are part of the market system. This trend has become more 
pronounced in the period from 2000 to 2017 as there has been a notable increase in 
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private sector low-income housing developments that have been launched that appear 
to be successful. A literature scope on research on the housing sector in Zimbabwe 
shows consensus on the need for private sector engagement. Government has been 
spearheading these calls and advocating for the involvement of the private sector on a 
larger scale as a solution to the low-income housing woes (Gumbo, 2010, 2015). If 
significant strides are to be made in denting this shortfall, studies show that there is 
need to come up with innovative ways of stimulating involvement of stakeholders in 
the production of low-cost housing (Chipungu & Adebayo, 2013; Gumbo, 2010; 
Kamete, 1998; W. Moyo, 2014) despite all the challenges that may be faced in serving 
the low-income target market. This research thus aims to examine private sector 
players that have ventured into the low-income housing arena, in a bid to learn their 
coping mechanisms and to learn how best they can be supported. 
 
1.2 Low-Income Housing Production: Preliminary Literature Review 
As has been detailed in the preceding section, it is indisputable that the low-income 
housing sector is a difficult market to serve. Studies have argued that it is impossible 
for the private sector to profitably go into low-income housing development and bring 
authentic social and economic development for the target market (Campbell, 2011a; 
Craig & Porter, 2006; Rolnik, 2013; Seisdedos, 2009). There have however been calls 
in other studies for research which targets how the private sector can be mobilized and 
encouraged in serving the lower end of the market, as a focused desire to incorporate 
the private sector can yield positive results (Abdul-Aziz & Kassim, 2011; Altmann, 
2011; Bredenoord & Verkoren, 2010; Lea, 2005; Miller, 2010). For there to be 
concrete strides towards the attainment of this feat, there is need to study all the players 
within the low-income housing production space and to understand the linkages and 
challenges and possible motivations that can encourage them to either start serving or 
continue serving this sector. This is imperative as the state, due to various constraints, 
has proven incapable of satisfying demand for housing in this market (Babatunde et 
al., 2012; Loxley, 2013) and it is known that there is a lot that can be benefited from 
sustainable private sector engagement (Lea, 2005).  
 
Previous research that has been undertaken in the provision of low-income housing 
has concentrated on just one or two aspects of low-income housing. For example, end-
user financing of low-income housing has been well-researched (Chinloy & 
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Megbolugbe, 2013; Ferguson, 2004; Frame, Wall, & White, 2013; Gooden, 2011; 
Gumbo, 2010; Hancock & Passmore, 2009; Jorgensen, 2008; Kajimo-Shakantu & 
Evans, 2006; Kamete, 1997; Lea, 2005; Moss, 2003). Although the availability of end-
user finance plays a huge role in the development of low-income housing, it does not 
detract from there being a need to understand the whole development process, right 
from the availability of development finance, the application of these funds, risk 
mitigation strategies and the exit strategy. A partial study of projects leads to 
incomplete information being known about individual projects resulting in project 
reviews going no further than general reviews that lack empirical support (Loxley, 
2013; Mooya & Cloete, 2007). As a result, most studies that concentrate on just one 
aspect suffer from this flaw. Studies that have looked at critical success factors of PPPs 
(Abdul-Aziz & Kassim, 2011; Babatunde et al., 2012) have called for the 
establishment of relevant laws, regulations and guidelines to guide PPPs especially in 
terms of agreement and action to be taken if these are not met. These rules are 
important especially in the low-income housing sector as they will provide clarity on 
the operating environment and attract more private players in low-income housing 
production (Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa, 2012). Just as much as 
studies are quick to call on the need for the law to act against errant developers, the 
state itself has been recognized as a potential barrier to private player engagement in 
the low-income housing space as it imposes constraints that may hinder private sector 
efficiencies. These include an insistence on unnecessarily high building standards 
(Mosha, 2013; W. Moyo, 2014; Rakodi & Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1990a) and stipulating 
how privately built low-income housing is allocated (Abdul-Aziz & Kassim, 2011; 
Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa, 2012).  
 
One interesting gap that is also evident in literature arises from the assumption that the 
state is typically in a position to provide subsidy support to both the low-income groups 
and the developers to bring down the cost of low-income housing (Bredenoord & 
Verkoren, 2010; Moss, 2001; Sivam & Karuppannan, 2002; Wang, Shao, Murie, & 
Cheng, 2012). If this assumption were to be relaxed, how would this impact on the 
production of low-income housing by the private sector? The desired objective by most 
neoliberal proponents is a situation whereby the state’s role is limited to creating an 
enabling environment through institutions aimed at supporting private financial 
activities (Abdul-Aziz & Kassim, 2011; Ibem, 2011; Mosha, 2013; Rolnik, 2013; 
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Sivam & Karuppannan, 2002). In South Africa, for example, even though the low-
income housing sector is currently characterized by heavy subsidy support, it is the 
state’s hope that by the end of 2020, this industry will have been weaned off the 
subsidy support and will be mature enough to stand on its feet (Centre for Affordable 
Housing Finance in Africa, 2012). The same can be said for most low-income 
countries that have huge fiscal constraints and large budgets that are not sustainable 
(Babatunde et al., 2012; Lea, 2005; Loxley, 2013) that would surely be willing to cut 
down on expenditure so as to concentrate on other areas of equal importance. So the 
question of how feasible it is to have private sector investment in the low-income 
housing under this situation of no subsidies is potentially a controversial topic that is 
likely to spark serious academic debate as private markets have been heavily criticized 
for excluding the urban poor (Bredenoord & Verkoren, 2010; Campbell, 2011a; Ibem, 
2011; Mosha, 2013; Moss, 2003; Rolnik, 2013).  
 
Closely linked to the above issue on subsidies, if these were to be unavailable, would 
the state still advance its insistence on homeownership as the ideal tenure style for the 
low-income group? Studies have pointed out that this a fallacy, as most low-income 
earners do not have the financial capability to own houses (Chinloy & Megbolugbe, 
2013; Mooya & Cloete, 2012), and the definition of what constitutes an adequate 
shelter should be adapted to the types of limited resources available for housing in 
each country (Stein & Castillo, 2005). Incorporating the poorest socio-economic 
groups is not ideal, as customary delivery processes when private capital is used are 
not suited for the group (Bredenoord & Verkoren, 2010; Rolnik, 2013). But, around 
the world, research shows that focus is still on delivering owner-occupied housing 
(Moss, 2001, 2003; W. Moyo, 2014; Özdemir, 2011) A complete study on a project 
that is financed by the private sector under these extreme conditions would thus yield 
results that might fill this literary gap. 
 
Critical success factors for the engagement of the private sector in the low-income 
housing space have been exhaustively studied in different contexts and scenarios 
(Babatunde et al., 2012; Moss, 2003; Stein, 2008), and a common thread that runs 
through all the research findings is that a stable economy is a critical input. However, 
in most low-income countries, the economies are far from stable, with most economies 
being characterized by a cocktail of economic and political challenges, which include 
 10 
 
unstable political climate, fraud, corruption, haphazard planning. Despite this, there 
are private activities that are mushrooming in response to the demand for housing in 
the low-income space. However, none of these studies looked closely at how the 
players in this particular segment have adjusted their strategies to take these challenges 
into account. 
 
All the above issues can be tackled through studying the structural environment and 
its impact on private-sector led low-income housing development. A study like that 
will yield empirical evidence on different mechanisms that can be used to channel 
private sector resources to the low-income housing sector (Stein & Castillo, 2005), 
how liberalization of low-income housing markets has affected investment and 
housing patterns of access and ownership (Wang et al., 2012) and risk pricing 
strategies (Demirag et al., 2011). Attempts to measure and expose these issues have 
notably been difficult as it involves the quantification of data that is frequently 
qualitative and context-specific in nature (Gallimore et al., 1997). 
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
The low-income housing sector in Zimbabwe is characterized by recipients with no 
stable incomes, lack of collateral, inadequate mechanisms for credit history checks, 
high housing standards and little or no long-term savings, and no government subsidies 
due to limited fiscal space (Mashoko, 2012; W. Moyo, 2014; Rakodi & Mutizwa-
Mangiza, 1990a). The period prior to 2009 was characterized by severe hyperinflation 
that contributed to a highly unstable local currency that was eventually abandoned in 
favour of the use of foreign currency as legal tender in 2009 [termed dollarization]. 
Post-2009, the dollarized environment has also brought in unique challenges such as a 
low to non-existent savings culture amongst Zimbabwean. Financial institutions thus 
find it difficult to give out long-term mortgage loans, which are a prerequisite if the 
low-income housing sector is to develop fully. In the period leading to 2015, the 
macroeconomic environment has taken its toll on industries with most companies 
scaling down operation or closing, leaving thousands of people unemployed. 
Unemployment levels have skyrocketed with more than 80% of the population 
believed to be either unemployed or involved in informal sector activities as a means 
of survival.  
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Against a background that is characterized by the challenging economic woes facing 
the country, many low-income housing developments have been launched that appear 
to be successful. Thousands of housing stands all targeted at the low-income sector 
have been developed and housing built as shown in Table 1-1.  
 
Table 1-1: Private developers active in Bulawayo 
Developer Area 
Number of 
Stands  
Year stands were 
allocated 
A Cowdray Park 532 1996 
B Cowdray Park 75 2004 
C Cowdray Park 274 2006 
C Cowdray park 126 2003 
D Cowdray park  983 Not available 
E Pumula South Phase 3 253 Not available 
F Phelandaba 185 2008 
G Mbundane 450 (estimate) Not available 
H Emthunzini Township 3500 planned Land bought in 2008 
Source: Compiled from various newspaper sources 
 
The empirical puzzle requiring explanation, therefore, is that, despite the adverse 
macro environment, there appears to be successful private-sector low-income housing 
developments in Zimbabwe. Working on the broad premise that these developments 
represent successful adaptation to the structural environment, the study has one main 
question and two sub-questions. The main question is what accounts for the success of 
private-sector low-income developments in Zimbabwe despite the environment not 
being conducive for it? The sub-questions are (1) How does the structural environment 
enable and/or constrain low-income developments in Zimbabwe by the private sector 
and (2) What strategies do developers adopt in response to the structural enablers 
and/or constraints in order to develop low-income housing in Zimbabwe? 
 
1.4 Aims and Objectives  
The overall aim of the study is to investigate the structural enablers, as well as the 
constraints, for low-income housing development in Zimbabwe, in order to determine 
how developers exploit the former and mitigate the latter, to achieve successful 
outcomes. To achieve this aim, the study has the following specific objectives: 
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• To assess the extent to which the specific housing schemes have been 
successful. 
•  To determine the structural enablers and constraints for low-income housing 
development in Zimbabwe. 
•  To determine the strategies that developers employ to exploit the structural 
enablers and to mitigate the constraints. 
• To assess to the extent to which the agency of the private sector in the 
development of low-income housing in the Zimbabwean context could be 
enhanced, and to make appropriate policy recommendations in this regard. 
 
1.5 Defining Low-Income Housing 
When loosely used, the term low-income housing generally means housing that is 
targeted at the urban poor, but the criteria used to identify the urban poor isn’t explicit 
and universal (Wratten, 1995). In analysing empirical usage of the term, this study 
notes that “low-income housing” is a common term in published scientific and policy-
making literature, but a literature survey showed that its definition is not universal. In 
some studies, low-income housing refers to informal settlements (African Centre for 
Cities, 2011), economic and comfortable Housing (Cao & Keivani, 2014), public 
housing (Claussen, 2015), subsidised housing (Eriksen, 2009) as an example. From 
the foregoing, it can be clearly seen that the meaning that is attached to the term has a 
profound effect on the issues that will be of concern in this study when analysing 
enablers and constraints to private sector provision of housing, a concern that requires 
the term to be defined upfront.  
 
It is acknowledged that the use of income only to define the ‘urban poor’ is misleading 
(Mitlin, 2004; Wratten, 1995). As an example of the complexity that arises from 
classifying housing using income, African Centre for Cities (2011) states that “not all 
of Africa’s poor live in informal settlements and slums, and conversely, not all those 
who live in informal settlements and slums are poor”. As an alternative to the use of 
income as a classifier, emphasis can be placed on the physical attributes of the property 
in question. Quality of housing and access to basic services is a clear dimension of 
urban poverty (African Centre for Cities, 2011) that can be used to differentiate 
between housing targeted at the higher income groups and that targeted at the low-
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income group. In Zimbabwe, there are three population density areas as per zoning 
laws, namely high-density, medium-density and low-density areas. In the same vein, 
there are clearly three levels of income groups that are catered for in the zoning of 
residential areas in Zimbabwe and these are high-income, middle-income and low-
income, as can be seen from a summary of the type of housing found in each zone 
shown in Table 1-2. 
 
Table 1-2: House typologies in Bulawayo 
Typical 
features 
High-
income/Low-
density housing 
Middle-income 
/Medium density 
housing 
Low-income/High-
density housing 
 
Type of housing 
single-family 
homes and 
duplexes 
semi-detached, the  
duplexes, and row 
houses in a compact 
neighbourhood 
Detached housing, 
Semi-detached 
houses, Cluster 
houses, terraced 
houses, 
Plot size 800m2-4000m2 500m2- 950m2. 190m2-490m2 
House designs 
3-5 bedrooms, 
2lounges, a dining 
room, pantry, 
study room, 
laundry room, 
sunroom, and 
playroom.  
 
3 bed-roomed, 
lounge, kitchen, a 
separate toilet and 
bathroom, and a 
dining room 
1, 2, 3, and 4 core 
housing depending on 
the design 
Other features 
fireplace, bar, 
fitted kitchen and 
scullery, fitted 
wardrobes, main 
ensuite and 
swimming pools 
Fitted wardrobes none 
Source: Adapted and updated from Magwaro-Ndiweni (2013) 
 
As can be seen, the type of housing that is built in each area depends on the target 
market, with the segregation of the “rich” from the “poor” being the norm as there are 
clearly low-income areas and suburbs for the rich (Brown, 2001; Magwaro-Ndiweni, 
2013). The plot sizes, together with the permissible designs and construction materials 
used results in the residential areas being distinct from one another in terms of price, 
with the lowest priced houses being in the high-density areas. This type of housing has 
the lowest permissible standards, and any formal low-income housing scheme thus 
cannot be situated anywhere else except the in high-density locations. From the small 
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area poverty prevalence statistics conducted in 2015 by ZimStat, all the 9 housing 
schemes identified in the problem statement are located in areas with the highest 
poverty prevalence rates in the city of Bulawayo. These areas are Rangemore where 
the poverty prevalence was at 79%, ward 13 at 43.8%, ward 28 at 41.9% and ward 27 
with 39.2% (ZimStat, 2015). In the context of Zimbabwe, and in the in the context of 
this study, the term low-income housing is thus defined as housing which is situated 
in the high-density areas, which adheres to formal planning regulations and design 
stipulations as enshrined in the Regional, Town and Country Planning Act (RTCPA) 
and Model Building Bylaws. 
 
1.6 Theoretical Framework 
There are a number of theories that have been proposed and used by studies in the field 
of property development - mainstream or neoclassical theory, institutions, Structure-
Agency theory and structure of building provisions (Ball, 1998; Drane, 2013). From 
these, the study identified the Structure-Agency model associated with Patsy Healy 
and developed in 1990 (Healey, 1992; Healey & Barrett, 1990) and derived from 
institutional economics as the best fit for a theoretical framework to navigate the 
research question being addressed in this study i.e. what accounts for the success of 
private-sector low-income developments in Zimbabwe despite the environment not 
being conducive for it. The Structure–Agency model focuses on processes through 
which the built environment is produced, and of main interest in this study is the 
processes of land and property development. In the model, structures are 
conceptualised as the material resources, institutional rules and organising ideas which 
agents acknowledge (Healey & Barrett, 1990) as they work towards achieving 
prespecified objectives, whilst agency, which is the capacity of individuals to act 
independently and to make their own free choices, is conceptualised in terms of roles, 
strategies and interests that culminate in the attainment of specific objectives. This 
model is ideal for this study as it can be used to develop an explicit relation between 
structure and the actions of developers, thus giving more attention to institutional 
dimensions on the production side (Guy & Henneberry, 2000).  
 
Developers are conceptualised in this model as bound to structural relations through 
resource flows, institutions (both formal and informal) and ideas/ideology and then the 
model analyses how each of these structural elements convey limitations and 
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possibilities that then frame individual agency. The theory posits the actions of 
developers as standing in a causal chain with clear structural variables and is sensitive 
to the context of developing countries whose structural environment is different from 
developed countries. The interrelation between structure and agency is not 
deterministic, but the interrelation may be observed through the way in which 
individuals and organisations define and implement their strategies in relation to the 
rules they acknowledge, the resources they draw upon and seek to accumulate, and the 
ideas and ideology they assert in determining and justifying their strategies (Healey & 
Barrett, 1990). The model strives to come up with an analytically useful development 
model that can be applied to all circumstances in which development projects are 
accomplished, that mitigates the shortcomings of equilibrium models based on 
economics paradigm that can only be applied in understanding the development 
process only in relatively stable conditions where active property markets exist. This 
model can thus be fruitfully used to fully explore the institutional environment i.e. 
political institutions, social institutions, economic institutions and legal institutions, 
and their effect on agency. The working hypothesis that market solutions to the low 
income-housing challenge can be successfully undertaken in an economy that has 
deep-rooted structural challenges can thus be tested through developing a conceptual 
framework from this theory. The successful development of low-income housing 
requires the employment of specific strategies that exploit specific resources and 
specific rules. The knowledge of the processes through which the built environment is 
produced and used, particularly the processes of land and property development, is 
thus critical to understanding urban development and the attempts at managing urban 
development processes (Healy, and Barrett 1990). By separating between structure and 
agency, the study will be able to fully explore how developers maximize utility under 
given constraints. This is of ultimate importance in the study of low-income housing 
by the private sector as the sector is fraught with challenges as was shown above.  
 
1.7 Research Design 
This study adopted a case study approach. To ensure relevant empirical data was 
collected, the criteria used in selecting projects was that each development project 
should have been commenced in the period under review i.e. from 2000-2015 and 
within that period, the developer should have managed to start, complete and deliver 
a significant number of low-income houses to the target market. The study noted that 
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the operating environment for private developers operating in different local authority 
areas is different, as each local authority in Zimbabwe is run differently. As such, 
relations between developers and local authorities differ as each local authority has its 
own unique budget, sets its own objectives, and has different approaches to solving 
the housing challenge. To work around this challenge, the study was limited to private-
sector housing developments in the city of Bulawayo, which is the second-largest city 
in Zimbabwe. Information on private sector activity in the low-income housing sector 
from 200 to 2015 was collected from the local authority and five housing schemes 
were selected from all private sector housing developments that have been undertaken 
in the city as detailed in chapter five.  
 
Data were collected through interviewing key stakeholders in the housing sector, and 
a survey of the housing schemes, which included 425 households within the schemes, 
was conducted. Systematic sampling was used to target the respondents in the survey, 
and the respondents were then stratified into two classes - owner-occupants and non-
owner occupants. Document analysis was also done to supplement the interviews and 
the survey. Planning legislation documents, housing policy documents and empirical 
research papers on the housing challenge in Zimbabwe were also analysed in a bid to 
identify the institutional framework that guides the development of low-income 
housing. Using a conceptual framework derived from the Structure-Agency model, 
qualitative analysis of the data was done from a critical realist perspective, and the 
findings are presented in chapter six.  
 
1.8 Academic Contribution to Knowledge 
In the literature reviewed, the study ascertained that although low-income housing 
development is a well-researched area, there is paucity in empirical studies focusing 
on strategies that developers employ in reaction to structural enablers and constraints 
embedded in adverse economic conditions. Findings from this study can thus help push 
theoretical boundaries that have been used to conceptualize low-income housing 
development using private sector funds. A contextual study like this one will also 
provide a canvas on which to test what happens when certain key assumptions that 
have been taken for granted in the provision of low-income housing like the 
availability of subsidies are relaxed. As such, this research will contribute towards 
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advancing the application of institutional analysis and will have significant policy 
implications in developing countries. 
 
Studying low-income housing developments in the Zimbabwean context might also 
give an insight into how the private sector can be employed on a larger scale despite 
the absence of key critical success factors identified by scholars. Lessons learnt from 
these initiatives will certainly be of use in conceptualizing how private sector 
initiatives in the low-income housing segment in the world can be structured.  
 
The fourth contribution will be the development of a conceptual framework that can 
be used to inform further work in the low-income housing field. From the literature 
review, the structure-agency theory has not been subjected to much theoretical 
challenge or empirical testing as there has been little substantive research on property 
development that acknowledges or extends the institutional model (Guy & 
Henneberry, 2000). The model remains in a state of incompletion (Drane, 2013) 
implying that there is a need for more empirical studies that apply this theory and 
improve it. Using the variables from the Structure-Agency theory, the study will refine 
the model, addressing the shortcoming that the model has been charged with, and 
develop a conceptual framework that will be applied in this study. Use of this 
conceptual framework will result in a more comparable body of knowledge that will 
help further interrogation of market solutions to the housing problem. 
 
1.9 Significance of the Study 
Governments of different social, economic and political makeup and composition 
across the world are seized with the dilemma of how to house their low–income 
groups. Continuous academic research is required to provide dynamic empirical 
insights and facilitate the development of possible solutions. Any such research will 
have practical value for decision-makers and inform policy development for the 
ultimate benefit of low-income earners hoping to own decent housing the world over, 
particularly in developing countries. Stimulating construction in the housing 
development sector can also create employment opportunities, improve local 
industries and have positive economic trickle-down effects in Zimbabwe, and other 
countries with a similar context. 
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1.10 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis has seven chapters. The second chapter will look at theories of low-income 
housing provision, which will culminate in the development of a conceptual 
framework that will be used in this study. Chapter 3 will be the general literature 
review that will probe the challenges of low-income housing development and 
interventions globally. Chapter 4 will provide the background and contextual literature 
on the operating environment in Zimbabwe with respect to low-income housing 
development by the private sector. Chapter 5 will present the research methodology, 
chapter six will present the empirical findings of the study and the discussion and 
lastly, chapter seven will conclude and give recommendations of the study. 
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2. THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The present interest for this chapter is theory, specifically how private-sector 
development of low-income housing in developing country contexts may 
appropriately be conceptualised. Theory is, of course, the basis upon which knowledge 
of a universal character may be advanced. Equally important, however, is that the 
conceptualisation allows the distillation of key causal variables, as well as their 
relationships, in terms of which the phenomenon of interest can be correctly and 
appropriately apprehended. This, in turn, aids a proper account of reasons for the 
successes (and failures) of the market in low-income housing provision, as well as 
directing attention to the relevant variables as levers for appropriate policy 
interventions variables. 
 
The chapter is arranged in the following manner. The next section critically reviews 
the contemporary debates on the importance of theory in housing research, which 
firmly establishes the relative importance of this chapter. Key theoretical perspectives 
in housing research are tackled in section 2.3. Being a well-studied subject, several 
alternative theories and/or disciplinary perspectives are potentially available. The 
focus in this chapter is, however, on those theories that could be broadly categorised 
as being rooted in the economics discipline – Marxist, neoclassical and institutional 
theories. This choice of perspective reflects the disciplinary interests of the author and 
the manner in which the problem has been conceived. Additionally, this perspective is 
useful in that the policy prescriptions of the multilateral agencies that are influential in 
the housing arena, such as the World Bank, tend to, in the main, be derived from 
economic theory. Section 2.4 zooms in on structurally inspired theories and models of 
the housing development process, which are all rooted in institutional analysis. These 
models are interrogated for applicability taking into account strengths and criticisms 
raised by other studies. Based on a synthesis, modification and adaptation of these 
structuralist theories, section 2.5 develops a conceptual framework for the analysis of 
private-sector development of low-income housing in developing country contexts. 
The penultimate section considers the methodological and policy implications of this 
framework, with concluding comments following in the final section. 
 
 20 
 
2.2 Importance of Theory in Housing Research 
Low-income housing production is a very challenging field that has attracted a lot of 
research in a bid to find solutions to the worldwide challenge of housing the low-
income groups (Abdul-Aziz & Kassim, 2011; Babatunde et al., 2012; Loxley, 2013). 
Theory should be the backbone of research which aims at informing policy on how to 
solve the low-income housing challenge as theories not only have the capability of 
explaining how and why things occur, but are also instrumental in predicting what is 
going to happen in the future given the present realities and can also provide 
intervention tools and predict outcomes of such interventions in the real world 
(Clapham, 2009, 2018). Good social research, it is argued, should attempt to theorise 
what it researches (Ruonavaara, 2018), and clarity and explicitness of paradigms and 
concepts is a basic requirement of research, but very few studies in the low-income 
housing field have used a theoretical framework to shape their studies (D. Moyo, 
2004), a concern which has also been noted even amongst property development 
studies in general (Drane, 2013). The paucity of theoretically informed research has 
led to a divergence in housing research between theoretical research not backed by 
empirical evidence and empirical work that is not guided by explicit theoretical work 
that was lamented on as early as 1987 by Arnott (1987), and this concern is still being 
echoed up to two decades later (Clapham, 2018; Van der Krabben & Lambooy, 1993). 
Without a theory to bind together all the empirical evidence that may be gathered on 
low-income housing, research in this area can end up being too descriptive, with 
limited ability to be applied in other contexts, which highlights the importance of an 
explicit theoretical position (Coase, 1998; Ganderton, 1994; Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 
2002). 
 
The complexity of housing implies that issues under research can be examined through 
the lens of different disciplines with different paradigms and concepts that might not 
be compatible (Clapham, 2018) resulting in differing results depending on the 
theoretical viewpoint that’s adopted (Van der Krabben & Lambooy, 1993). This 
further supports the need for studies to identify specifically the theoretical paradigm 
framing the research if there are to be significant strides towards a theory of housing. 
Given the relative importance of low-income housing in poverty alleviation, use of an 
appropriate theoretical framework is likely to shift the focus of academic research from 
“lower-level” concerns as was emphasized by Mbiba and Huchzermeyer (2002). 
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Examples of these lower-level concerns in low-income housing provision would be 
the implications of private-sector production of low-income housing, ideal critical 
success factors etc. (ibid.). What is needed instead is a critical engagement with 
economics at a theoretical level, backed by empirical evidence (Clapham, 2018), 
which will highlight especially supply-side economics of a product that is tailor-made 
to suit the target group, with emphasis being given to reducing actual barriers to entry, 
and using policy tools to encourage more involvement of the private players, which is 
where this study fits in. Also, key assumptions, differences, definitions of terms etc. 
amongst studies will be easily identified if studies adopt an explicit theoretical 
framework, which will make empirical studies around the world more comparable, and 
less limited to context (Coiacetto, 2000; Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002), allowing 
adaptability of such studies to different contexts such that policy implications can be 
gleaned accordingly or further additional research work can be undertaken. This is of 
ultimate importance in low-income housing research as there are significant variations 
in the economies, definitions of low incomes, levels of subsidy support and so on in 
countries, which will aid comparability and adaptation of research undertaken 
elsewhere for policy implementation in similar contexts. 
 
 The importance of theory in low-income housing research highlights the relative 
importance of this chapter to this research, as the theoretical framework will guide this 
study. From the theoretical framework, a conceptual framework will be developed, 
further positioning this study to significantly contribute towards academic debates and 
contributing to knowledge.  
 
2.3 Key Theoretical Perspectives in Housing Research 
Economics has been flagged as the most influential discipline in housing research 
(Clapham, 2009). The following sections will critically review each of these theories 
zooming in specifically on their applicability in low-income housing research. There 
are six main theoretical perspectives that were identified by Drane (2013) in a survey 
of property development models between 1950 and 2012 namely, Neoclassical, Neo 
Marxists, Political Economy, Institutional, Praxis and Sociological as shown in Table 
2-1. This summary is the most comprehensive compared to other works, but only three 
constellations of theories in housing research derived from economics can be identified 
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in most works, namely, Marxist theory, neoclassical theories, and structuralist theories 
(Van der Krabben & Lambooy, 1993).  
 
Table 2-1: Theoretical stance map for models of the development process -1954-2012 
Perspective 1950's 1960's 1970's 1980's 1990's 2000's 2010's 
    
Drewett 
1969 
Kaizer 
1970   
Adair 
1991    
Neoclassical   
Donnelly 
1964 
Markusen 
1978 Ball 1986 
Scott 
1996 
Bulan 
2009  
      
Massey 
1978         
NeoMarxist     
Massey 
1978 
Boddy 
1981      
        
Harvey D 
1985       
Political 
Economy 
Lichfield 
1956 
Craven 
1969 
Chapman 
1978 
McNamara 
1988 
Ball 
1998 
Guy 
2000,2 
Adam 
2012 
        
Ambrose 
1986 
Adams 
1994     
Institutional     
Barret 
1978 
Bryant 
1982 
Healy 
1990,1,2 Ball 2001 
Fanstein 
2001 
      
Bather 
1973 
McNamara 
1983 
Gore 
1991     
Praxis     
Drewett 
1973 
Goodchild 
1985 
Fisher 
1999 
Coaicetto 
2000,1,9  
            
Shiller 
2001   
Sociological 
Form 
1954       
Diaz 
1999 
Beauregard 
2005   
Source: Drane (2013) 
 
2.3.1 Marxist theories 
Marxism is a theory that sees society in terms of a class struggle between capitalists 
and the ‘working class’. This in practical terms is conceptualized as a conflict between 
those who own the means of production, who are rich, and workers, who are poor. The 
relations have traditionally been seen as exploitative, with the capitalists accumulating 
wealth at the expense of the poor workers. Marxist economists take the view that the 
market is, in essence, monopolistic, based on the possession of capital (Van der 
Period 
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Krabben & Lambooy, 1993), which implies that the perspective conceptualizes 
developers and landlords as the exploitative capitalist class, whose interests is at 
variance with the occupiers of low-income housing. Emphasis if this theoretical stance 
were to be adopted in this study would be on constraints that are imposed on the 
behaviour of individuals by the activities of powerful groups and institutions within 
the low-income housing space. Indeed, there are several studies in the low-income 
housing space which assert that involvement of the private sector in low-income 
housing provision is likely to result in the marginalization of the poor and more 
landlessness (Bredenoord & Verkoren, 2010; Campbell, 2011; Craig & Porter, 2006; 
Mosha, 2013; Rolnik, 2013; Seisdedos, 2009). Such studies, working from this 
Marxist perspective would prescribe that low-income housing problems could be 
solved only within socialism, which would eliminate class exploitation (Pugh, 2001). 
Failure to that, the alternative would be to advocate for social justice and call for more 
government involvement in ensuring equitable wealth redistribution. Since the subject 
of study is the low-income groups, those assumed to be without the adequate means 
of outrightly affording housing on the open market, the Marxist perspective would 
advocate for more subsidy as a form of wealth redistribution. The social implications 
will be a reluctance to adopt alternative housing solutions such as self-help schemes 
even by those groups in the society who have the means to get access to housing 
(Landman & Napier, 2010). But, the status quo in most developing countries is a fiscal 
policy embattled with budget deficits and, as a result, very little fiscal resources 
channelled towards housing which falls far short from adequately addressing housing 
demands exerted by this group (Chipungu & Adebayo, 2013; Lea, 2005; Loxley, 
2013). Failure also by the government to provide housing under the neo- Marxist 
perspectives can lead to civil unrest within the society, especially if the low-income 
groups take it as an infringement of their rights. 
 
It is obvious that a Marxist theory of housing is unlikely to lead to fruitful results in 
research whose objective is to understand the conditions under which market solutions 
to the low-income housing challenge may be successfully undertaken. The Marxist 
theory essentially vilifies private developers as they are assumed to impose and 
manipulate the low-income group to ensure the most profitable arrangement of land 
uses, resulting in ‘unpalatable social outcomes’ (Mbiba & Huchzermeyer, 2002; 
Westra Richard, 2010). This assumption is however problematic because it wouldn’t 
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make economic sense for private developers to actively want to serve this low-income 
housing market to the exclusion of other higher income groups who can afford higher 
rents. Adopting this theoretical stance would thus entail giving up the fight before even 
attempting to understand the ideologies and strategies of those private sector players 
who serve this market against calls by other studies for research which targets how the 
private sector can be mobilized and encouraged in serving the lower end of the market 
(Abdul-Aziz & Kassim, 2011; Altmann, 2011; Bredenoord & Verkoren, 2010; Lea, 
2005; Miller, 2010). Because of the underlying premise of Marxist theories, critical as 
they are of the role of ‘capital’, they are not considered appropriate for the analysis of 
the problem as conceived above. There cannot be a Marxist theory of housing that sees 
the development of low-income housing by the private sector in a positive light. 
Marxist theory is therefore rejected a priori. 
 
2.3.2 Neoclassical theories  
At the core of neoclassical economics is consumer or rational choice theory (Clapham, 
2009). Neoclassical consumer theory begins its analysis by considering individuals, 
who are rational and have full information but are income constrained as consumers 
only i.e. as purchasers of consumer goods. Applied to private-sector development of 
low-income housing in developing countries, the neoclassic consumer theory of 
housing demand has significant shortcomings. Perhaps the most fundamental of these 
is that it has nothing to say about the supply side of the housing market (Van der 
Krabben & Lambooy, 1993) and assumes a Pareto optimal outcome, where resources 
are put to their most productive uses, and the market arrives at an optimal output level 
(Kim & Mahoney, 2005). This is of course where the developers come in. It is 
therefore inappropriate for the theorizing the question of development of low-income 
housing. More broadly, the neoclassical consumer theory of housing demand suffers 
from the same problems associated with neoclassical economic theory. Neoclassic 
economic theory is based on the idea that the market can always correct itself and is 
frictionless (Buitelaar, 2004; Van der Krabben & Lambooy, 1993). A form of agent 
rationality is assumed which allows for unproblematic negotiation given certain 
structuring parameters which is ideal for perfect supply (Healey & Barrett, 1990) with 
the price mechanism efficiently and costlessly coordinating economic activities (Kim 
& Mahoney, 2005) in an environment where capital and asset markets are perfect and 
in equilibrium (Isaac, Allen, & Mary, 2009). A form of agent rationality is assumed 
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which allows for unproblematic negotiation given certain structuring parameters, 
which is ideal for perfect supply (Healey & Barrett, 1990). Housing is, however, a 
commodity that deﬁes all the standard assumptions of mainstream economic theory 
(Clapham, 2018; Ruonavaara, 2018). Despite substantial demand for low-income 
housing as evidenced by housing backlog figures, empirical evidence which points to 
market failure in the provision of low-income housing to the low-income segment is 
abundant (Craig & Porter, 2006; Özdemir, 2011; Rolnik, 2013; Sivam & 
Karuppannan, 2002). Supply in housing markets is acknowledged to be inelastic in 
that it is slow to respond to changes in demand resulting in markets being in 
disequilibrium for long periods of time and characterised by long term problems of 
housing shortage or unaffordability as the market itself cannot correct in the way that 
neoclassical theory would predict (Clapham, 2018; Van der Krabben & Lambooy, 
1993). 
 
Neoclassical theory is therefore inappropriate for the theorizing the question of 
development of low-income housing as asset markets that are in equilibrium imply 
that there is no excess supply or demand in the market, yet the housing challenge points 
to excess demand oversupply. The unresponsiveness of supply could be partly due to 
supply bottlenecks emanating from various structural issues in the market such as 
scarcity of resources such as land suitable for low-income housing, differing ideologies 
amongst market players and regulatory frictions. The capital markets in developing 
countries are also not well-developed (Winchester, 2005) to a level where players in 
the market are price takers, which is a key feature of perfect markets. Developing 
countries are also susceptible to macro-economic volatilities (Lea, 2005) which 
invariably negatively affects the development of financial systems. In short, capital 
and asset markets in developing countries are not perfect and are not in equilibrium 
for any theories derived from neoclassical economic theory to be productively utilized.  
 
One other key assumption of neoclassical theory is that agents act independently on 
the basis of full and relevant information, with the price mechanism instrumental in 
keeping the supply of goods and the demand for them in equilibrium. This assumption 
presupposes fully developed property markets, which challenges the applicability of 
neoclassical theory in a developing country context (Healey, 1992). Property 
developers in the low-income housing segment in developing country contexts have 
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to contend with a number of challenges emanating from imperfect information 
(Ganderton, 1994) in various areas such as the operating environment itself, risk 
management and enforceable property rights. Simulations of developer decision 
making from a neoclassical perspective have also been criticized as being isolated from 
real-life human manoeuvring and also do not explain why developers behave in certain 
ways (Coiacetto, 2001). As Healey (1992) aptly puts it, the neoclassical theory does 
not provide the means for examining the methods used by agents within the 
development process in the face of imperfect markets and imperfect information in 
circumstances without well-developed property markets, except to the extent that this 
is built into theoretical models based on rational expectations. 
 
There is thus need for research on supply-side variables (Follain & Jimenez, 1985), an 
area that is typically ignored by the neoclassical approach, which highlights that the 
metaphor of the invisible hand that ensures harmony of individual actions in a zero-
transaction-cost world does not hold in the low-income housing sector (Furubotn & 
Richter, 2005; Van der Krabben & Lambooy, 1993. Property developers also must 
depend on imperfect information (Ganderton, 1994) in the low-income housing 
segment, which rules out the application of any theoretical models that are derived 
from a neoclassical perspective. The existence of imperfect information in the low-
income housing market thus points to incomplete contracts (Furubotn & Richter, 2005) 
which further imply higher transaction costs. The importance of minimizing 
transaction costs cannot be overemphasized in low-income housing (Arnott, 1987), as 
cost minimization might make the final product more affordable to the target group. 
 
Despite several modifications to the basic neoclassical model, there is consensus that 
no single model of the housing market that is rooted in neoclassical theory can fully 
incorporate imperfect and non-competitive features of housing markets (Isaac et al., 
2009). Consequently, classical theories have shortcomings in explaining housing 
market phenomenon (Arnott, 1987; Drane, 2013), and neoclassical economic 
modelling is prone to having a narrow focus as the emphasis is on measurable 
outcomes. There is need to incorporate qualitative attributes such as preferences, 
perceptions, attitudes in housing studies as quantitative modelling on its own results 
in a large margin of unexplained variances (Isaac et al., 2009). Thus, there is a need 
for an alternative, more conceptually correct, non-competitive economic theory that 
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can capture social processes that underlie housing decisions (Arnott, 1987; Isaac et al., 
2009). Micro oriented theories are likely to provide more useful insight in 
understanding fully how housing markets in different circumstances function 
(Boelhouwer, 2011). Economic models are also charged with failure to consider 
different forms of demand, development agents being motivated for reasons other than 
profit; the difficulty of assessing the financial viability of schemes, including the 
distortions produced by appraisal methods and the complexity of the development 
process (Guy & Henneberry, 2000) citing Healey 2001. 
 
2.3.3 Institutional analysis 
Institutions are shared rules and typifications that define appropriate activities or 
relations (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Buitelaar, 2004). A broad definition of institutions 
according to Guy and Henneberry (2000) includes both formal organisations and 
socially habituated behaviour, i.e. individual habits which when shared and reinforced 
within a society or group assume the form of socio-economic institutions. These 
institutions are thus humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction and 
include rules, norms, habits, and hierarchies that shape agents’ actions and 
expectations. On the other hand, some studies have stressed that institutions do not 
have just the sense of constraint, but they are also enabling, as they furnish both the 
resources that make action possible and the rules that guide it (Healey & Barrett, 1990; 
Whittington Richard, 2015). 
 
 Real estate markets can easily be conceived in institutional terms as there is a broad 
institutional form that provides the context for market activity. Once institutions have 
been properly defined, it is possible to explore a number of research questions, 
examples of which according to Mooya (2009) include: 
 
• Given institutions such as the nature of property rights, what incentives do 
users, developers or investors face?  
• What constraints do property market organisations face, given the institutional 
environment?  
• Given the organisation structure of the property market, what transaction costs 
must participants in the market face? 
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Institutional analysis concentrates on how institutional arrangements influence 
decision-making and how they regulate and influence the functioning of markets. 
Institutional theory when applied in the study of property development holds that 
agents in the development process “are suspended in a web of values, norms, rules, 
beliefs and taken-for-granted assumptions” (Barley & Tolbert, 1997) which provide 
blueprints for acceptable procedures. It thus places individual actors in a development 
process in a ‘structure’ and focuses on the influence of institutions on decision making 
of people and organizations. Keogh & D'Arcy (1999, cited by (Mooya, 2009) 
illustrates a three-level hierarchy for the analysis of real estate markets, with the higher 
levels tending to structure the lower levels as shown in Box 2-1. 
 
Box 2-1: 3-level hierarchy for the analysis of real estate markets 
The institutional environment 
Political institutions 
Social institutions 
Economic institutions 
Legal institutions 
The real estate markets as an institution 
Market (and non-market) aspects 
Decentralized and informal 
Legal and conventional aspects of property rights 
Legal and conventional aspects of land use and development 
Property market organizations 
Users 
Investors 
Developers 
Property service providers 
Financial service providers 
Professional bodies 
Government and non-government agencies 
Source: Mooya (2009) 
 
 Structure, as was defined by Giddens, comprises the framework that human agents 
draw on and reproduce as they act (Yates, 1997) and is thus the framework within 
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which agents make their choices (Healey & Barrett, 1990). As such, given that 
structure both enables and constrains options that individuals and collectives are likely 
to exercise through setting bounds on rationality by restricting the perceived 
opportunities and alternatives (Barley & Tolbert, 1997). Even though institutional 
theory acknowledges that structures are socially constructed, insight into the processes 
by which structures emerge is provided by structuration theory. Given the 
shortcomings of neoclassical and Marxist theories, consensus amongst property 
development studies exists in support of some form of institutional analysis (Guy & 
Henneberry, 2000). When contrasted with the neoclassical theory, structuralist 
theories enable scrutiny of the development process, paying particular attention to 
enablers and constraints as presented by the environment, and how these, in turn, 
influence the choices and behaviour of agents. 
 
One of Anthony Giddens quotes is “Men make history, but not in circumstances of 
their own choosing” (Yates, 1997). As such, even though the operating environment 
in developing countries may be far from ideal for market-based low-income housing 
solution, developers may have found a way of navigating the structural environment, 
mitigating constraints and exploiting enablers, as “humans are knowledgeable agents 
operating in specific contexts, not just pawns of forces - whether economic or social - 
larger than they are” (ibid). Thus, institutional analysis focusses on how the behaviour 
of agents is influenced by and or constrained by structure, and how those are in turn 
affected by this behaviour. This view has been echoed by different studies “However, 
human agents are creative, experiential beings and their contexts of action are 
constantly shifting. For this reason, extensive research programmes, commonly 
adopted in the empiricist/positivist research tradition often fail to untangle the dynamic 
and contextual relational links between social action and economic structures” (Guy 
& Henneberry, 2000) which further advocates for institutional theory as a more 
appropriate theory for this study. 
 
For developing countries, which are characterised by macro-economic and political 
instability, weak and/or cloudy property rights, absent credit records and inefficient 
property markets, there is a need for a theory that is flexible enough to enable research 
into a phenomenon without being weighed down by assumptions that cannot transcend 
contextual issues. Given that problems around housing indicators also abound due to 
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missing or incomplete data, institutional theory may still be useful as it can still be 
applied at project level, with an emphasis on qualitative data instead of quantitative 
data. The terminology provided by theories that recognised institutions as part of a 
structure and the impact of agency enables the navigation of issues that cannot be 
quantitatively analysed, such as ideology, culture and strategies in various contexts. 
Such theories, according to Lawson (2009) can be termed “structurally inspired 
theories”. These theories embrace institutions as part of a structure and therefore are 
firmly rooted in institutional analysis.  
 
Given the aforesaid discussion, three points stand out that make structural theories 
superior to theories that flow from neoclassical economies when researching on market 
solutions to the low-income housing in developing countries: their approach shifts 
analytical focus from market outcomes to market processes, provides a framework and 
terminology for the analysis of individual projects and conceptual frameworks 
developed from institutional theories can be sensitive to the context of developing 
countries. 
 
2.4 Structurally Inspired Models of the Development Process 
 There are three main theories that can be applied to study housing development 
processes whose theoretical foundations are rooted in institutional analysis – the 
structuration theory, the Structure-Agency model and Structures of Housing Provision. 
Differences between these theories revolve around debates on the relative power of 
structure over individual agency, the level of consciousness held by agents and the 
endurance of structures over time and space. 
 
2.4.1 Structuration theory 
 Structuration theory, associated with the works of Anthony Giddens 
(1976,1979,1984), just like institutional theory posits that structures shape human 
actions, and also goes a step further to explicitly focus on the dynamics by which 
structures are reproduced and altered by agents (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Yates, 1997), 
a relationship that is termed “the duality of structure”. The relationship between 
institutional analysis and structuration was summarised by Barley and Tolbert (1997) 
as follows: 
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“Structuration theory and institutional theory provide complementary insights. Both 
share the premise that action is largely organized by institutions…. Both acknowledge 
that institutions are created, maintained and changed through action. Structuration 
theory, however, explicitly focuses on the dynamics by which institutions are 
reproduced and altered, an issue that has been largely neglected by institutional 
theorists. Nevertheless, as it is currently formulated, structuration theory provides 
little guidance on how to investigate the way in which everyday action revises or 
reproduces an institution.”  
 
Over time, competing and conflicting theories, models and conceptual frameworks 
with theoretical foundations based both on institutional analysis and also leaning 
heavily on structuration theory have emerged, and differences between these have 
mainly been on the relative power of structure over actions of agents, the level of 
consciousness held by agents and the malleability of structures over time and space 
(Lawson, 2009). The following section focuses on what Drane (2013) lists as the most 
compelling property development models which held traction - Healey’s Structure-
Agency model (Healey 1992) and Michael Balls’ model based on Structures of 
Provision whose theoretical foundations are institutional and structuration theory.  
 
2.4.2 Structure-Agency model (Healey and Barrett 1990; Healey, 1991, 1992)  
The Structure–Agency model focuses on processes through which the built 
environment is produced and used and in particular the processes of land and property 
development (Healey, 1992; Healey & Barrett, 1990). The model draws extensively 
on the work of Anthony Giddens (structuration theory), who argues for a relational 
approach between structure and the actions of agents as is advocated for under 
structuration theory. In coming up with the model, Healy noted that Institutional 
analysis did not theorise the relations between individual actors and behaviours and 
the wider context and strives to come up with an analytically useful development 
model that can be applied to all circumstances in which development projects are 
accomplished. This mitigates the shortcomings of equilibrium models based on 
mainstream economics paradigm, which can only be applied in understanding the 
development process only in relatively stable conditions where active property 
markets exist. The model also gives more attention to institutional dimensions on the 
production side (Guy & Henneberry, 2000). 
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The model explicitly separates structure from the actions of agents and develops an 
explicit relation between structure and the actions of the agents. Examples of agents in 
land and property development include landowners, investors, developers, and 
consultants, public agencies, planning officers, Non-Government Organisations 
(NGOs), Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs) politicians and community groups. In the 
model, agency is conceptualized in terms of three variables with which to analyse the 
behaviour of actors: Roles, strategies and interests. Possible roles in the real estate 
development process that can be undertaken by the public sector and/or private sector 
and were identified in Healy’s later work as summarised in Box 2-2. 
 
Box 2-2: Public sector and private sector roles in development 
 
Strategic planning 
Land assembly 
Land supply 
Land development  
Infrastructure construction 
Development finance 
Property investment  
Infrastructure provision 
Source: Healey (1994) 
 
Roles in production can also be grouped by using elements of a production process 
(Healey, 1992) 
1. Rights in land and buildings: a) controller of ownership/rights; b) controller of 
use/development 
2. Labour: a) physical production labour (land clearance firm, building materials 
producer, building construction firm, infrastructure supplier); b) organizational 
labour (development co-ordinators (i.e. the developer), expert adviser, sales 
agent 
3. Capital: a) family savings and personal wealth; b) production capital; c) 
commercial capital d) finance capital; e) public subsidy (i.e. from taxation 
revenues and f) plant and machinery  
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A look at the second classification shows that the roles are being classified based on 
factors of production vis. land, labour and capital. Applied in this study, the role that 
a developer plays in the development process can be conceived as equivalent to what 
the developer is contributing towards the development of low-income housing. Once 
roles have been classified, indications of the kinds of interest particular agents 
involved in production may have in the development process can be gleaned as agents 
actively constitute their interests as they perform and develop their roles in practice 
(Healey, 1992). However, Healy cautions that just by looking at the roles, one cannot 
just read off the interests that the agent has in the development as a specific agent may 
have more than one role that may conflict. 
 
Structures are conceptualised as the material resources, institutional rules and 
organising ideas which agents acknowledge (Healey & Barrett, 1990) as they work 
towards achieving their prespecified objectives. This definition is three dimensional as 
it conceives agents as bound to structural relations through resource flows, institutions- 
both formal and informal which provide rules and ideas/ideology and then analyses 
how each of these structural elements convey limitations and possibilities that then 
frame individual agency. The economic environment thus affects the development 
process through resource flows, whilst political organisation and cultural values are 
reflected in rules and ideas (Healey & Barrett, 1990). Ideology, in the model, is defined 
as “ideas and values people hold about what they should build, what they would like 
to occupy and what kind of environment they seek” (ibid.) This model can thus be 
fruitfully used to fully explore the institutional environment i.e. political institutions, 
social institutions, economic institutions and legal institutions, and their effect on 
agency. A four-level framework is proposed. First, a mapping exercise with the 
purpose of describing what happens in the development process. Secondly, a relational 
analysis is made: identifying who does what and to whom. Thirdly, the strategies and 
interests of significant actors are analysed and related to the structural resources, rules 
and ideas. The fourth level takes the approach beyond empirical sifting by connecting 
it to underlying social theories. With respect to the processes responsible for property 
development.  
 
Applied in this study, development would be defined as the transformation of land and 
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buildings from one state to another, through the effort of agents with interests and 
purposes in acquiring and using resources, operating rules and applying certain 
ideologies to achieve a predefined objective – housing targeted at the low-income 
group. The Structure-Agency model posits the actions of developers as standing in a 
causal chain with clear structural variables. The model is thus sensitive to the context 
of developing countries whose structural environment is different from developed 
countries. The interrelation between structure and agency, is not deterministic, but the 
interrelation may be observed through the way in which agencies, individuals and 
organisations define and implement their strategies in relation to the rules they 
acknowledge, the resources they draw upon and seek to accumulate, and the ideas and 
ideologies they assert in determining and justifying their strategies (Healey & Barrett, 
1990) 
 
The working hypotheses that private-sector low income-housing development can be 
successfully undertaken in an economy that has deep-rooted structural challenges can 
thus be tested through developing a conceptual framework from this theory. Successful 
development of low-income housing requires the employment of specific strategies 
that exploit specific resources and specific rules. This hypothesis requires a qualitative 
case study approach to examine policy levers, which are the structural variables, 
rules/regulation of property development and resources available to developers. The 
knowledge of the processes through which the built environment is produced and used, 
and in particular the processes of land and property development, is thus critical to our 
understanding of urban development and the attempts at managing urban development 
processes (Healy, and Barrett 1990). By separating between structure and agency, the 
study will be able to fully explore how agents explore enablers and mitigate constraints 
embedded in the operating environment. This is of ultimate importance as the low-
income housing sector is fraught with challenges as was shown above. In addition, 
separating structure and agency will enable the study to explore influential variables 
on agency, which can then be used as pivotal points in policymaking. 
 
1.1.1.1 Criticism of structure agency  
 According to Ball (1998), this particular institutional model has been applied in the 
UK by Healey et al. (1992) and in the Netherlands (van der Krabben, 1996; van der 
Krabben and Lambooy, 1993; van der Krabben and Boekma, 1994). From these 
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studies, the model seemed to be most successful in locally-based studies (Ball, 1998). 
This observation resonates well with the concern raised by Hooper (1992) as cited by 
Guy and Henneberry (2000) and (Ball, 1998) that the claims of the model – 
“construction of a grand theory which transcends context whilst acknowledging local 
specificity” gives rise to ambiguity. The argument is that universality is at odds with 
the historical groundedness of institutions. In the example where Healy uses the 
Structure-Agency (SA) model to study the transformation of Hebburn riverside in 
Tyneside, UK, links between the specific development experience of the locality and 
its position in the wider political economy. However, the study is critiqued on this 
point as it evidently does not present any evidence that shows it explored these 
interactions in any depth (Guy & Henneberry, 2000). As such, “the analysis fails to 
offer any deep insight into the mechanisms of market capitalism, or to identify in any 
detail how economic processes frame local development practice… [making it] 
difficult to consider the ways in which locally contingent factors interact with wider 
forces to produce specific material outcomes (Guy & Henneberry, 2000).  
 
In developing the model, Healey is charged with not pay attention to defining what 
“structure” and “agency” is. From the model, agents seem to be key people working 
in institutions, in which case institutions become wrongly personified as people, as 
seen through the practical focus of agency being the major players within each 
institution and the strategies they have towards specific property projects (Ball, 1998). 
This conceptualisation leads to two problems, the first being that the strategy of the 
identified key agent in an institution must be the institutional strategy as well, which 
might not always be the case. The second problem identified by (Ball, 1998) is the 
focus on strategy. Outcomes may be attributed to strategies, which, in reality, may be 
the product of external economic or other forces. Rules to identify causality and to 
explain change are not well explained, with the resulting effect being the difficulty to 
move beyond the self-interested justifications given by identified agents. Guy and 
Henneberry (2000) phrased this same concern as that the model tends to downplay any 
analysis of processes of economic structuring, in favour of a predominantly actor-
oriented perspective. Agencies have to have some exogenous determinants of their 
existence to justify their separation from the structure, otherwise explanation of them 
merely collapses back into structural issues. 
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Van der Krabben and Lambooy (1993) critiques the Structure-Agency model on two 
points- says the model is not explicitly linked to location, with the resulting effect 
being that locational differences in property development cannot be satisfactorily 
explained. The argument is that the existing urban spatial structure also acts as either 
a stimulus or constraint to property development. To resolve this, a fifth element to the 
Structure-Agency model is proposed – locational characteristics- including the quality 
of the location. The second argument is that institutional rules – those governing 
ownership and control over resources are seen as a static element to the model of the 
development process, which is too limited a notion of the institutional context. A more 
dynamic conception of the institutional context is advocated for, which will capture 
changes in the composition of institutions and organisations involved in the 
development process. Institutional change can interfere with property development 
and spatial restructuring at three different levels of change- innovations and the 
introduction of new technologies in the production process, levels of internal and 
external transaction costs that can result in vertical integration and disintegrations 
changing the organisation of firms and markets. 
 
That said, the Structure-Agency model has not been subjected to much theoretical 
challenge or empirical testing as there has been little substantive research on property 
development that acknowledges or extends the institutional model (Guy & 
Henneberry, 2000). The model remains in a state of incompletion (Drane, 2013) 
implying that there is a need for more empirical studies that apply this theory and 
improve it.  
 
2.4.3 Structures of Housing Provision (SoHP) – Michael Ball, 1998  
The Structures of Housing Provision (SoHP) theory provides a conceptual device for 
how to examine institutions and their role, and how these institutions then affect the 
development process. A structure of building provision refers to the contemporary 
network of relationships associated with the provision of particular types of building 
at specific points in time (Ball, 1998). These relations are an historically given process 
of providing and reproducing the physical entity under study and bring the spotlight 
on the social agents involved in production, allocation, consumption and reproduction, 
which are all processes that are essential to the process of provision and the relations 
which exist between them in time and space (Lawson, 2009). Once the network of 
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interrelationships is recognised, constraints and influences on individual agency 
behaviour can then be mapped (Ball, 2003). When applied to the research on housing, 
an institutional structure of housing provision thus specifies the organisations 
associated with a way of creating housing and the rules and constraints influencing 
behavioural relations between them. The most fruitful approach for examining house-
building institutional structures would be to distinguish between land developers and 
actual housing building, as they require particular types of management, finance, 
specialised equipment and specific range of construction-related labour competencies 
(Ball, 2003). 
 
This provision thesis is potentially useful for this study as it is contextually sensitive - 
it recognises that structures of housing provisions differ depending on the context. It 
thus can easily be used to analyse different submarkets within the housing market to 
interrogate how delivery systems differ in each market. It can also be employed to 
analyse/describe specific projects instead of taking a wide sectorial view. Given that 
the structures of housing provision are “empirical constructs which cannot be 
theoretically deduced”, this model calls for an empiricist approach, which is useful in 
analysing and discovering unique ways of low-income housing provision. Although 
SoHP is acknowledged in literature it has had little empirical application, implying 
that there is scope for contribution to knowledge if it is applied in this study. The model 
has remained undeveloped in any detail, barring David Adam’s use of its concepts in 
his article on the speed of housing supply (Drane, 2013) 
 
1.1.1.2 Critique of the SoHP 
The major critiques against this model stem from it being incomplete as a theory of 
housing provision. The SoHP thesis was criticized by Kemeny for not being able to 
produce a coherent theory of housing provision but rather just putting the focus on the 
production aspect of housing that the thesis proponents thought had been neglected by 
the established consumption- and policy-centred approaches (Ruonavaara, 2018). The 
housing provision thesis is charged with being not a good candidate for a theory of 
housing because it has nothing to say about the micro-level of housing, which implies 
that it can only be applied on the most general level of analysis. A researcher can 
always start from mapping the structure of social relations of housing provision, but 
after that, the researcher still has the task to theorize the structure as she or he wishes 
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(ibid.). The author did not even make such a claim but states that structures of provision 
are just conceptual device – a methodological theory about how to examine institutions 
and their roles in the development process and cannot be used to offer an explanation 
(Ball, 1998). This could partly be because the SoHP does not distinguish between 
‘structure’ and ‘agency’ (Ball, 1998), making it difficult to explain developer 
behaviour in terms of the structural context that they operate. Instead, the theory 
concentrates on mapping out the structures of housing provision through concentrating 
on identifying the system of housing provision, i.e., the networks that have been 
identified and mapped to the housing provision at a particular point in time. It, 
however, lacks the explanatory power to explain why the network is as it is, as it does 
not specifically link variables in a causal chain. Ball himself cautioned that: 
 
“After the mapping, specific theories are still needed, none the less, to understand what 
institutional arrangements are important and why they exist” (Ball, 2003).  
 
Although the SoHP acknowledges that networks are influenced and /or constrained by 
rules, it lacks the explanatory power to explain how agents then react to these 
constraints. The theory can only be used on the most general level of analysis through 
mapping all the elements of the housing provision chain: promotion, ﬁnance, 
construction, distribution, consumption, management, as well as the social relations 
inherent to these elements, but theoretical explanations and reflections have to be 
drawn from other theories (Ruonavaara, 2018). In studying the impact of structural 
constraints on housing, studies applying the SOHP only would have to deduce from a 
longitudinal study how the constraints have resulted in a change in networks, making 
the model less useful in cross-sectional studies, which are carried out more frequently. 
This in a way assumes that all the reactions to constraints are translated into changes 
in networks. However, this is not always the case as cultural norms can make a 
structure of provision rigid such that it might not fully reflect the agents’ reaction to 
certain institutional constraints. Since Ball’s Structures of Housing Provision does not 
separate between structure and agency and the author states that there may be no 
contemporary rationale for the existence of a particular structure (Ball, 1998), this 
perspective does not equip researchers with much to go on in low-income housing 
research that is targeted on finding ways of attracting private sector developers into 
the sector, which will result in researchers having to resort to other theories in order to 
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answer some research questions that they may have and how developers deal with 
information asymmetry and other similar challenges.  
 
2.5 Conceptual Framework 
A review of literature showed that concepts from the Structure-Agency model and 
Structuration theory will be useful in coming up with a conceptual model to help 
understanding the development process, and was adopted as the main theoretical 
framework from which the conceptual framework which can help unpack the 
challenges and enablers faced by developers and more importantly, the strategies that 
they employ in reaction to these, was derived.  
 
The development process in this study refers to the act of transforming urban land into 
both low-income housing and sites for low-income housing. Low-income housing in 
Zimbabwe is predominantly located in high-density areas as gazetted by local 
authorities and is guided by The Housing Standards Act and related Model Building 
Bylaws, as well as the Minimum Building and Planning Standards that define the 
standards for shelter and structure (GoZ, 2002). Accordingly, these sites and structures 
that are termed “low income” can only be in certain areas in line with a local 
authority’s master plan, have prescribed minimum and maximum plot sizes, and 
beneficiaries of these sites and houses are vetted by the local authority and should be 
first time homeowners in the high-density areas. When undertaken by private 
developers, this development process is understood as occurring through market 
mechanisms, in which individuals and firms, not the State, are the main actors and 
profit-making is the basic motivation (Yeh & Wu, 1996). In the Structure-Agency 
model, the development process takes place through the effort of agents who strive to 
convert factors of production to produce a predetermined outcome (Buitelaar, 2004; 
Healey, 1992; Healey & Barrett, 1990), which in this study, is low-income housing. 
As such, the individuals and firms who engage in this development process are 
identified as the “agents” in the Structure-Agency model. The focus of this study is on 
“private sector low-income housing developers”. Therefore, any organisation that falls 
under this description is identified as an agent and all other organisations that interact 
with the agent are classified under institutions.  
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2.5.1 Defining structure  
In this conceptual framework, structure refers to the interrelation of political, social, 
economic and legal institutions that make it possible for development activity to take 
place in a systemic form. These institutions include the firms and public bodies 
associated with property development (Van der Krabben & Lambooy, 1993) and they 
determine “the rules of the game” (Buitelaar, 2004) which govern the way material 
resources are used (Healey, 1992) and contain prescriptions that both forbid and permit 
action and/or outcome (Furubotn & Richter, 2005). Implicit in this definition is that 
structure guides the developers’ actions through formal and informal rules that guide 
the development process as stipulated by the institutional environment via the various 
organizations that interact with the agent. Structure, as defined here, does not have the 
sense of constraint only, but it is also conceived as enabling as it furnishes both the 
resources that make development possible and the rules that guide the development 
(Healey, 1992; Whittington Richard, 2015). This definition of structure regresses back 
to Giddens structuration theory where he describes structure as a set of rules and 
resources that he refers to as modalities that provide the critical link between the action 
realm and the institutional realm (Mukunda, 2012). Healey (1992) also refers to the 
conceptualization of tension in a social organization being analyzed by looking at 
modes of accumulation and modes of regulation. The Structure-Agency model added 
a third variable, ideas, whose inclusion is meant to acknowledge the importance of 
ideology in structuring the consciousness of actors. For this research, only one 
homogenous group of developers is under study- private sector developers; and this 
group is assumed to have the same ideology, which makes the classification of 
structure using the Structure-Agency model superfluous. The developers, however, 
interact with various organisations as they undertake the production process- and these 
various organisations might have different ideologies, e.g. the central government, the 
local government, financiers etc. and these different ideologies will be reflected either 
in the resources that are available to the developers or in the institutional framework 
that guides development. The ideology of these various organisations will thus be 
viewed as exogenic in the conceptual framework and will only be discussed in the 
extent to which the ideological orientation of the various organisations affects the 
institutional environment and the resources available for private sector low-income 
housing developers.  
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According to the Structure-Agency model, the applicable rules that govern low-
income housing development can be siphoned through using the first two levels of the 
basic empirical account prescribed by the structure-agency model:  
1. A mapping exercise to describe the development process, focusing on events 
in the production process of a development project 
2. Analysis of the agents involved in the production process, identifying their 
roles in the development process and the power relations that evolve around 
them.  
 
 In defining structure, this study contends that the starting point should be recognizing 
that approaches to solving the housing challenge for the low-income group are heavily 
dependent on the state’s ideology. Since low-income housing has traditionally been 
under the ambit of the state, involvement of the private sector implies a shift in 
ideological orientation towards market solutions to the housing challenge 
(neoliberalism), with the level of government support that is given to the private sector 
developers being the backbone of the contextual realities facing developers operating 
in different countries/contexts. As such, the role played by the state has a structuring 
effect on the agency of private sector developers, as it has a significant impact on the 
institutional environment and resources that the developers can access via the extent 
of state intervention in low-income housing, which affects market formation, policies 
guiding low-income housing and subsidy support. For example, if a state adopts a 
neoliberal ideology key features that will be exhibited in that operating context would 
include: the extension of market relationships and reduction in state intervention, 
welfare state roll-back, and a renewed focus on individuals’ responsibility to maximise 
their freedoms and opportunities within competitive markets whilst the state plays a 
supporting role through creating a conducive environment for private sector 
participation (Forrest & Hirayama, 2015; Moyo, 2004; Stonehouse, Threlkeld, & 
Farmer, 2015). From theory, private sector developers operating in that context are 
likely to have a different set of constraints and enablers given the institutional 
environment and the resources they have access to, compared to private sector 
developers who are operating in an environment where the state’s ideology is more 
towards communism or socialism. The argument put forward in this study is that the 
contextual reality that is faced by the developers hinges on the role that is being played 
by the state in the low-income housing space as seen through the policies that are 
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applied towards solving the housing challenge, the resources for housing that the state 
actually channels towards the low-income group and support that is given to the private 
sector to encourage participation in the low-income housing space. An analysis of 
these factors shows that the role played by the state as guided by the ideological 
orientation of the state in its approach to solving the low-income housing challenge 
has a significant impact on the institutional environment and resources available to the 
developers.  
 
This study thus proposes to amend the basic empirical account that is put forward by 
the Structure-Agency theory as follows: 
• Step 1 - Examine the role of the State in low-income housing 
• Step 2 - A mapping exercise to describe the development process, identifying 
the role of agents in the development process 
• Step 3 - Identify and examine the various institutions and their respective roles 
that agents in step 2 interact with in carrying out development roles 
• Step 4 - Define the structure in which low-income housing development takes 
place 
• Step 5 - Identify strategies that are used by the agent given the structure define 
above. 
 
Step 1 will provide the background necessary for the study to appreciate the policies 
and the formal rules that guide development, which might also provide insight on how 
the private sector got to be involved in low-income housing in the first place. This first 
step will also help identify possibilities of involving the private sector given the role 
of the government as is. The state is drawn into this analysis as a mediator and 
facilitator for private sector participation in low-income housing, through planning 
regulations, subsidy or direct development activity and through influencing the 
capacity of a locality to supply land (Abdul-Aziz & Kassim, 2011; Healey, 1994; 
Sivam & Karuppannan, 2002). Once the role of the state is understood as seen through 
a detailed narration of the state’s activities in the low-income housing sector, the effect 
of the state’s role on the structure of the low-income housing market can then be 
gleaned. For example, in Zimbabwe, the supply of serviced land for low-income 
housing has always been considered as a public sector responsibility since 
independence in 1980 (Brown, 2001; Chipungu & Adebayo, 2013) and this role was 
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firmly entrenched in legislation governing urban development (Chitekwe-Biti, 2009). 
The ability of the private sector to penetrate this segment is thus largely hinged on a 
change in state ideology resulting in a change in the role of the government in low-
income housing  
 
The second step and third step are very similar to the two basic steps that are suggested 
by the Structure-Agency model as the basis of an empirical account of the development 
process, which are: Level 1 - a mapping exercise to describe the development process 
in operation, focusing on events in the production process, and level 2 -analysis of the 
agencies involved in the process, identifying the roles in production, the power 
relations between, and their interests. Instead of concentrating on key identified agents 
that the developers have to interact with, which is what the Structure-Agency model is 
critiqued for (Ball, 1998), focus in this conceptual framework will be on the 
institutions. There are four broad categories of institutions that need to be considered 
in this step i.e. political, social, economic and legal institutions. These institutions 
provide blueprints for acceptable procedures and therefore can either constrain or 
enable the production of low-income housing by the private sector. This mapping 
exercise, which will help identify these institutions, has to be based on empirical 
evidence instead of theoretic constructs, keeping in mind that the institutional 
environment for one developer might be slightly different from the next. 
 
Step four involves defining the structure i.e. the framework in which the private 
developers make their decisions. Emphasis will be on detailing the formal and informal 
rules that guide the development process as stipulated by the identified institution as 
per step 2 and how these same institutions impact access to resources. These structures 
are accepted and recognized to be weakly malleable, with agents able to influence 
these structures through their actions. Lawson (2009) noted that “whilst structures have 
an enduring quality, they are also malleable, being carried and mediated by actors with 
agency”. However, the effect of agency on structure is not fluid, and it is assumed in 
this study that it is possible to identify at a certain time period particular existing 
structures that have not been debased by the effects of agency. Structures can enable 
agency through providing conduits for implementing action that is necessary for 
development to take place. On the other hand, the same structures can constrain for 
example through prescribing procedures that are at variance with what is deemed 
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necessary for the efficient production of low-income housing. For example, in 
Zimbabwe, issues that have been identified as possible constraints to low-income 
housing development by other studies include overlapping responsibilities between 
different tiers of government resulting in a complex institutional environment, 
expensive land delivery approaches (Chipungu & Adebayo, 2013; Gumbo, 2014), high 
building standards (Kamete, 1999; Mashoko, 2012), lack of access to land (Chaeruka 
& Munzwa, 2009), mortgage loan affordability issues, lack of finance to support the 
funding of housing investments and high interest rates (Nkala, 2012). These structural 
challenges are tackled and resolved as developers resource and produce low-income 
housing whilst guided by the institutional environment.  
 
The low-income group presents affordability challenges that have informed the 
critique against the desirability of private sector provision of low-income housing 
(Arku, 2009; Baker & Tually, 2008; Cao & Keivani, 2014; Stonehouse, Threlkeld, & 
Farmer, 2015). The generally low incomes and inability to qualify for mortgage 
finance by the low-income group (Aribigbola, 2008), which is exacerbated by informal 
sector employment presents peculiar challenges that must be dealt with by the 
developers. These challenges are magnified in developing countries, like Zimbabwe, 
where high poverty levels and inequality are pervasive characteristics (Alvarado & 
Gasparini, 2015; Buckley & Kalarickal, 2005; Moyo, 2004) exacerbated by a lack of 
social safety nets for low-income earners. If the target group for the developers is a 
different income group, for example, the higher income group, the set of constraints 
flowing from the context, will also be different. In summary, the structure which 
enables and/or constrains the activities of private sector developers can only be fully 
defined after the various institutions that the agent interacts with in carrying out his 
role in the development process have been determined.  
 
2.5.2 Defining strategy 
This research recognizes that developers operate in a “structure” as defined above, 
which guides decision making as the developers engage in the development process. 
As such, it is recognized that activity is institutionally situated (Olsen, 2009) and 
decisions that are made by these developers as they convert factors of production via 
the development process can either reinforce or amend established institutions 
resulting in a change in the modes of regulation. The Structure-Agency model sought 
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to address one noted shortfall of institutional analysis as was noted by Healey and 
Barrett (1990) – it did not theorise the relations between individual actors and 
behaviours and the wider context. In trying to resolve this, the Structure-Agency model 
is charged with succumbing to dualism, with attention being directed to the agency 
part of the dualism (Ball, 1998; Guy & Henneberry, 2000). As a result, when it comes 
to defining what strategy is, the model has been critiqued on two points: the model 
does not define what a strategy is, and due to the dualism noted above, it becomes 
difficult to attribute outcomes, which are just products of external economic forces, 
from outcomes that are due to strategy itself (Ball, 1998). As such because of the 
greater weight given to agency, the model is therefore likely to give analytical 
emphasis on the micro-level, leading to a partial understanding of what is actually 
going on (Doling, 2001).  
 
The question that still needs to be addressed is: which outcome should be attributed to 
the actions of entities and which to the context within which they operate? A solution 
to this problem according to Guy and Henneberry (2000) is to consider suggestions by 
Jessop (1996), i.e. view structural constraints as not monolithic, but as operating 
selectively whilst agents are viewed as reflexive, and able to engage in strategic 
calculations given their current situation. As such, structural moments can be 
identified, where action is strongly shaped by structure and “conjunctional moments”, 
where the action of agents results in the context being modified.  
 
Having noted the shortcoming of the Structure- Agency model, this study defines 
strategy as decisions made by agents in pursuit of a pre-specified objective whose 
implementation  
1.  results in a deviation from laid down procedures as defined by institutional 
environment defined in step 4 and/or 
2. results in a material change in the organizational structure of the agent and 
subsequently changes or has the potential to change the structure of housing 
provision and/or 
3. Seems contrary to what other institutions carrying out the same role as the 
agent have been traditionally doing. 
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These decisions that are defined as strategy, have the potential to eventually change 
structures, as they become reinforced and codified through social and political 
institutions. If a strategy is defined in this manner, it will then be possible to interrogate 
presented evidence to in a bid to answer the following questions: What was this 
identified strategy in response to? What made it possible for the agent to carry out this 
strategy? Does this strategy have any enduring qualities that are likely to result in the 
strategy being replicated and or institutionalized? It has been argued that explanations 
of actions should acknowledge the constraining and enabling factors, which include 
sociocultural and material factors as understanding such causal processes aids in 
comprehending relationships between structures and action (Guy & Henneberry, 
2000). In the analysis, responses to these questions can link what has been identified 
as strategies to the wider economic forces, thus addressing the concerns that have been 
raised about the Structure-Agency theory. 
 
2.6 Methodological and Policy Implications of this Framework 
The conceptual model, on the structure side, requires that the study examines formal 
and informal institutions and their impact on the availability and use of resources by 
developers. As such, in addition to codified rules, ideologies, social norms and culture 
are a critical aspect that can potentially explain how developers access and employ 
resources. It is thus imperative that the study adopts qualitative methods, which can 
help unravel each of these aspects. Studies involving multiple, dynamic, and shifting 
relationships in context, such as the ones detailed above, favour qualitative approaches 
which are capable of producing situated analytical explanations through the use of 
intensive methods such as interviews, case studies, ethnography etc. (Zachariadis, 
Scott, & Barrett, 2013). With the qualitative approach, the analytical focus shifts from 
market outcomes (as measured through housing market indicators) to market 
processes, which is in line with the analytical focus of this study. The Structure-
Agency model provides an operational framework and terminology to study market 
processes and can be employed to systematically carry out qualitative research to 
conceptualise the actions and strategies of developers via a causal chain that has clear 
structural variables.  
 
Methodologies that flow from the neoclassical approach are inappropriate and cannot 
be applied in this case as they emphasize or rely on the use of quantitative housing 
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market indicators such as rent, prices etc. to study trends via the use of econometric 
models. Econometric and the associated statistical approaches that require data are not 
suitable for studying contextual studies that require exploration of individual projects 
in a developing country context, where there are usually data availability constraints. 
There is also need for the variables identified above to be validated in different 
contexts, and the Structure-Agency model is robust enough to handle the 
contextualisation of studies, unlike methodologies that flow from the neoclassical 
approach, which are guided by assumptions that smooth out contextual differences 
amongst studies. Some of these assumptions are a generally positive view of the 
market, and assumptions that property rights are clear, the title will be delivered, and 
contracts enforced. Research guided by the Structure-Agency theory does not make 
such assumptions but allows a thorough investigation of processes, analysis of and 
understanding of constraints and contingencies that alternately pattern and perturb 
daily life. These processes cannot be captured in hypothetical deductions, and in order 
for the study to decode, translate and interpret behaviours, a qualitative analysis might 
be the best approach. The Structure-Agency theory thus fits in perfectly and addresses 
all the methodological gaps especially in unravelling the complexity of the 
development process itself and missing housing indicators.  
 
The structural variables, from a policy perspective, are what can guide policymakers 
on how agency can be improved in low-income housing. The Structure-Agency thus 
provides insight into the policy levers that can be used if the private sector is to be co-
opted in solving the low-income housing challenge. Once frictions are noted in a 
market as is evident in the low-income housing sector, appropriate policy 
recommendation that can be of use in stimulating private sector engagement cannot be 
gleaned from any studies that adopt a neoclassical theoretical perspective. If 
policymakers were to understand why developers behave in a certain way and how 
they are likely to react to certain policy changes, then they could actively start pursuing 
the implementation of policies that are likely to encourage more private players in the 
low-income housing space. Policy should thus be crafted, not with a blanket view of 
the property development sector but should be tailor-made to suit different types of 
developers. If policymakers are made aware of the significance of structure in shaping 
developer outlooks, then more care and attention will be given in policy crafting to 
influence more involvement of the private sector. 
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It has been noted in this chapter that the state is involved in the development processes 
in diverse ways vis. sectoral policies, as a development intermediary itself, and to 
safeguard particular interests and values (Healey and Barrett, 1990). However, the 
financial and economic interest of the private sector need to be harmonized with the 
political and social needs of the government and that can only happen through policy 
intervention. Through using the Structure-Agency theory, the effect of current 
government policy on the operations of practising low-income housing developers will 
be uncovered. From the challenges faced and strategies that are being implemented, 
the government can help the developers, through policy, to produce a tailor-made 
product suitable to the target group in all aspects. Issues that have been consistently 
raised by other studies such as bureaucratic land acquisition and planning procedures, 
high housing standards, costs of exchange and so on are likely to be exposed, but in 
greater detail which shows the relative importance of policy reform in solving the 
housing challenge. 
 
2.7 Concluding Comments 
 Low-income housing shortages are real, the world over, more so in developing 
countries. The solution to the housing challenge will take a concerted effort from 
researchers, practitioners and policymakers. Knowledge of the processes through 
which the built environment is produced and used, and in particular, the processes of 
land and property development, is thus critical to our understanding of urban 
development (Healy, and Barrett 1990) and is key in policy formulation. Policy, 
however, must be adequately informed for it to have the desired effect. This can be 
achieved by research that draws on an appropriate theoretical framework and is backed 
by empirical evidence that fits the context in question. The Structure-Agency model is 
a promising theoretical entry point that can be used to research ongoing low-income 
housing developments in a bid to unravel the effects of policies on market solutions to 
the housing challenge. Results from such studies are also going to highlight challenges 
being faced by developers, giving the state a chance to use policy as a tool to reduce 
barriers to entry for the private sector developers and to create a structural environment 
that is conducive to the creation of a product that is affordable to low-income earners. 
A conceptual model has been developed in this chapter from the Structure-Agency 
model, but there is still a need to test the model through empirical application to test 
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its robustness.  
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3. NEOLIBERALISM IN LOW-INCOME HOUSING POLICY  
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the importance of ideological orientation of the state as seen 
through policy and resources that are availed towards low-income housing by the state. 
Section 3.2 is a literature review on the role of the state in solving the low-income 
housing. Section 3.3 looks at the evolution of low-income housing policy zooming in 
on how neoliberalism got to be established as a hegemonic ideology that is being 
extended into spheres like low-income housing which have traditionally been under 
the purview of the state. Based on this review, Section 3.4 maps out the key elements 
under a neoliberal housing policy and how it relates to low-income housing. Criticisms 
of neoliberal housing policy are detailed in Section 3.5. In the penultimate section, the 
various ways that the state can advance private sector engagement in low-income 
housing is explored through looking at two case studies where neoliberalism in the 
housing sector has been successfully implemented – China and Ghana. The final 
section draws on the above discourse and explores the implications of neoliberalism 
in low-income housing as a potential panacea to the low-income housing challenge 
 
3.2 Role of the State in Solving the Low-Income Housing Challenge 
Housing is a basic need that needs to be met on a priority basis (Arnott, 1987; Steggell 
et al., 2001). In situations where the indigent fail to provide for themselves this basic 
need, the state is expected to be active in spearheading the provision of alternative 
accommodation and the right to adequate housing is enshrined in some constitutions 
(Arku, 2009; Moss, 2001). A cocktail of options is available through which the 
government can intervene in the low-income housing market in a bid to satisfy its 
social welfare function, and these options can be tailor-made to be in line with the 
state’s fiscal resources, balanced with the demand for low-income housing that is 
exerted by the low-income group. The options range from direct provision (Ibem, 
2011; Özdemir, 2011), supply-side and demand-side subsidies (Abdul-Aziz & Kassim, 
2011; Mosha, 2013; Moss, 2003) to providing a conducive environment for 
participation by the private sector of low-income housing (Abdul-Aziz & Kassim, 
2011; Ibem, 2011; Mosha, 2013; Sivam & Karuppannan, 2002). 
 
The state is a critical actor in the development process (Healey & Barrett, 1990) as 
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there is need to support the development process, moderate adverse externalities, 
safeguard social needs and conserve resources and environmental heritage. The overall 
objective of government administration in housing development should be to provide 
the policy and administrative frameworks to ensure the smooth operation of the land 
and housing markets (Buckley & Mathema, 2007; Sivam, 2002), and the government 
can achieve this through being a mediator in the development process via planning and 
enforcing regulations and, on the other hand, being a facilitator through subsidy 
support or direct development activity (Healey, 1994). These mediatory relations 
shape the institutional relations of local land and property-development markets as the 
public-sector influences what is built where, how, and by whom. Economy-wide 
reforms act as a key supporting factor (Yap, 2016) to the structure and functioning of 
housing markets and the functioning of the housing market is in turn dependent upon 
the legislative and regulatory arrangements mandated by the state (Bone, 2014; 
Chelcea & Druta, 2016). Excessively detailed, and inﬂexible regulatory and legal 
framework can adversely affect the smooth supply of land and housing (Sivam, 2002). 
For example, procedures and steps for obtaining development permission if not 
properly managed can make it difﬁcult for developers to respond quickly to changing 
housing demand, thus contributing to supply-side constraints.  
 
The solution to the housing problems of the urban low-income population, it is argued, 
partly lies in improving access to urban land which requires urban planning and 
government intervention in the urban land market (Yap, 2016). For the low-income 
groups, there is substantial research that also roots for housing assistance arrangements 
(Arku, 2009; S. Nicholls, 2014; Özdemir, 2011; Wang et al., 2012). This literature, 
which supports government intervention in low-income housing markets runs counter-
intuitive to the neoliberal ideology (Derossett, 2015), an ideology that thrusts and 
supports market-led development (Derossett, 2015; Fawaz, 2009; Kitchin, 
O'Callaghan, Boyle, Gleeson, & Keaveney, 2012; Lazzarato, 2009; Vanwynsberghe, 
Surborg, & Wyly, 2013), which manifested itself in the political mainstream agenda 
in the 1970s. The mission under neoliberalism is to facilitate conditions for profitable 
capital accumulation even in domains that have been formerly regarded as off-limits 
to the calculus of profitability (Harvey, 2007; Hyslop, 2016; Schipper, 2015), and one 
such contested area is low-income housing. The argument is that public sector efforts 
around the world to be direct providers of low-income housing have yielded dismal 
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results, with very low output filtering down to the target market compared to the 
overall housing requirements of the urban population a (Moss, 2003; Özdemir, 2011; 
Sivam & Karuppannan, 2002). In low-income housing markets, since there are supply-
side constraints, the government can tackle the housing challenge through 
strengthening the environment for participation by the private sector (Sivam & 
Karuppannan, 2002), via promoting conditions that facilitate commercial profit and 
advance corporate interests (Arku, 2009; Hyslop, 2016). Kohn and von Pischke (2011) 
concur and cite Thailand as a positive example where government intervention in the 
land market attracted private developers and investment and resulted in large scale, 
low-income housing development.  
 
As can be seen above, the role played by the government in the low-income housing 
markets has an impact on the ease with which the private sector can penetrate that 
market and determines the operating environment via the institutional framework and 
the resources that can be accessed by the developers as was discussed in chapter 2. In 
line with the study’s focus on private sector involvement in low-income housing 
provision, the chapter seeks to detail the evolution of low-income housing policy, 
culminating in how neoliberalism got to be established as a dominant policy 
framework. Based on this review, the third section maps out the key elements under a 
neoliberal housing policy and how it relates to low-income housing interrogate what 
neoliberalism means in housing policy. The evolution of housing policies and the 
successes and failures of neoliberalism will be explored with the aim of bringing to 
the fore the intricate linkages between neoliberal housing policy and low-income 
housing provision, particularly in the low-income housing sector. The questions that 
will be explored are: what was the neoliberal agenda in housing in reaction to? What 
are its key elements? What are the main arguments against private sector engagement? 
All these are key issues that will help situate this study’s findings amongst 
contemporary debates on solving the low-income housing challenge and help in 
synthesising policy implications. 
 
3.3 Evolution of Low-Income Housing Policy: 1970 to Present 
There are leading multilateral organizations that influence housing policies such as the 
World Bank and UN-Habitat. The way these international policy leaders conceptualize 
and support housing policy influences national housing policy for governments in the 
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developing world (Keivani, Mattingly, & Majedi, 2005; Kitchin et al., 2012; Mooya 
& Cloete, 2007; S. Nicholls, 2014; Van Waeyenberge, 2015). Support for national 
efforts to meet the human settlement challenges facing developing country 
governments is usually given through supplementing resources of governments by 
providing them with the necessary financial and technical assistance as well as support 
for evolving institutional arrangements as they seek new and effective ways to solve 
the housing challenge (Buckley & Kalarickal, 2004; Kitchin et al., 2012). A neoliberal 
agenda in housing policy implies that the role of the state in the housing market should 
metamorphose in line with the ideological shift (Harvey, 2007; Marston, 2002), and 
the support rendered to States by multilateral organizations should be modified 
accordingly. 
A summary of the policy lending instruments used by the World Bank to influence 
housing policy in countries and the associated role of the government is detailed in 
Table 3-1.  
 
Table 3-1: World Bank policy lending instruments, 1970s - 90s 
Period Main Policy and Lending Instruments Role of the Government 
1970s 
*Sites and services demonstration 
projects 
*slum upgrading 
Direct provision of land, housing 
and finance to project beneficiaries 
1980s 
*Housing finance projects (interest rate 
reform)  
*subsidy design 
*improving institutional performance of 
government agencies 
*Provision of housing finance by 
public institutions, 
*rationalizing housing subsidies i.e. 
reduction of housing subsidies, 
improving subsidy targeting and 
shifting from financial subsidies to 
fiscal housing subsidies 
1990s 
*policy and lending instruments to 
stimulate demand and supply  
*Institutional reform and coordination 
with macro-economic policy 
*policymaking coordination 
*regulatory responsibilities of an 
enabling role to facilitate the 
provision of land and housing by the 
private sector 
* improving coordination of sector 
and macroeconomic policy 
Source: Mayo & Angel (1993) 
 
During the 1970s, the main policy lending instruments that were utilized by the World 
Bank were sites and services and slum upgrading projects (Mayo & Angel, 1993). 
These programs entailed the government directly providing land, housing and finance 
to the project beneficiaries. A critical analysis of the policy and lending instruments 
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reveals that these programs were largely unsuccessful. Problems that have been cited 
with sites and services programs include land acquisition problems, lack of financial 
sustainability, poor cost recovery and problems of replicability for the infrastructure 
and services provided and (Mayo & Angel, 1993; Mooya, 2009; Thahane, 1993). 
Targeting errors coupled with fronting also resulted in most beneficiaries being mostly 
middle-income groups (Mosha, 2013; Potts & Mutambirwa, 1991) contributing to the 
ineffectiveness of these programs that were targeting the low-income groups.  
 
From the 80s onwards, there was a shift from reliance on sites and services to the 
emergence and establishment of housing finance projects and housing policy loans as 
the dominant lending instruments funded by the World Bank (Mayo & Angel, 1993). 
The role of the State, as suggested through the World Bank-funded projects, has thus 
been evolving, from direct provision to technical planning solutions (Andrew Beer, 
Kearins, & Pieters, 2007). The shift to housing finance sought to address two 
objectives: it provided opportunities for the World Bank - which includes International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Development 
Association Bank (IDA) and International Finance Corporation Bank (IFC), to address 
broader economic issues and housing sector performance issues. A well-developed 
financial sector is perceived to yield greater economic benefits that would also impact 
positively on the housing sector (Mayo & Angel, 1993). 
 
The evolution in the role of the state was partly necessitated by recognized state failure 
in the provision of adequate housing to the low-income group. Public sector housing 
delivery strategies have been marred by targeting errors, with little or no output 
filtering through to the low-income group (Ibem, 2011; Mosha, 2013; Stonehouse et 
al., 2015), and cost overruns due to inefficiencies in both design and subsidy allocation 
(Klink & Denaldi, 2014; Tipple, Korboe, Willis, & Garrod, 1998; Yap, 2016). State 
efforts were also seen to be having a negligible impact on the housing challenge and 
the turn to technical planning solutions was in a bid to find policies with a potential to 
provide solutions at a scale that can make a significant dent to the housing challenge 
(Thahane, 1993). As such, the overall piece-meal effect in housing provision of sites 
and services projects and slum upgrading projects, representing the inability of these 
programs to significantly contribute towards the housing challenges, also informed the 
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ideological progression from direct provision to policy instruments skewed in favour 
of markets (Keivani et al., 2005). 
 
From a macro perspective, the shift from direct provision of housing to policies that 
are aligned to making markets works is in line with the broader political ideological 
shift that asserts the superiority of free markets (Kotz, 1999). The dismantling of the 
Keynesian welfare state in Western countries in the 1970s and 80s (Vanwynsberghe 
et al., 2013) emphasized markets over nation-states through a transformation of the 
institutional landscape. This market enthusiasm received a powerful boost from the 
demise of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, as the fall of the Soviet Union was 
interpreted as in the words of as proof that “any effort to build a more just economy 
through collective action was bound to lead, sooner or later, to economic stagnation 
and eventual collapse”, thus vindicating adoption of free-market theory. 
 
Under a neoliberal housing policy, the role of the state is to create and preserve an 
institutional framework that is appropriate and conducive for engaging the private 
sector in home building programs for the lower end of market and providing serviced 
plots at affordable levels (Harvey, 2007; Mooya & Cloete, 2007; Thahane, 1993). If a 
market does not exist, in order to further the neoliberal agenda, it is argued that the 
state should go to the extent of creating that market. Markets in the low-income 
housing sector can be created if the State works at removing regulatory barriers to 
entry and creates a legal infrastructure that can attract and incubate private players in 
that market. The state thus needs to create embedded incentives in its regulatory 
framework. 
 
From the 90s onwards, Mayo and Angel (1993) note that there was a significant 
decrease in lending for physical assets in the housing sector, in favour of an enhanced 
focus on incentive related interventions, crucially through finance. The shift to housing 
finance sought to address two objectives: it provided opportunities for the World Bank 
(which include International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 
International Development Association Bank (IDA) and International Finance 
Corporation Bank (IFC)) to address broader economic issues and housing sector 
performance issues (ibid.) as shown in Figure 3-1. A well-developed financial sector 
is perceived to yield greater economic benefits that would also impact positively on 
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the housing sector and this has seen an increase in housing finance loans and housing 
policy loans. 
 
Figure 3-1: World Bank Group (IBRD, IDA and IFC) shelter portfolio across different 
types of intervention, in constant million 2012 US$, 1971-2014 (July) 
 
Source: Van Waeyenberge (2015) 
 
Van Waeyenberge (2015), did an analysis of the World Bank Group activities and the 
conclusion was that during the period 2001 – 2007, there was a significant increase in 
housing finance and housing policy loans, which grew to over 60 % of all World Bank 
shelter activities and this increase was coupled with a decrease in investments in sites 
and services and slum upgrading programs. Housing policy loans. This was of course 
in tandem with the ideological policy shift towards “making markets work” that was 
being pushed by the World Bank (Mayo & Angel, 1993), with the housing policy loans 
meant to entice banks to lend to lower-income households through enabling 
governments to guarantee such loans made to low-income earners. One of the primary 
objectives pursued by the World Bank through these interventions was to demonstrate 
cost recovery and replicability of projects, which would then imply a potential for 
profitable investment and possibly attract the private sector in serving the low-income 
housing segment (Van Waeyenberge, 2015). As such private markets are the housing 
delivery mechanism which form the backbone of all housing strategies in the World 
Bank and the UN-Habitat (Keivani et al., 2005). 
 
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2007 2008-2014
C
o
n
st
an
t 
2
0
1
2
 M
il
li
o
n
 U
S
$
Period
Housing Finance
Sites and Services/ Housing
Construction
Housing Policy
Slum Upgrade
 57 
 
3.4 Neoliberalism: The Current Policy Landscape 
Neoliberalism is associated with a market-led development approach in which there is 
wide adoption of principles associated with neoliberal policies (Derossett, 2015; 
Fawaz, 2009; Theodore, Peck, & Brenner, 2011). It is postulated that if markets were 
allowed to function without restraint, they would optimally serve all economic needs 
including housing through efﬁcient utilisation all economic resources (Shaikh, 2005). 
The components of neoliberal housing policy are homeownership, private property 
rights and binding financial commitments, and these components are the backbone on 
which the dominance of neoliberalism in housing rests on (Rolnik, 2013). Foci also 
commonly associated with neoliberalism in the housing market are free trade or 
commodification of land markets, free capital movements (Campbell, 2011) and 
reduced government intervention in housing markets (Mayo & Angel, 1993; Mosha, 
2013). Within the housing sphere, mechanisms of neoliberal urbanisation such as the 
restructuring of urban housing markets through a reduction in housing subsidies and 
erasure of public housing and other low rent accommodation have resulted in the 
creation of new opportunities for private players within the housing market.  
 
Governments have at their disposal according to (Mayo & Angel, 1993) three enabling 
instruments that address demand-side constraints - developing property rights, 
developing mortgage finance and rationalizing subsidies. The three supply-side policy 
instruments that can be used to boost housing provision to the low-income sector are 
providing infrastructure for residential land development, regulating land and housing 
development and organizing the building industry to create greater competition in the 
building industry. The aim of these supply-side instruments would be to remove 
constraints to the housing development process. Policies affecting the responsiveness 
of the supply side of the market to changes in demand, therefore, often offer the 
greatest potential for improvement in sector performance. In line with the neoliberal 
principles, most countries now rely on a public policy approach that augments and 
compliments market processes rather than substitutes for them (Buckley & Kalarickal, 
2004). To encourage and stimulate the supply of low-income housing by the private 
sector, the World Bank emphasizes the establishment of a suitable regulatory 
environment for the delivery of housing finance. The recommended strategy is to bring 
together infrastructure agencies to coordinate infrastructure provision that creates an 
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adequate supply of serviced land and a review of existing legislation to improve sector 
performance (Mayo & Angel, 1993).  
 
3.5 Failings/ Criticisms of a Neoliberal Housing Policy in the Low-Income 
Housing Sector 
Neoliberal goals namely, capital accumulation through reliance on the free market, a 
shift of responsibility from government to civic society and rescaling of the state from 
central to local levels (Fawaz, 2009; Nijman, 2008), have been slated as they are 
perceived to marginalise the low-income group. Issues that have been at the fore of 
these criticisms are mainly around five themes as discussed below: social inequity 
which is attributed to be on the rise due to neoliberal housing policies, challenges with 
the neoliberal fix to the unaffordability problem and the associated immature finance 
system. Quasi-government efforts have also been part of the debate including 
challenges arising from implementing a neoliberal housing policy in less than ideal 
macro-economic conditions. 
 
The market mechanism is assumed to be unable to provide adequate, affordable and 
equitable housing for all (Craig & Porter, 2006; Rolnik, 2013). It has also been noted 
that neoliberalism promotes insecurity of tenure through the adoption of imperatives 
for developing a housing finance system such as enforceable foreclosure for mortgage 
lenders (Mayo & Angel, 1993; Mooya & Cloete, 2007). A number of studies concur 
that neoliberalism and social policy are not compatible at all (A. Beer et al., 2016; 
Campbell, 2011; Craig & Porter, 2006; Derossett, 2015; Marx, 2008; Pattison, 2009; 
Seisdedos, 2011) since markets and market principles have a tendency to overreach 
themselves, undermining the social fabric in which they are embedded and 
consequently dependent on (Forrest & Hirayama, 2015). In addition, reliance purely 
on the private sector for low-income housing production is argued to result in polarised 
society and gentrification (Hedin, Clark, Lundholm, & Malmberg, 2012). 
 
Despite these reservations, the World Bank endorsed neoliberalism by expressing 
enthusiasm regarding the capacity and superiority of a market-oriented approach to 
housing (Van Waeyenberge, 2015). In the early 90s, it was thought that the overall 
performance of the housing sector in developing countries would be affected through 
the broad instrument of housing finance system development (Mayo & Angel, 1993). 
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Finance is a central issue and a very potent influence on any potential remedies to the 
housing challenge for the low-income groups (National Building Research, 1987). In 
order to extend homeownership to the low-income segment, the neoliberal fix for the 
affordability problem has been the development of new financial products to enable 
poorer households to take out mortgages (Forrest & Hirayama, 2015). This has also 
been termed the socialisation of credit (Rolnik, 2013). This route has however been 
fraught with challenges, with most low[er] income households failing to maintain 
mortgage burdens (Hodkinson, Watt, & Mooney, 2013). This socialization of credit, 
however, comes with other challenges such as risk pricing and difficulties of 
measuring the repayment capacity (Aribigbola, 2008; Demirag et al., 2011; Rolnik, 
2013) given that most of the low-income groups do not qualify for government 
guarantees (Mosha, 2013). For risk to be successfully transferred, the receiving party 
has to possess both the competence to assess it fairly and the expertise necessary to 
control or minimize it. 
 
From the early 90s when the world bank rolled out its making markets work strategy, 
countries are still grappling with how to implement a neoliberal housing policy in the 
low-income segment, with housing finance systems not yet developed to the extent 
that was envisioned, especially in developing countries. This could partly be due to the 
characteristics of developing countries: macro-economic instability; fluctuating 
inflation; foreign exchange risk and short-term investment horizons (Lea, 2005). The 
finance system of countries is indisputably linked to the macro-economic environment 
and volatilities within markets can destabilize the market, thus swinging the market 
far from the stability that is the cornerstone of long term housing finance. Indeed, it is 
unlikely that the housing problem can be solved without solving the economic problem 
(Moss, 2003). Two basic difficulties continue to exist regarding the widespread 
adoption of market solutions for the low-income groups: the scarcity of medium and 
long-range funds, and insufficient development of financial markets (Winchester, 
2005). 
 
The World Bank is on the fence about state interventions in situations where the 
finance system is not mature enough to service all the mortgage needs. It advises that 
countries can institute directed credit schemes for housing by commercial lending 
institutions. At the same time, the Bank cautions that directed credit lessens incentives 
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for resource mobilization by lending institutions and works against the principles of a 
well-functioning housing finance system (Mayo & Angel, 1993). The result of directed 
schemes may sometimes be that lending volumes for housing may be reduced to a 
level that is below one under a more neutral financial regime which permits lending 
for housing to seek its own level based on market conditions (ibid.). Detailed empirical 
evidence from countries where credit has been extended to the low-income groups for 
housing purposes has shown that government guarantees are one of the preconditions 
of success, given the risk exposure that couples lending to the low-income groups 
(Winchester, 2005). But this condition presupposes a state which has enough fiscal 
space to accommodate even the low-income groups. This is not the case in most 
developing countries where the low-income housing challenge is most severe. Most of 
these countries have huge fiscal constraints and large budgets that are not sustainable 
(Babatunde et al., 2012; Lea, 2005; Loxley, 2013).  
 
Besides access to market provided mortgages for housing, the major housing delivery 
models that have been used in most countries that have embraced neoliberalism 
include public-private partnerships and private finance initiatives. These models have 
however yielded very low percentages of the required stock to the target group (Ibem, 
2011; Makinde, 2014; Mashoko, 2012). The major problems that have been cited are 
the prohibitive cost of the final product resulting in an affordability gap. Contributors 
to this high cost have been cited to be the high cost of land, high cost of land 
registration and titling (Makinde, 2014), leading to a conclusion that neoliberal 
housing policy is unlikely to help solve the housing shortage. 
 
In the context of developing countries, one important criticism of the enabling market 
paradigm is the appropriateness of the enabling strategy, especially where the 
macroeconomic conditions can put a damper on private sector ability and willingness 
to put capital at risk. Thus, according to Keivani et al. (2005), there is a need to explore 
alternatives to the neoliberal agenda. General movement towards neoliberalism in an 
economy with inflation, economic recession, escalating building costs is not likely to 
yield positive results since a stable economy is a critical success factor for the 
engagement of the private sector in the low-income housing space (Babatunde et al., 
2012; Keivani et al., 2005; Moss, 2003; Stein, 2008). Faced with little or no public 
housing, the low-income groups have no fall-back position. The turn to neoliberalism 
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in the housing sector has thus created an unserved niche market. Can neoliberalism 
again come to the rescue?  
 
3.6 Neoliberalism in Action 
Given the criticisms of a neoliberal housing policy that have been cited in the above 
discussion, the aim of this section is to review empirical research in areas where a 
neoliberal housing policy has been implemented with the aim of understanding the 
framework in which the neoliberal housing policy was carried out. This review will 
put the criticisms in context and enable lessons to be drawn from the various ways that 
the state can advance private sector participation in low-income housing. Two cases 
stand out, China and Ghana. These two countries embraced the neoliberal agenda 
resulting in the role of the state shifting from direct provision to taking on a supporting 
role by creating the required regulatory and economic framework for the formal private 
sector to work. In China, the replacement of socialist welfare housing with a market 
dominated system is hailed as probably the largest neoliberal reform project ever 
implemented in the world.  
 
3.6.1 Neoliberalism in China 
China adopted a market-oriented housing policy in the 1990s after the fall of the Soviet 
Union (Buckley & Kalarickal, 2004). This neoliberal agenda is said to have led to 
affordability problems, as the low-income groups were priced out of the market, 
resulting in rising inequality between the higher income groups and the low-income 
groups (Wang et al., 2012). Historically, China's housing reform can be divided into 
three stages: the pilot stage from 1979 to 1991, during which experiments with 
preliminary reform measures were conducted in a small number of pilot sites, the 
transitional stage from 1991 to 1998, when nationwide housing reform was initialized 
but housing marketization had not yet formally begun and the rapid marketization 
stage which took off after the official termination of public housing allocation in 1998 
(Chen, 2011). The 1998 reform led to the end of public housing provision for state 
employees and privatization of the public housing stock (Chazovachii, 2011) and these 
reforms were followed by market enhancing policies of 2003 which established market 
housing as the dominant form of urban housing. The housing provision system, 
envisaged in the 1994 policy was based on the neoliberal premise of growth, which 
assumes that a market takeover of housing provision will result in sustained housing 
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development and improved living conditions (Chen, 2011) and comprised direct 
investments from private resources, the state, and state-owned organisations (Cao & 
Keivani, 2014). China is now categorised as a housing system that has a mass 
homeownership rate with small public housing system (Li, 2015; Wang et al., 2012). 
Figure 3-2shows the ratio of market to non-market completion of housing and ratifies 
the dominance of the market in housing supply. 
 
Figure 3-2: Ratio of market to non-market completion of housing in China 
 
Source: Cao and Keivani (2014) 
 
Although by the end of 2005, 75.7% of China's urban residents were nominal 
homeowners by the end of that year, Chen (2011) however asserts that empirical 
findings suggest that the ownership-based housing model was promoted among the 
poor in exploitative ways, which resulted in profound deprivation for the low-income 
groups. A review of China’s urban housing outcomes reveals housing price inﬂation 
and a shortage of affordable housing in the fast-expanding housing market (Cao & 
Keivani, 2014). Low real interest rates on loans fuelled demand for housing, adding 
pressure on house prices thus limiting affordability (Hoek-Smit, 2011). To encourage 
borrowing, the central bank reduced basic interest rates seven times between 1996 and 
1999. Between 1985 and 2002, mortgage interest rates were gradually from15.5percen 
to 5.7 (Wang et al., 2012). State banks also extended the normal period for a home 
loan from 20 to 30 years and increased the maximum amount of loan from 70 to 80 
per cent of the purchase price. China’s ongoing property boom shows that there are 
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large capital flows into the sector, leading to price inflation even when supply is 
expanding, with commercial banks dominating the financial sector (Dübel, 2011; 
Hoek-Smit, 2011). In the face of rising inflation and absence of protection through 
fixed-rate mortgages, the low-income groups’ ability to access mortgage finance has 
been curtailed, contributing towards their inability to afford housing (Dübel, 2011). 
 
However, a look at the enabling instruments that were proposed by the world bank 
shows that liberalisation of the housing markets in China did result in an increase in 
private sector capital in the housing market. Since the 1990s, there has been extensive 
urban infrastructure improvement, including underground railways, which has resulted 
in more land being made available for residential development (Cao & Keivani, 2014). 
In addition, to ensure that there are no barriers to housing developments, roads, water 
and sewerage and electricity has been timeously made available before 
commencement of housing developments. 
 
Despite these great strides towards creating an enabling environment, there were many 
nonmarket factors related to China's social and political institutions that were highly 
influential regarding inequitable housing distribution (Chen, 2011). Chief amongst 
these factors were distributive inequalities, which were carried forward from the public 
housing era. Higher socio-political ranks could afford better housing during the public 
housing era and after the privatisation process, these differentials were translated into 
substantial economic inequalities after the privatisation of the housing stock as the 
elites captured the beneﬁts of the housing privatization program (Cao & Keivani, 2014; 
Chen, 2011). This is because sitting tenants were the beneficiaries of the deeply 
discounted public housing that was converted into homeownership housing.  
 
The World Bank sanctions the use of targeted, measurable, transparent subsidies that 
have little potential of distorting the housing market (Mayo & Angel, 1993). In China, 
production subsidies were offered to developers of Economic and Comfortable 
Housing (ECH). These production subsidies were meant to enable such housing to be 
sold at discounted prices to low-income households and were in the form of reduced 
taxes and waiver of land costs. However, these subsidies often beneﬁted unintended 
users, with research findings indicating that there were serious targeting errors, 
resulting in most ECH being sold to relatively well-off government employees at large 
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discount to market prices (Cao & Keivani, 2014).  
 
There was also rampant speculative behaviour in the market which pushed up house 
prices, which led to worsening housing affordability and housing shortages, 
particularly for the low-to-medium income groups (Cao & Keivani, 2014; Wang et al., 
2012). To compound this problem, there were no limits on multiple homeownership, 
resulting in artificial house shortages as the higher income groups hogged on to 
housing, pushing up house prices. The State eventually reacted to these issues through 
imposing purchase restrictions, taxing multiple homeownership and tightening 
mortgage terms. Although these policy responses run against the neo-liberal idea of 
free markets, these interventions were necessitated by persistent speculative market 
behaviour which was resulting in price inﬂation and reduced affordability (Cao & 
Keivani, 2014). 
 
From the foregoing, significant involvement of private sector hinged on interventions 
by the state in four major areas, all of which were embodied in the housing policy: 
• Reduction in direct housing provision through privatising public housing stock 
and terminating public housing allocation for state employees, resulting in this 
group being forced to seek market provided housing solutions. 
• Enabling low-income groups via relaxing housing finance for the low-income 
group 
• Supporting private sector developers through availing production subsidies and 
• Regulating the market to curb speculative tendencies by higher income groups. 
 
3.6.2 Neoliberalism in Ghana 
Before 1970, the government of Ghana was involved in the direct provision of housing 
via state-owned enterprises, but the housing programs were critiqued as skewed 
towards benefiting the upper and middle-income groups to the detriment of the low-
income earners. For example, in the period between 1964 and 1970 the state had a 
target of 60 000 units, with 31.3 million pounds budgeted for commercial housing and 
13.3 million pounds for low-income housing (Arku, 2009). This implies that the formal 
public sector was typically focused on housing for the middle classes, and the formal 
private sector was focused on housing for the upper classes, leaving the low-income 
group not catered for. The Government was also a major shareholder in some housing 
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finance institutions, and mortgage loans were provided well below market rates. These 
government initiatives were yielding a disproportionate output, which was well below 
expectation given the amount of money the government was pouring into the state-
owned enterprises.  
 
In response to the failure of the previous policies, dwindling state resources, poor 
performance by state enterprises in housing provision and a worsening housing 
challenge-the government introduced neoliberal reforms which focused on a 
fundamental shift in housing policy, with the State shifting from direct state provision 
and leaning more towards active participation by the private sector in housing 
production (Arku, 2009; Tipple & Korboe, 1998). This saw the role of the state shifting 
to taking on a supporting role by creating the required legal, regulatory and economic 
framework for the formal private sector to operate. The policy changes were shaped 
by a growing need for private sector participation, institutional reforms, a favourable 
financial and regulatory environment and foreign investment in the housing market. 
Particular measures that were undertaken by the government to encourage private 
sector participation include: 
 
• Tax incentives to potential investors. Corporate tax was reduced from 55%to 
45%, 5-year tax holidays were extended to real estate developers, house 
purchases from real estate developers were exempted from stamp duty and 
sales tax on locally produced building material was reduced.  
• State-owned enterprises were required to secure private capital and to operate 
on a commercial basis.  
• Rental housing stock was sold to sitting tenants- which resulted in a change in 
the structure of housing provision. 
• Complete withdrawal by the government from budgetary funding mechanisms 
for housing institutions, with housing institutions and private banks expected 
to provide mortgages at market rates.  
 
The reform policies successfully attracted substantial private sector real estate 
developers active in residential construction, civil engineering and real estate 
development who between 1994 and 2005 invested a total of $105 billion as shown 
in the table below: 
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Table 3-2: Registered real estate projects in Ghana: September 1994-2005 
Year Number of Registered Projects Values in US$ ’000 
1995 8 12 504.54 
1996 13 36 617.61 
1997 14 8 432.48 
1998 11 12 801 
1999 10 13 751.14 
2000 8 7 243.48 
2001 7 4 702.71 
2002 7 8 922.97 
2003 2 56.18 
2004 1 50 
Total 81 105 082.11 
Source: Arku (2009) 
 
The number of units constructed by formal private developers also increased 
approximately tenfold after the reform policies were implemented. Despite this 
success in encouraging private sector developers into the housing market, the struggle 
for low-income housing in Ghana is not yet over with the main issue being house price 
unaffordability. As in many other developing countries, unemployment in Ghana is 
high and household income is generally low, with 39% of the population live below 
the poverty line, and about 27% living in extreme poverty. What exacerbates house 
price unaffordability, are a variety of factors that have contributed to rising house costs 
including rising land costs due to speculative activities, heavy dependence on imported 
building materials [stringent building codes and regulations prohibit builders from 
using certain traditional building materials, such as sun-dried bricks, woods and swish] 
and persistently high inflation rates. The mortgage market system is also said to be not 
functional with interest rates charged by private banking systems ranging between 
30% and 40%. Houses that are provided by the private developers are sold on a pre-
sell basis, with home buyers required to make a 50% down payment before the start of 
construction, which they have to raise on their own as most of the target group doesn’t 
qualify for mortgage finance. As a result, homeownership is out of reach for most of 
the low-income group, especially given their inability to access mortgage finance.  
 
Scrutiny of the institutional environment in Ghana, however, reveals that from 1970, 
successive governments in Ghana have tended to adopt neoliberal policies without 
altering them for local circumstances (Tipple & Korboe, 1998). One major issue which 
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is a stumbling block in the success of the neoliberal agenda is access to land (Buckley 
& Kalarickal, 2004; Chazovachii, 2011; Hoek-Smit, 2011). In Ghana, outside of a 
small government-controlled sector, land is generally not for sale but is only available 
for occupation on leases and with titles of usufruct (Tipple & Korboe, 1998). The 
clouded nature of land titles and the lack of bankable titles over traditionally allocated 
land also inhibits access to mortgage finance (ibid). Housing finance has been 
recognised as an increasingly important vehicle in providing low-income housing 
under a neoliberal housing policy (Bolnick & Mitlin, 1998; Buckley & Kalarickal, 
2004). It is thus unsurprising that lack of ﬁnance has also been identified as an 
impediment in the provision of low-income housing in Ghana. 
 
Given these challenges that still exist in the low-income housing sector, there is still 
room for the government to strengthen the environment further for private sector 
participation, with special emphasis on the low-income group. Inadequate government 
support, poor publicity, and lack of interest for local materials are acknowledged to be 
factors that are exacerbating the low-income housing challenge (Arku, 2009) which 
can still be worked on. Indeed, the adoption of a neoliberal housing policy has drawn 
a few criticisms. Houses developed by the private sector are said to be unaffordable to 
the low-income groups due to the liberalization of the land market that has led to 
speculative activities and escalating prices, (Arku, 2009; Tipple & Korboe, 1998). In 
addition to these challenges, the total supply of housing in Ghana is marginal compared 
to the potential housing demand, resulting in the greater part of the population being 
in critical need of housing (Arku, 2009). This marginalization of the urban poor can 
be possibly due to an overemphasis on the formal market process in housing policies 
to the detriment of other existing modes of provision (Keivani et al., 2005). 
 
3.7 The potency of Neoliberalism as a Panacea to the Low-Income Housing 
Challenge 
Researchers are in consensus over one thing: neoliberalism is not uniform, and its 
expression at the local level is contingent upon local circumstances and the macro 
environment (Altmann, 2011; Andrew Beer et al., 2007; Fawaz, 2009; Lin & Zhang, 
2017; Wang et al., 2012) which can be influenced by the macro environment. The 
implication therefore for low-income housing provision is that replication of projects 
based on successes in other areas will need to be supported by a lot of empirical work 
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as those successful projects can only form the core of a shell and the empirical evidence 
can then be used to fill in the finer detail. There is thus need to look at each system in 
detail. As Theodore et al. (2011) colourfully put it, the stubborn embeddedness of the 
neoliberal agenda and the circumstances of its dynamic evolution warrants serious 
scrutiny, especially in regard to processes of urban development. Governments in 
developing countries have proved neither effective nor efficient as housing providers 
(Berner, 2001). Despite the presence of subsidies, corruption in the tendering process 
results in profits pocketed by speculative, poorly monitored contractors, and huge 
targeting errors resulting in a negligible output reaching the targeted low-income 
group. 
 
Buckley and Kalarickal (2005) note that generally, policymakers have adjusted 
policies and are now adopting more market-oriented housing policy. Examples that are 
cited are India, China, Chile, Colombia, Malaysia, and Mexico as countries that appear 
to have adopted a much more market-friendly public housing policy, with market-
oriented subsidy systems having been implemented. This shift towards the market is 
meant to circumvent constraints that are associated with an interventionist housing 
policy. 
 
The World Bank warns that while largely private housing markets produce most of the 
housing in developing countries, this does not necessarily mean that these markets are 
either efficient or equitable (Mayo & Angel, 1993). Nor does it mean that these 
markets completely satisfy all housing needs or help attain broader development goals. 
Housing sector policies must be based on a positive view of how the sector actually 
works in a given context, and, as well, with specific notions of how it could work better 
(ibid.) The interplay between structure and agency should be investigated in a 
neoliberal context, and this calls for more empirical work on the low-income housing 
space to substantiate the criticisms of neoliberal policies where they have been applied 
and to also detail their successes. 
 
Policymakers have a choice: either to view the low-income housing challenge from a 
problem-based perspective or to tackle this challenge through policies that seek to take 
advantage of the opportunities in urban economies. One way to do this is through 
viewing cities as motors for development, and as instruments for the growth and 
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development of regional economies (Winchester, 2005). If there is a way that the 
housing challenge can be tackled through private sector involvement, then policy 
should be used to leverage those who are willing to try and serve this market. Use of 
capital in return for profit would require enterprising actors, and that would attract 
more and more players, resulting in economic growth. It is known that cumbersome 
and lengthy regulatory approval processes involved in land acquisition and 
development tend to limit the private sector participation in the housing industry. The 
bureaucratic processes lead to inefficiencies, wastefulness, exploitation, delays and 
high project cost (Makinde, 2014), and this insight can be a point of entry for the State 
to use policy to leverage private sector efforts in the low-income housing sector. 
 
The private sector has the potential to significantly contribute towards solving the 
housing challenge and the key to involving the private sector in the provision of low-
income housing could be incentives (Winchester, 2005). It should also be 
acknowledged that the private sector has always been the major contributor in the 
housing sector (Makinde, 2014; Sivam & Karuppannan, 2002) albeit not to the low-
income group. What research still needs to uncover is that key which will just sway 
the private sector towards the low-income housing segment, despite there being low 
profits (Mosha, 2013). 
 
Mooya and Cloete (2007) add on to the debate by observing that from a demand 
perspective, the shift from direct state provision to a more market-oriented intervention 
would be smoother if the State can, through regulation, improve administration that 
would reduce waste, enhance cost recovery and provide greater incentives for the low-
income groups to become a part of the market recovery and provide greater incentives 
for the low-income groups to become a part of the market place. A balance between 
demand and supply can go a long way in ensuring that markets work, especially in the 
low-income housing sector. Whilst acknowledging the role of the state in enabling 
markets to work, it is important that state intervention in markets be kept at a bare 
minimum because powerful interests will inevitably distort and bias state interventions 
for their own benefit (Harvey, 2007). This is more so in land markets as access to land 
can be extremely politicized which can further complicate market formation and the 
efficiency and opacity/transparency of these markets. 
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There are still no strong competitors to neoliberal ideas when trying to address the 
housing challenge (Forrest & Hirayama, 2015) especially when the political ideology 
of homeownership is taken into account. Homeownership is believed to be a natural 
and normal desire which encourages social stability, social responsibility, and a 
stronger sense of territorial attachment, which eventually leads to greater social capital, 
individual household well-being and happiness. This homeownership momentum has 
undermined acceptability of alternative tenure status, such as rental housing, and this 
complicates the housing challenge for the low-income groups. If a way can be found 
to encourage more involvement of private-sector developers in the low-income 
segment thus extending the benefits of homeownership to the low-income groups, then 
there are likely to be more positive ripple effects that negate the criticisms of a 
neoliberal housing policy. This is more so especially in the face of economic austerity 
that continues to impede any manoeuvres that are required to forge an anti-neoliberal 
front (Peck, Theodore, & Brenner, 2013).  
 
Homeownership for the low-income group, on the other hand, is associated with 
economic negative views as it is said to reduce labour market flexibility. For example, 
it is argued that it ties the target group down through reducing their mobility flexibility 
thus limiting their ability to explore the market in search for better-paying jobs 
(Chelcea and Druta, 2016). In this argument, since low-income areas are also generally 
concentrated in areas  with relatively few amenities or services and substandard 
housing (Derossett, 2015), homeownership thus ties down the lower-income groups to 
the areas accessible to them from where their house is located, where there is usually 
higher levels of crime and social problems, which thus cements their low-income 
status.  The financial burden of also maintaining such substandard homes given that 
low-income households typically have variable incomes and less savings to get them 
through periods of unemployment strains them and puts them at high risk of losing 
equity in a foreclosure (Rohe and Stegman, 1994).  
 
Despite all these disadvantages that are associated with the preference of 
homeownership tenure for the low-income groups over other tenure choices, there is 
overwhelming literary evidence that shows that many nations undergoing 
neoliberalisation promote homeownership over other tenure options (Rolnik, 2013, 
Forrest and Hirayama, 2015). The homeownership drive is thus more often than not 
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described as a political force- pursued in spite of any perceived advantages and 
disadvantages associated with homeownership for the low-income group (Chelcea and 
Druta, 2016, Rolnik, 2013). There are many countries where a distinctive characteristic 
feature of the housing system is a tenure structure with higher levels of owner-
occupation compared to other tenure systems (Özdemir, 2011) eg South Africa (Moss, 
2003), Zimbabwe (Chaeruka and Munzwa, 2009), Ireland (Kitchin et al., 2012)just to 
mention a few. 
 
 
Incremental housing has also been touted as an effective strategy for housing low-
income groups but at the same time, speculative tendencies tend to bid up land prices. 
One way of bringing down the cost of land-intensive processes of construction 
involving multi-storey apartment buildings. The pros of this approach are that high 
rise buildings discount the price of land by distributing it amongst many families. 
However, this changes the nature of the housing product from a small parcel of land 
that can be developed a brick at a time over several years to a finished apartment that 
requires intensive capital use (Fawaz, 2009). So, not only has neoliberalism resulted 
in a reduction in state involvement in low-income housing production, it is capable of 
further alienating the low-income groups from partaking in the market if no proper 
policy stances are taken. Could there be possibly an alternative economic ideology to 
neoliberalism? Or neoliberalism needs to be restructured for a better fit in the housing 
delivery market? 
 
 The implication therefore for low-income housing provision is that replication of 
neoliberal housing projects based on successes in other areas will need to be supported 
by a lot of empirical work. Successful neoliberal housing projects can only form the 
shell of any intended projects in a different context, and empirical evidence can then 
be used to fill in the finer detail. There is thus need to look at each system in detail. As 
Theodore et al. (2011) colourfully put it “the stubborn embeddedness of the neoliberal 
agenda and the circumstances of its dynamic evolution warrants serious scrutiny, 
especially in regard to processes of urban development. Despite all the criticisms the 
neoliberal agenda does not seem to be retreating (Fernandez Milan, 2016; Kitchin et 
al., 2012), there is no sign of a U-turn (Hodkinson et al., 2013), nor is there any sign 
of any radical departures from the neoliberal orthodoxies (Kitchin et al., 2012).  
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Within the neoliberal camp, the response to these critics has been that neoliberalism is 
a sound idea, whose outcome is heavily affected by context-specific regulatory 
landscapes (Chelcea & Druta, 2016). The structure and functioning of housing markets 
is heavily dependent on the legislative and regulatory environment, which is under the 
ambit of the state (Bone, 2014; Buckley & Mathema, 2007). For example, land 
administration, and local land-use regulations that restrict housing supply have been 
shown to have negative effects that more than offset the gains of a neoliberal policy in 
housing (Buckley & Mathema, 2007; Hsieh & Moretti, 2017). Housing finance 
innovations also have to fit into a broader financial sector and legal policies. Whilst 
acknowledging the role of the state in enabling markets to work, it is important that 
state intervention in markets be kept at a bare minimum because powerful interests 
will inevitably distort and bias state interventions for their own benefit (Harvey, 2007). 
This is more so in land markets as access to land can be extremely politicized which 
can further complicate market formation and the efficiency and opacity of these 
markets. 
 
Problems are likely to abound in adopting a neoliberal housing policy in the low-
income sector, chief amongst which is very low-incomes among the targeted group to 
sustain mortgage finance. Volatile economies with high inflation, economic 
recessions, and lack of primary mortgage instruments contribute towards hurdles in 
implementing a neoliberal housing policy. Notwithstanding all these similarities in 
how neoliberalism rolls out in the housing sector, there is a recognition that 
neoliberalisation is spatially and historically uneven globally (Hodkinson et al., 2013). 
It has a tentative character which is heavily influenced by political forces and 
institutional arrangements (A. Beer et al., 2016; Fernandez & Aalbers, 2016), which 
begs for empirical evidence in the critique of neoliberalism as a possible solution to 
the housing challenge for the low-income groups. 
 
But, neoliberalism in the context of housing, as has been detailed in the above case 
studies where it has been implemented takes a slightly different form, it 
metamorphoses as agents in each economy adapt their strategies to shield themselves 
from any threats in the market. There is however paucity in empirical data on how the 
private sector can be incorporated in low-income housing provision as the link between 
conception and practice has not been made. A complete study on a project that is 
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financed by the private sector under extreme conditions would thus yield results that 
might fill this literary gap. Neoliberalism is anchored on markets, property rights and 
competition. The market can operate as a regulatory principle only if there is 
competition in the market (Lazzarato, 2009). How states can create markets in the low-
income housing sector is the topical question that should be under debate. This further 
highlights the need for a lot of empirical research where there is private-sector-led 
development that is targeted at low-income groups. From these studies, lessons can be 
extrapolated, with the aim of identifying any challenges so housing policies can be 
adjusted accordingly. So, how adopting a neoliberal policy will play out in any 
scenario in the provision of low-income housing, should be a synthesis of ideal-type 
and contingent neo-liberalism ideas, and these neoliberal ideas should be highly 
flavoured by contextual realities in the market in question.  
 
In conclusion, neoliberalism has resulted in a reduction in state involvement in low-
income housing production and gone some way in making markets work, but it is also 
capable of further alienating the low-income groups from partaking in the market if no 
proper policy stances are taken. Currently, there are no proffered alternatives by the 
critiques, thus neoliberalism still needs to be restructured for a better fit in the low-
income housing delivery market, which begs for more research in this area. 
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4. ZIMBABWE: HOUSING POLICY AND OPERATING 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is a descriptive account of the empirical context in Zimbabwe in which 
this study is located. The rest of the chapter is arranged in seven sections. Section 2.0 
looks at the magnitude of the housing problem for the low-income group as it stands 
currently, and thus highlights the issues that low-income housing developers have to 
contend with. Section 3.0 explores the housing policies that have been implemented in 
Zimbabwe since 1980 and the effects of those policies on the housing backlog and 
private-sector development of low-income housing. The next section explores the 
regulatory environment from the perspective of the developer whilst section five 
details the prevailing economic environment that low-income housing developers have 
to operate in. The penultimate section details the opportunities for low-income housing 
development by the private sector in Zimbabwe and the last section details the housing 
development process that has to be adhered to.  
 
4.2 Housing Problem 
Zimbabwe is a former British colony which attained its independence on the 18th of 
April 1980. Shortly after independence, there was an influx of people from the rural 
areas due to a variety of reasons viz. quest for employment, post-war disturbances in 
rural Matabeleland and Midlands, drought and food insecurity in the immediate post-
war period in the rural areas and families moving to join their husbands after a 
relaxation of the colonial bylaws on urban settlement (Chitekwe-Biti, 2009). This rural 
to urban migration, has been recognised as a significant contributor to the low-income 
housing challenge in most developing countries (Addo, 2013; African Centre for 
Cities, 2011; Özdemir, 2011; Potts, 2006; Rizvi, 2016; World Bank (IBRD) & USAID, 
2016), and Zimbabwe is no exception. As at 2012, from the census results, there were 
an estimated 3 059 836 households in Zimbabwe, with over 1.2 million households 
still in need for low-income housing spread across all urban councils in Zimbabwe 
(Chirisa et al., 2014; Muchadenyika, 2015a).  
 
Need for low-income housing in Zimbabwe has generally been measured by looking 
at people on local authority housing lists. The waiting list is a pivotal tool for the 
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housing delivery system as it reflects the needs of applicants and gives an evaluation 
of how housing delivery is being carried out (Mashoko, 2012; Mutembedzi, 2012). 
These housing waiting lists are also recognised as the official administrative tools of 
local authorities where all home-seeking households or individuals register and are 
classified with regard to the date they register. The registration date then determines 
the households entitled to get a house or plot and the income group they belong to 
which determines which housing project they qualify for (Kamete, 2001b). In theory 
the use of the waiting-list for allocations should limit the emergence of absentee 
landlords and high income and middle-income households from taking over housing 
projects intended for low-income groups, and has been used in various countries where 
supply of housing earmarked for the low income is limited (Barron, 2008; Gallent, 
1997; Katz, Turner, Brown, Cunningham, & Sawyer, 2003; Potts & Mutambirwa, 
1991) 
 
These housing lists, however, understate the magnitude of the housing problem in 
Zimbabwe, as they are usually not up to date. This is a result of local authorities having 
introduced registration fees and renewal fees which cannot be afforded by some low-
income earners. These fees have had the effect of reducing the numbers on the waiting 
list, but nevertheless, these lists remain as the best proxy for housing demand which 
can be satisfied by private developers who have the capacity to tailor housing products 
that can be afforded by the low-income groups. At least 80% of the demand for low-
income housing is found in level 1 cities. Urban Councils in Zimbabwe are divided 
into four level- in descending order of status, power, authority and resources. City 
Councils are categorised as Level I cities, Municipalities are level II cities whilst Town 
Councils and Local Boards are level III and IV cities respectively, as shown in Table 
4-1. 
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Table 4-1: Waiting list sizes for different urban councils 
Level I Cities Level II Cities 
City Council Waiting List Size Municipality Waiting List Size 
Harare 600 0001 Redcliff n/a 
Bulawayo 110 0002 Chegutu 9 3003 
Gweru 23 0004 Chitungwiza 13 0005 
Masvingo 20 0006 Victoria Falls 15 0007 
Kadoma 150008 Chinhoyi 13 0009 
Kwekwe 16 00010 Gwanda 15 00011 
Mutare 30 00012 Marondera 17 0001 
  Bindura n/a 
Source: Compiled from various newspaper sources 
 
 It is on record that only 1% of the waiting list is being housed annually whilst the state 
of land delivery is only 2,4% of the demand generated by the waiting list (Palmer 
Associates, 1995). These figures illustrate that the record of house construction is 
nowhere near alleviating the housing shortage. The government has consistently said 
it cannot handle the burden of housing provision due to limited fiscal space and is 
willing to facilitate private sector involvement especially in the low-income housing 
segment (GoZ, 2012; Potts & Mutambirwa, 1991). Local authorities, which are 
supposed to facilitate the delivery of suitable serviced land for low-income housing 
provision rely on the following main sources of revenue of urban councils (Murimoga 
& Musingafi, 2014):  
 
• the levying of assessment rates on property;  
• receipts from 'trading' accounts like sale of water;  
• tariffs or fees for services rendered;  
• education and health grants as well as road grants for roads in their areas;  
                                                 
1 http://www.sundaymail.co.zw/housing-in-search-of-a-place-called-home/ 
2 http://www.sundaynews.co.zw/local-authorities-abandon-housing-waiting-lists/ 
3 https://www.newsday.co.zw/./2011-09-25-chegutu-grapples-with-housing-. 
4 http://www.chronicle.co.zw/tinshel-properties-inspired-to-change-gweru-landscape/ 
5 http://www.chitungwiza.co.zw/housingpolicy.html 
6 http://www.herald.co.zw/mega-youth-housing-project-for-masvingo/ 
7 www.chronicle.co.zw/cbz-unveils-a-12-million-housing-project 
8 http://www.chronicle.co.zw/city-owed-us10-million/ 
9 allafrica.com/stories/200607270903.html 
10 http://allafrica.com/stories/201603151693.html 
11 www.newzimbabwe.com/news-21710.Gwanda./news.aspx 
12 http://source.co.zw/2014/12/land-choked-mutare-struggles-to-find-housing-space-waiting-list-
exceeds-30000/ 
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• loans for capital works from central government through the national housing 
fund in respect of housing, general loan fund in respect of other infrastructure 
like water and sewerage reticulation, roads and stormwater drainage; and  
• loans from the open market after obtaining necessary borrowing powers from 
the Minister.  
 
Funds raised from operations are however insignificant as most ratepayers are unable 
to settle their bills due to the socio-economic problems that the country is engulfed in 
(Chipungu & Adebayo, 2013) which has resulted in an unemployment rate that is over 
90%. The central government has also been incapacitated in funding the local 
authorities, resulting in all authorities having budget deficits and thus crippled from 
carrying out any meaningful development in the housing arena (Brown, 2001; Chirisa, 
2014; Chitekwe-Biti, 2009; Kamete, 1997). 
 
Despite waiting lists being the sole way of registering with the local authorities for 
low-income housing, city councils have rendered these lists useless as they usually 
don’t make reference to them whenever land and housing is available (Mutembedzi, 
2012; NewsdzeZimbabwe, 2015). Reasons given for this tendency are that more than 
80% of the people on the waiting lists are low-income earners who cannot afford the 
stands that are being serviced by the city councils, and the local authorities need money 
for operations. This move has worsened the plight of low-income earners and reduced 
their chances of getting subsidised housing via the local authorities. The housing 
situation as it currently stands further highlights the low-income group as a niche 
market that is currently not being fully exploited and presents opportunities for private-
sector developers. Furthermore, abandoning the housing waiting lists implies that the 
low-income groups have to resort to the market for all their housing needs, a situation 
which presents opportunities for private developers who might possess resources and 
key competencies to outperform local authorities in the provision of cheaper housing 
products to the target group. 
 
4.3 Housing Policies - Background to Zimbabwe’s Housing Backlog 
Pre-independence, there was always an insufficient supply of housing, through a 
deliberate policy of discouraging blacks from permanently settling in the urban areas 
(GoZ, 2012). Between 1965 and 1979 the national housing stock for blacks increased 
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in response to the rapid growth in the urban population (Muchadenyika, 2015a). This 
population increase was in part because of economic growth and a liberation war-
induced rural-urban migration. After independence, the government of Zimbabwe 
came up with policies that were intended to rectify the urban housing shortage, and 
these policies were mainly a reaction to the perceived imbalance that had occurred 
during the colonial era. Right from the first development plan, Transitional National 
Development Plan (TNDP) which was launched shortly after independence, in the 
period 1982/3 – 1984/5, housing was a top priority, and the government hoped to deal 
with housing backlog through both public and private sector investment (Potts & 
Mutambirwa, 1991). However, at the end of the planning period, there was a massive 
gap between planned and actual construction, with only 13 500 out of 115 000 planed 
houses being delivered. The major reason for this huge discrepancy was lack of 
adequate fiscal resources, with the budget allocation to the Ministry of Construction 
and National Housing below the planned required. This fiscal constraint stemmed from 
a recession that coincided with the TNDP period, a sluggish response from the private 
sector and foreign investment that was much less than what was hoped for 
(Mutembedzi, 2012). 
 
By 1985, the national housing backlog was at 240 000, and in the following year, in 
1986, the government launched the First Five Year National Development Plan 
(FFYDP), which was to run from 1986-1990. Even though the housing backlog was at 
240 000, the plan set the target at 75 000-100 000. Again this 5-year plan was 
predicated on significant input from the private sector, with the formal large-scale 
sector [construction companies, building societies offering construction loans, and 
employers building housing for employees] expected to play a role. But fiscal 
constraints and escalating building costs resulted in actual units built during the 
FFYDP being less than what was achieved during the 2-year TNDP. Thus, the housing 
backlog has continued growing year after year. 
 
 A summary of some housing policies and programs that have been designed to 
increase housing to the low-income groups since independence is shown in Box 4-1. 
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Box 4-1: Housing policies and programs post-independence in Zimbabwe 
▪ The Repeal of Pass Laws (1980) which had been used to regulate and restrict 
the form and permanency of black urban residency.  
▪ Home Ownership which allowed house occupiers to purchase the 
Council/Government rental  
▪ Rent Control Regulations (1982) to regulate the rental market in ways that 
offer protection to both tenants and landlords.  
▪ The establishment of the National Housing Fund (1982) used as a general 
development loan through which local authorities received resources for 
house construction and infrastructural development.  
▪ The establishment of cost-effective and labour-intensive modes of house 
construction such as aided self-help and Building Brigades and the 
development of.  
▪ The Housing and Guarantee Fund (1985-1995) to facilitate civil servants 
and the general public to acquire building society loans for home purchase 
or construction. The Fund was supported by, among others, the World Bank 
and USAID and focused on low-income residential development.  
▪ Implementation of minimum building standards, training of builders and 
other artisans (trade testing system) to ensure the provision of decent and 
durable housing and associated facilities.  
▪ Continuation, broadening and refining the maintenance of Housing Waiting 
Lists.  
▪ Housing Upgrading Programmes where former ‘bachelor accommodation’ 
and housing units were upgrades 
▪ Slum upgrading with the only large-scale project being Epworth outside 
Harare.  
▪ Promotion of Cooperatives and other community-based settlement 
development models. Some of these were directly facilitated by local 
authority Departments of Housing and Community Services and relevant 
arms of the central government as well as civil society organizations such as 
NGOs and CBOs.  
▪ Introduction of rural housing and social amenities programmes including 
the creation of a specific Ministry.  
▪ Private Sector Participation and Employment-based Schemes where the 
involvement of the private sector in the delivery of housing has seen several 
land developers and other companies not involved in the housing sector 
providing housing for their employees while others were promoted by civil 
society organizations. 
 
Source: Mutembedzi (2012) 
 
The policy thrust in housing, post-independence, has been skewed towards 
homeownership, to the unfortunate exclusion of other key policy areas like social, 
rental and institutional housing (Chaeruka & Munzwa, 2009; Potts & Mutambirwa, 
1991). In consequence, 90% of all council housing in Zimbabwe was converted to 
homeownership post-independence. Those who could afford to buy the council houses 
that were offered did so, a move which relegated all those who could not afford to buy 
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the council houses into tenants, lodgers, and to reside in tied accommodation. The 
fixation with homeownership explains why private sector participation has 
traditionally been in the high-income end of the housing market (Chaeruka & Munzwa, 
2009) as the low-income groups usually do not have the financial capability to own 
houses (Chinloy & Megbolugbe, 2013; Mooya & Cloete, 2012). The conversion of 
rental housing to homeownership also resulted in an absence of adequate stocks of 
affordable social accommodation (Chakaipa, 2010), forcing all low-income earners 
who wished to have access to housing to register on council waiting lists with the hope 
of getting access to subsidized land and housing. However, local authorities have been 
unable to cope with the increase in demand for low-income housing (Rakodi & 
Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1990a) and they lament the lack of government support in housing 
the low-income groups, with the last disbursement of funding for housing from the 
central government via the housing development fund having been received in 1983 
(NewsdzeZimbabwe, 2015). The implication for private-sector developers in the low-
income housing segment is that the most supported tenure style in Zimbabwe is that 
which encourages homeownership. Despite this target group having been side-lined in 
the past by private developers, the pent-up demand in this target group presents an 
opportunity for private-sector developers to leverage on economies of scale and design 
homeownership products that are affordable. 
 
4.4 Impact of Zimbabwe’s Economic Policies on Low-Income Housing 
Provision 
Zimbabwe’s urban housing challenge has been steadily getting worse since 
independence. Out of an annual target of 162,000 housing units set between 1985 and 
2000, the actual delivery of housing units ranged between 15,000 and 20,000 units per 
annum with production levels falling further to as low as 5,500 plots in the major urban 
centres against an estimated annual demand of 250,000 units in 2002. The lowest 
number of allotted stands was recorded at 200 in 2004 and the highest at 10, 000 stands 
in 1989 (Chirisa, 2014). In order to redress the colonial imbalances, expectations in 
local governance soon after independence were that the new government should 
remove racial discrimination, abolish dual systems of development emphasizing white 
and black areas, develop democracy, good governance, decentralisation and to align 
local governments institutions’ politics and policies in such a way that they support 
national strategies and visions for development (Jonga, 2014). The country’s urban 
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population increased from 23% during the early 1980s to 38.3% in 2010 (Gumbo, 
2015), putting pressure on the need for urban housing solutions. Efforts in the housing 
department were also directed towards upwards convergence, away from established 
concepts of ultra-low-cost and high-density housing which were perceived as 
reflective of structural inequalities of the colonial period (Davies & Dewar, 1989). 
Given that it is generally accepted in the literature that the main challenge to housing 
the urban poor is housing finance, this section aims to scrutinize Zimbabwe’s 
economic policies, to understand their impact on low-income housing provision by all 
relevant stakeholders – the local authority, central government, the private sector, and 
civic groups. To what extent were the economic policies that were crafted skewed 
towards unlocking finance to solve the housing challenge? 
 
 Between 1980 and 2018, the government of Zimbabwe crafted several economic 
policies as shown in Table 4-2. 
 
Table 4-2: Zimbabwe’s economic policies - 1980 to 2018 
Source: Sibanda and Makwata (2017) 
 
Date  Policy Period Covered 
1-Feb-81  Growth with Equity (GWE)  1981 
1982 Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) 1982-1985 
1985 First Five-Year National Dev Plan (FFYNDP) 1985-1990 
18-Jan-91  
Economic Structural Development Programme 
(ESAP)  
1991-1995 
20-Feb-98  
Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social 
Transformation (ZIMPREST) 
 1996-2000 
29-Mar-00  Vision 2020 & Long-Term Development Strategy  1997-2020 
1-Aug-01 
 Millennium Economic Recovery Programme 
(MERP)  
2001-2002 
1-Feb-03  National Economic Revival Programme (NERP)  2003-2004 
1-Nov-04  Macro-Economic Policy Framework (MEPF)  2005-2006 
1-Apr-06 
National Economic Development Priority 
Programme (NEDPP)  
2006-2008 
30-Sep-07  Zimbabwe Economic Development Strategy (ZEDS) 2007-2011 
19-Mar-09  
Short Term Emergency Recovery programme 
(STERP I)  
2009 
23-Dec-09  
Short Term Emergency Recovery programme 
(STERP II)  
2010-2012 
1-Jul-11  Medium Term Plan (MTP)  2011-2015 
1-Oct-13  
Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic 
Transformation (ZimASSET) 
2013-2018 
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Government expenditure rose to over 50% of GDP between 1980 and 1989, mainly 
because of increased spending on health, social services and infrastructure. Funded by 
an increase in taxation. The budget became unsustainable in the late 1980s due to rising 
unemployment, increasing inflation and a spiralling budget deficit, and a need for 
major structural change was recognised (Brown, 2001). In 1990 Zimbabwe joined the 
World Bank/IMF sponsored Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAP) in 
an attempt to jumpstart the economy which was showing signs of stagnation by the 
late 1980s (ILO, 2006). None of the Economic Structural Development Programme’s 
(ESAP) macroeconomic goals were attained which led to the government introducing 
a second round of economic reforms, the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and 
Social Transformation (ZIMPREST) in 1996 (Brown, 2001). ESAP which signalled 
an end to Zimbabwe’s socialist economic policies worsened the housing challenges- 
the removal of subsidies, coupled with escalating inflation, and an increase in 
unemployment led to a decline in real wages and a dramatic increase in poverty 
(Brown, 2001; Potts, 2006). The Poverty Assessment Study Survey (PASS), carried 
out in 1995, showed a high incidence of poverty in Zimbabwe, with 62% of the 
population classified as poor and 46% classified as very poor, with an income of less 
than US$122 per year (GoZ, 2002). Another dimension of state retrenchment was that 
the national housing fund also shrank (Chirisa et al., 2014). There was overall a 
negative impact on urban living standards (Potts, 2006) and overpopulation, as most 
low-income earners could not afford to stay in proper housing became the norm 
(Chazovachii, 2011).  
 
 As for the Millennium Economic Recovery Plan (MERP), launched in 2000, the lack 
clear priorities, sequencing and binding targets made it difficult to apply resulting in 
the failure to resolve the macroeconomic imbalance (OECD & AfDB, 2002). This 
failure stemmed in large part from weak policy implementation and from policy 
inconsistencies between the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and the government, with 
fiscal policy remaining highly expansionary (Economic Commission for Africa, 
2002). NERP, launched in 2003 also tried to address the macroeconomic imbalances 
which were resulting in high inflation and an overvalued exchange rate, price controls 
were partly removed, but because the programme was largely incoherent- it did not 
provide a clear policy framework to fight macroeconomic imbalances, and government 
still maintained price controls resulting in further deepening of distortions in the 
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allocation of scarce resources. Despite the implementation of NERP, the construction 
industry was affected by a shortage of cement, and a sharp increase in building material 
costs (OECD & AfDB, 2004). NEDPP, which was hinged on PPPs died a natural death 
as the success of the program was compromised by “Operation Murambatsvina”, a 
controversial slum clearance program launched in the same period program that left 
hundreds of thousands of people homeless (Muchadenyika, 2015a). The economy was 
ailing, and international organisations were pulling out of Zimbabwe or taking a back 
seat (Gumbo, 2010) so the government came up with yet another programme, the 
Zimbabwe Economic Development Strategy (ZEDS) in 2007, which contained 
nothing new, but a repackaging of policies contained in the previous policy 
announcements, before NEDPP was implemented (Sibanda & Makwata, 2017). The 
launch of ZEDS was postponed indefinitely at the end of September 2007 (ibid.) 
 
Short Term Emergency Recovery Programmes (STERP I and STERP 2), introduced 
by the inclusive government managed to address issues pertaining to runaway inﬂation 
and economic instability. Under STERP government recognised housing as a critical 
imperative and pledged to make it a priority, starting with evaluating and reviewing 
the national housing policy (GoZ, 2009). The review of the national housing policy 
was to guarantee the transfer of significant portions of land- at least 500 to a million- 
acquired under the land reform programme by local authorities for housing, and to 
adopt a multi-stakeholder approach in the servicing of this land- calling on the private 
sector, government and financial institutions to combine efforts (Chipungu & 
Adebayo, 2013; GoZ, 2009). What contributed to the success of the program is that 
politicians worked together and on the housing front, this was evidenced by the 
government handing over to local authorities the housing projects that were 
commenced under the failed OG/HK (Chipungu & Adebayo, 2013; Sibanda & 
Makwata, 2017). Despite these positives, STERP was charged with being too 
ambitious given that it was short term and therefore did not address the structural 
development challenges facing the country (Sibanda & Makwata, 2017; Zinyama & 
Takavarasha, 2014). The Medium-Term Plan (MTP), launched in 2011, was meant to 
guide all Government programs beyond short term stabilization. This economic 
program acknowledged that the housing backlog was partly attributable to contracting 
budgetary allocations and liquidity constraints which made it difficult for private 
sector participation. Other challenges facing the housing sector were listed as a 
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shortage of building materials, skills flight, uncoordinated town planning and rural 
resettlement. Policy measures targeted at resolving these issues included reviewing the 
national housing policy, resource mobilisation for the National Housing Delivery 
Programme where the government wanted to ensure that there is construction of core 
houses and provision of associated amenities for low-income earners and civil 
servants. The private sector in this economic programme was to be roped in via 
provision of land for private sector development for the low to middle income earners 
by the state via the local authorities, establishing PPPs in residential property 
development and reviewing laws and regulation pertaining to lease arrangements to 
encourage private sector housing construction (GoZ, 2011). This program was hastily 
abandoned when the political party, ZANU PF, won the 2013 elections paving the way 
for the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation 
(ZimAsset) Programme in 2013 (Sibanda & Makwata, 2017). ZimAsset was described 
as a results-based agenda built around four strategic clusters namely: Food Security 
and Nutrition; Social Services and Poverty Eradication; Infrastructure and Utilities; 
and Value Addition and Beneficiation. The document acknowledged the housing 
backlog estimated at 1.25 million housing units and intimated that the Land Reform 
Program had also increased demand for housing in urban and resettlement areas. 
ZimAsset sought to improve the standard of living under the social services cluster in 
the housing department and a target of 125,000 housing units to be constructed over 
the five years, between 2013 and 2018 was set as shown in Table 4-3. 
 
 85 
 
Table 4-3: Excerpt from ZimASSET’s Social Services and Poverty Eradication Matrix 
Cluster 
Outcome 
Cluster 
Output 
Strategies 
Lead 
Institution 
Improved 
standard of 
living 
125,000 
housing 
units 
constructed 
• Provide serviced land 
• Strengthen Public-Private Partnerships 
• Adaptation of new building technology 
• Strengthen community-based housing 
organisations 
• Strengthen micro-housing finance institutions 
• Adopt densification (vertical expansion) 
• Recapitalisation of the National Housing and 
National Guarantee Fund 
Ministry 
responsible for 
national housing 
Source: GoZ (2013) 
 
This target which was set of 125,000 housing units was a ‘daunting challenge’ (CAHF, 
2015) as this economic blueprint was being implemented in a country with serious 
challenges on transparency, accountability and corruption and weak public service 
delivery institutions which have serious capacity challenges (Sibanda & Makwata, 
2017). ZimASSET required about USD 27 billion to fully operationalise but the 
country was struggling to fund a USD 4 billion budget whose bigger share was going 
towards recurrent expenditure. As at 2018, all analysts who were evaluating ZimAsset 
were in agreement, the economic policy was a flop (Sibanda & Makwata, 2017). 
 
Despite all these economic policies, the economic crises in Zimbabwe has been 
chalked down to poor macroeconomic management and an unsustainable fiscal policy 
(OECD & AfDB, 2002). Right from independence, the state and local authorities were 
in no position to underpin the new housing movement from their own financial 
resources and instead opted for a market based housing process, based on the concepts 
of freehold tenure and ability to pay – which underpinned the commodification of 
council-owned housing (Davies & Dewar, 1989), and this drive for homeownership 
was inherited and continued post-independence (Kamete, 1998). These economic 
programmes have been viewed by the western donor community and local analysts as 
not comprehensive enough to stop the deterioration of the country’s economic and 
social conditions, mainly due to the lack of political will, and as a result, funding for 
development programmes virtually dried up, with the AfDB only providing the 
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country with humanitarian assistance in response to the food crisis in 2002 and 2005 
(AfDB, 2007). A solid track record of prudent macro-economic policies and positive 
development prospects with significant investment supporting economic growth can 
lead to an improvement of fiscal dynamics and would mean the country would be less 
dependent on donor aid, as has been witnessed in Ghana where the ratio of total donor 
aid has reduced from 49% in 2005/6 to 29% in 2015/16 (CAHF, 2015). Only those 
countries that rank high on good governance indicators and have in place strong 
political institutions that regulate government policy have good relations with donor 
institutions and the donor support can go a long way in developing the housing finance 
sector (ibid.). Zimbabwe is a testament to the importance of donor funds in the housing 
sector, as the highest number of housing units was delivered in the 1990s, largely 
driven by donor funding. The major impediment for the government to successfully 
achieve meaningful strides in housing provision was lack of funding, especially after 
the ﬂight of donor support. It is this lack of funding which was behind the failure of 
the massive construction program undertaken by the government since independence 
dubbed “Operation Live-Well” that was undertaken by the government in the 
aftermath of the slum clearance programme (Operation Murambatsvina) in 2005 
(Chipungu & Adebayo, 2013; Gumbo, 2010). One of the reasons behind the refusal of 
the IMF, the World Bank and many donor countries who are very active in the housing 
sphere to release funds to Zimbabwe was because of its economic policies (Chitekwe 
& Mitlin, 2001). 
 
Donor organisations are a key player in low-income housing delivery (Mashoko, 2012) 
as donor support is needed to support community-to-community exchanges, to pay for 
professional support costs and to provide funds for innovative activities in, 
infrastructure and housing designed to provide loan funds (Chitekwe & Mitlin, 2001). 
There are numerous examples of these activities in literature, e.g., in the first decade 
of its independence (1980-1990), the Government of Zimbabwe worked quite 
assiduously, with the assistance of the donor community, to upgrade Epworth- a 
squatter settlement (Chirisa, 2013). During the 1980s and 1990s, local authorities 
around Zimbabwe embarked on large site and services programmes ﬁnanced by donor 
funding through bilateral agreements with the central government (Chipungu & 
Adebayo, 2013). When donor funding ceased, the site and service schemes were 
discontinued (Chitekwe-Biti, 2009; Mashoko, 2012). In 1991, Mutare City Council 
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established a twinning link with the City of Haarlem in Holland, the aim being to 
provide housing to the poor population living in the Sakubva residential area, with the 
donor funding schemes contributing 2.1% from 2000 to 2010 (Mashoko, 2012). In the 
late 90s, lower-income families in Zimbabwe were being offered mortgages at 15 per 
cent through building societies within a scheme subsidized by USAID at a time when 
inflation was at 60%. Activities of Dialogue for shelter in Beitbridge, targeted at the 
low-income group were capitalised by Misereor, the first donor for Dialogue for 
shelter (Chitekwe-Biti, 2009). The government was also able to send officers to 
academic institutions for programs in the field of freshwater resources, solid waste and 
sewage management which are critical in housing under Capacity-Building, 
Education, Training and Awareness-Raising donor-funded programs (GoZ, 2002). 
These examples are not exhaustive, but they give a clear indication of the positive 
impact that donor funding has had in Zimbabwe.  
 
The flight of donor funding and the continued dry spell despite the various economic 
policies that have been launched from 1980 to 2018 is an indicator that the policies 
have not had a positive impact on the housing front. Good economic policies are also 
supposed to result in an improvement in governance indicators, so as to attract other 
stakeholders such as the private sector into the low-income housing field. Governance 
indicators for Zimbabwe as measured by the World Bank have generally been 
declining since 1996. 
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Table 4-4: World Bank governance indicators for Zimbabwe 
Governance 
 Indicator 
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2017 
Voice and 
accountability 
-0.61 -0.79 -1.09 -1.36 -1.55 -1.54 -1.55 -1.48 -1.47 -1.26 -1.18 -1.20 
Political  
stability  
-0.46 -0.74 -1.32 -1.52 -1.21 -0.93 -1.21 -1.10 -0.78 -0.71 -0.62 -0.77 
Government  
effectiveness 
-0.32 -0.33 -0.80 -0.91 -1.00 -1.23 -1.53 -1.51 -1.34 -1.21 -1.16 -1.19 
Regulatory  
Quality 
-0.77 -0.70 -1.42 -1.93 -2.06 -1.96 -2.14 -2.07 -1.89 -1.90 -1.72 -1.56 
Rule of Law -0.81 -0.66 -1.34 -1.59 -1.80 -1.74 -1.78 -1.82 -1.63 -1.43 -1.37 -1.38 
Control of 
 corruption 
-0.28 -0.48 -0.98 -1.23 -1.33 -1.36 -1.36 -1.37 -1.37 -1.39 -1.25 -1.27 
Source: World Bank data set13 
 
Of interest in the housing sector from other studies are four indicators - government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. Government 
effectiveness which measures quality of public service provision, bureaucracy, the 
competence of civil servants, government policy credibility & independence of civil 
service from political pressures has an effect on the development in Zimbabwe as 
studies have lamented on uncalled for transaction costs in the development process, 
stringent procedures and delays in the approval of plans and permits, slow acquisition 
of peri-urban land for housing and lack of coordination among the institutions which 
are involved in housing delivery (Chirisa, 2014; Mashoko, 2012). The policy 
environment in Zimbabwe is also characterised by a thin dividing line between the 
policy-making process and party politics and has been described as an authoritarian 
approach to policy-making, which often results in policies being implemented without 
stakeholder consultation and support, further reducing the credibility of such policies 
(Chipungu & Adebayo, 2013). Interference from the Central Government on the day 
to day management of local authorities has contributed to the crippling of local 
authorities (GoZ, 2009; Muchadenyika, 2015a). Regulatory quality, on the other hand, 
looks at the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls, inadequate 
bank supervision and excessive regulation. This index was on a downward trend pre-
2008, with the index bottoming at -2.14 in 2008. Price controls during the 
hyperinflationary environment in Zimbabwe adversely affected the construction sector 
                                                 
13 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home 
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as there was a significant shortage of building material. Foreign exchange rates were 
controlled until 1993 (Brown, 2001; Chitekwe & Mitlin, 2001), and in response to 
worsening macro-economic fundamentals, the government in 2007 reintroduced 
regulations and exchange rate controls that it had abandoned earlier in the decade 
(Brown, 2001; Chitekwe & Mitlin, 2001; Sibanda & Makwata, 2017). 
 
Inflation, which peaked at 231 million per cent in 2008 (Stoeffler, Alwang, Mills, & 
Taruvinga, 2016) resulted in an increase in building costs (Brown, 2001), an increase 
in market mortgage interest rates beyond what could be afforded by the low-income 
group (Chitekwe & Mitlin, 2001). There were also building societies that collapsed as 
a result of hyperinflation (GoZ, 2009). All these economic policies contained useful 
objectives and roadmaps addressing the challenges that the country was going through. 
But the results from these economic policies are ‘always disastrous’, because 
systematic parameters through which these policies are supposed to be implemented 
are not clearly defined, possibly due to the institutional design and political culture 
which undermines a multi-stakeholder approach, as consultation, which is a key input 
for a healthy policy environment is often not done (Chipungu & Adebayo, 2013).  
The country has institutions through which consensus-building can be achieved such 
as the Tripartite Negotiation Forum that brings together business people, labour 
movements and the government but the government does not take these institutions 
seriously (Chipungu & Adebayo, 2013). 
  
Absence of policy credibility led to exchange rate risk and volatility, currency 
speculation and rent-seeking economic behaviour (Zinyama & Takavarasha, 2014). A 
general legal framework for faster, non-judicial arbitration of disputes as measured by 
ease of contract enforcement is also key in the development sector. But it has been 
shown that in most developing countries state institutions are weak and the 
enforcement of policy and legislation is wanting, especially in the area of land tenure 
(CAHF, 2015). Zimbabwe is no different, as, since the land reform exercise, there have 
been land tenure disputes. The rule of law (effectiveness and predictability of the 
judiciary, enforceability of contracts, incidence of crime), and, control of corruption 
(perception of corruption) is very important to attract investment into the low-income 
housing sector as it improves ease of doing business rankings (CAHF, 2015; Sibanda 
& Makwata, 2017). In Zimbabwe, the dismissal of councillors, mayors and councillors 
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due to corruption and the introduction of Governors, Provincial Administrators and 
District Administrators in urban councils’ administration all have failed to improve 
local governance. In contrast, due to lack of stakeholder and political commitment, 
corruption has not been abated but has continued to further deteriorate local 
governance (Chirisa et al., 2014; Jonga, 2014; Kamete, 2001b; Sibanda & Makwata, 
2017). 
 
Corrupt tendencies tend to raise the costs of building (Chirisa, 2014), results in hazy 
land allocation processes and land accumulation in the housing sector by government 
officials in power and compromises council urban service delivery (Muchadenyika, 
2015a, 2015b). All of the country’s economic policies acknowledged that combating 
corruption, especially in the public sector is vital to reviving the economy and even 
specify the measures that should be taken including the Prevention of Corruption Act 
and formation of an Anti-Corruption Unit (GoZ, 2009; Zinyama & Takavarasha, 
2014), but it is widely perceived that the courts have generally been biased towards 
the government in handling political cases (Zinyama & Takavarasha, 2014)and the 
government has not shown any political will to stamp out corruption. 
 
4.5 Regulatory Environment 
The regulatory environment governing low-cost housing development can be put into 
four categories. These according to (Chaeruka & Munzwa, 2009) include: 
▪ policies, legislation and institutional arrangements that relate to land 
development 
▪ housing development procedures  
▪ housing policy and allied legislation  
▪ housing finance and urban settlement management. 
 
The guiding principles and basic sectoral settlement policies are identified in the 
Regional Town and Country Planning Act with related statutory instruments. The 
Housing Standards Act and related Model Building Bylaws, as well as the Minimum 
Building and Planning Standards define the standards for shelter and structure (GoZ, 
2002). Ordinarily and at law, land allocation functions reside in local authorities and 
central government through the state land office. However, since 2000, countering the 
prominence of opposition parties in governing cities and urban areas, a new approach 
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to housing land allocation emerged. Local authorities have been unable to perform 
land allocation functions (Muchadenyika, 2015a) and the government has used three 
instruments to undermine the functioning of urban councils: the local government 
minister; changes to the Urban Councils Act (Chapter 29: 15); and ruling party 
structures, including youth militia. These developments, though political, 
inadvertently affect low-income housing developers as the success of such ventures 
depend on access to land. 
 
The following sections detail the rules that guide the housing development process, 
access to land for low-income housing and also expounds on the impact of rent control 
and slum clearance programs in Zimbabwe. 
 
4.5.1 The housing development process in Zimbabwe 
The development process is not documented, but through interviews with private 
developers and officials from the town planning department from the city of 
Bulawayo, the study was able to gather that the development process follows the flow 
process in Figure 4-1. 
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Figure 4-1: The housing development process in Zimbabwe 
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4.5.2 Access to land for low-income housing 
Private developers intending to undertake housing development can either apply for 
state land or apply for land within local authority bounds. Problems with regard to the 
acquisition of land and the bad location of many projects on cheap peripheral land with 
inadequate trunk infrastructure have been listed as one of the major contributors to the 
low-income housing challenge in Zimbabwe (Mutembedzi, 2012). Muchadenyika 
(2015a) however posits that for the low-income groups, the challenge is not just the 
availability of land, but the land should be suitable and affordable for the target group. 
In Zimbabwe, conversion of state land to private land is a process that takes many 
stages including acquisition, compensation for improvements, planning, allocation of 
stands, and full payment (Chirisa et al., 2014), a process that can take years to 
complete. Level I and Level II cities own land within their boundaries, and this land 
can be disposed to prospective developers to generate revenue (Chakaipa, 2010). If 
land is available from the local authority, the process in Figure 4-2 has to be adhered 
to. 
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Figure 4-2: Land application procedure from Local Authorities 
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The flow process is relatively simple as shown above. If one submits a land application 
proposal to any urban council, and if the land is available and suitable for residential 
development, the council executive officials write a report in response to the 
application. The report is discussed, and a decision is taken by the council land 
committee. If the council land committee approves, the decision is taken to full 
council, which should ordinarily take a decision as advised by the land committee. 
However, due to the politics and fighting between the central government and local 
Authorities, if council land committee is dominated by one party and the full council 
dominated by another party, it complicates the process, and this can result in land 
supply bottlenecks (Muchadenyika, 2015a).  
 
During the 1990s and around 2000, Council and the state did not own much land in 
the urban areas, since most of the land earmarked for urban expansion was privately 
owned and indications are that there were protracted negotiations with landowners 
over selling prices (Mutembedzi, 2012). Although farms were offered for urban 
development under Section 5 of the Land Acquisition Act in 2007 from the fast track 
land reform (FTLR) exercise, most local authorities could not use them for expansion 
because they had not been transferred into the local authority jurisdiction through 
Section three of the same Act. Reasons given point to political misunderstandings 
between central and local government as each is run by the ruling party and the 
opposition respectively. Instead, central government gave FTLR-acquired peri-urban 
land, without services, directly to housing co-operatives, resulting in the sprouting of 
unplanned settlements around cities (Muchadenyika, 2015a) 
 
Council found it difficult to provide serviced stands on the market because it had had 
no money and had also lost much of its land in the land occupations of the FTLR 
program (Mutembedzi, 2012). Both the government and council were finding it a 
challenge to remove people who had settled themselves on farms which were to be 
used by the council for urban development. Also, houses were developed on the 
occupied farms without consultation with the city’s Planning Department and the 
Department of Physical Planning. These were presenting council with difficulties since 
even though legally council can condemn the structures, politically it cannot do 
anything since the political party that is in power considers the occupants as legitimate. 
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4.5.3 Rent control 
The rental market is a viable market for housing developers operating in the low-
income housing space (CAHF, 2015) but in Zimbabwe, this is not the case. The rental 
market is guided by Rent Control Regulations which were introduced in 182 and later 
amended in 2007. While benefiting tenants, the immediate result of rent control laws 
has been to deter private individual and institutional investment in residential rental 
properties and to encourage the sale of rented property (Rakodi & Mutizwa-Mangiza, 
1990a). Because of the regulations, rental housing has generally been viewed 
negatively, resulting in considerable capital flight (Chaeruka & Munzwa, 2009). Issues 
that have been raised that arise from the rent regulation are that it is difficult to evict 
bad tenants and it is illegal to increase rents on a residential property without a rent 
order even if there has been a change in ownership for the property or a new lease. 
State involvement in an otherwise private transaction also complicates the functioning 
of a rental market as Existing legislation empowers the Minister responsible for 
housing issues to regulate the letting and hiring of any immovable property, determine 
and establish bodies (the Rent and Rent Appeal Boards) that deal with the setting of 
rents charged. The jurisdiction of courts regarding eviction orders is curtailed to 
protect lodgers/tenants from landlords (Chaeruka & Munzwa, 2009). 
 
4.5.4 Operation Murambatsvina and Operation Garikai 
The national slum clearing programs code-named “Operation Murambatsvina” (OM) 
meaning operation restore order, that was carried out in 2005 worsened the housing 
problem (Msindo, Gutsa, & Choguya, 2013). About 700 000 people are estimated to 
have been directly affected by the operation through the loss of housing (Chipungu & 
Adebayo, 2013). Operation “Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle” meaning operation live well 
commenced on 29 June 2005 as a successor programme to deliver low-cost and decent 
accommodation mainly to the victims of OM (Mufema, 2006). The initial plan was for 
the government to construct 5 000 housing units countrywide, under phase one and 10 
000 housing units under phase two. Due to a shortage of funds, this target was revised 
and instead phase two then became an aided self-help scheme where developers, 
employers, co-operatives and individuals were allocated un-serviced land to build their 
own houses. From inception, the operation was not well planned for and suffered from 
a lack of funds (Mufema, 2006; Mutembedzi, 2012). 
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Whilst the operation had noble intentions, the way it was carried out raised a lot of 
furore as central government overreached local government turf and imposed housing 
resettlement plans without prior consultation with the local government. A decade 
later, beneficiaries under the “Garikayi/Hlalani Kuhle” housing scheme still did not 
have sewer trunk infrastructure and potable water and some of the living conditions 
are squalid (Mutembedzi, 2012). Council was important to the project for various 
reasons which included the need to assess potential water sources and sewage 
processing and the provision of services such as transport, education and health 
facilities. As a result, some settlements that were created by the operation are still 
classified as informal settlements in council books (ibid.) as the projects were not 
incorporated into local authority areas and are away from the major built-up area of 
cities and nearby water and sewer connections. Most of the beneficiaries of this 
operation were however not the victims of OM as most could not raise the deposit that 
was required under the scheme (Mufema, 2006). Once again, targeting errors resulted 
in an increase in the number of low-income groups in need of housing solutions.  
 
In summary, despite the various efforts and policies implemented by the state, the 
housing challenge has been worsening due to the following reasons (GoZ, 2012; 
Mutembedzi, 2012) 
• Lack of policy coherence regarding rural-urban integration, 
• Inadequate investment by both the public and private sector in the housing 
sector, 
• Lack of policies to enable effective participation of other actors in housing 
development, 
• Unreliable supply of affordable building materials, and 
• Bottlenecks in the land delivery process 
• Weak financial capacities of local urban authorities to upgrade both existing 
old and dilapidated off-sight infrastructure to accommodate new ones. 
• Unavailability of relevant appropriate, accessible housing finance mechanisms 
in the market. 
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4.6 Facilitating Civil Society and Private Sector Participation in Low-Income 
Housing  
Since independence, all the economic policies have been aimed at increasing civil 
society and private sector participation in low-income housing. A summary of these 
policies is given in table 4-2 above. In 1982, a National Housing Fund (NHF) was 
formed, and its purpose was to allocate government loans to local authorities for the 
servicing of land and construction of housing earmarked for low-income housing and 
to also provide funds for civil service housing programme, most of which were low-
income oriented (Kamete, 1997, 1998). Provision of these serviced stands was the key 
for enabling privately mobilised funds into low-income housing via incremental 
housing. In the 1983 Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP), the concept of 
self-help was central to policies designed to help alleviate poverty. Housing co-
operatives were identified as part of the strategy ( Co-operative Housing International 
[CHI], 2016; Rakodi & Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1990a). With the adoption of neoliberal 
market reforms in the 1990s under the Economic Structural Adjustment Program 
(ESAP), the state removed subsidies and all forms of public support to the citizens. 
Another dimension of state retrenchment was that the national housing fund for public-
sector housing which was key in funding aided self-help low-income housing projects 
(Gumbo, 2010) shrank, resulting in local authorities being unable to service land for 
the low-income groups (Chirisa et al., 2014). Low-income people have been coming 
together to pool their resources and build houses for members in the form of 
cooperatives (Zimbabwe National Association of Housing Cooperatives, n.d) as a way 
of providing houses for the low-income groups and 94 840 houses were built in the 
country between 2010 and 2015. These forms of civic organisation have however been 
fraught with a number of challenges viz. access to sufficient, affordable land in good 
locations, poor resource mobilisation (Chirisa et al., 2014), access to affordable 
finance in the form of construction loans, recognizing the financial capacity of the 
people and the co-operatives and access to affordable building material (CHI, 2016; 
Rakodi & Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1990a), political interference and vulnerability to land 
barons (Langa, 2016) 
 
 With effect from April 2016, the government of Zimbabwe announced it will stop 
allocating state land to co-operatives. Council authorities have also stopped issuing 
land to co-operatives following a review of their housing policy (Voinea, 2016). This 
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development presents a unique opportunity for private developers who are willing to 
serve the low-income group as the target group no longer has any alternative options 
for housing provision. Zimbabwe currently has over 7,000 housing co-operatives that 
have been registered with the Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises and Co-
operatives Development and these co-ops can now only access land from private 
individuals, an option which can be too expensive. Given that housing cooperatives 
have been a fund pooling mechanism, and these cooperatives would then go ahead and 
engage private developers to develop and construct their houses, this move, therefore, 
works against small developers and opens opportunities for developers with a higher 
capital base to buy land and develop that land for presale to the low-income groups. 
 
4.7 Opportunities for Private Sector Low-Income Housing Development in 
Zimbabwe 
Traditionally, in Zimbabwe, private sector provision of housing has concentrated on 
medium and high-cost housing development (Mutembedzi, 2012). Unlike high-density 
housing, where most low-income housing schemes are located, low-density housing 
does not require connected sewer and water systems required for high-density 
schemes. Beneficiaries can use septic tanks and boreholes for sewer and water 
respectively and can comfortably occupy un-serviced land unlike low-income 
developments which are placed in zoning areas where septic tanks are not allowed 
under the Town and Regional Planning Act (Chapter 29:12). 
 
Given the high housing backlog and a government that is failing to raise the fiscal 
resources necessary to alleviate the housing shortages in the country, Zimbabwe 
presents a fertile ground for those private developers willing to adapt their business 
models and serve the low-income housing sector. The government has openly called 
on the private developers to partner with the state and local authorities. There are a 
number of studies which have lamented the high building standards that have to be 
upheld in Zimbabwe in line with building model by-laws (Chaeruka & Munzwa, 2009; 
Mufema, 2006), and have listed these as barriers to entry for private-sector developers. 
UN defines housing standards as measures of the acceptability of housing at a given 
time and place in a cultural, technological and economic setting (Zami & Lee, 2007). 
In line with current housing policy, local authorities have sanctioned a reduction in 
housing standards (Chideme, 2013). These reductions include a reduction in minimum 
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plot sizes from the traditional 300m2 to 150m2, a move that will significantly reduce 
the cost of buying land for the low-income earners. Gravel roads are now permitted as 
the local authorities are no longer insisting on tarred roads. For the superstructure, 
whilst the external walls still must conform to the Standards of Association of 
Zimbabwe, the internal walls can be built using cheaper alternative materials e.g. farm 
bricks. This reduction in standards is summarised in Table 4-5 
 
Table 4-5: Reduction in building standards 
Aspect Previous Current 
Minimum plot size 300m2 150m2 
Internal walls Standard bricks Alternative cheaper materials 
Roads Tarred Gravel 
Toilets Strictly sewer 
Temporary use of Ecological 
Sanitation toilets 
 
Patel et al. (2018) point to empirical work from Brazil, India and Tanzania which has 
shown that high standards e.g. lot sizes and road width impose unnecessary costs on 
residents, users, and developers by making housing more expensive and they conclude 
that restrictive regulations have prevented the private sector from supplying affordable 
housing at a scale that can make a difference. Another aspect of the regulatory 
framework which should be looked at according to the literature which adds on to costs 
are cumbersome, costly, and time-consuming land registration and subdivision 
processes (Monkkonen, 2013, Chirisa, 2014) and complex, bureaucratic, and multi-
layered process of converting agricultural land on the urban periphery to developable 
land suitable for urban use and housing production (Patel et al., 2018). 
 
 
 
 
It is important to note that in Zimbabwe, there is little if any, government support that 
is offered to private-sector developers who intend to service the low-income group. It 
is recognised that policy and legislative instruments are usually required to incentivize 
the participation of private finance in low-cost housing as without such incentives low-
cost housing rarely attracts viable and affordable funding options for the poor 
(Chaeruka & Munzwa, 2009). But in Zimbabwe, due to fiscal constraints, there is a 
predisposition to try and promote development without raising public expenditure. Of 
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key interest is the endowment policy where private developers are obligated to cover 
all the costs of development and/or directly provide or donate land as endowment in-
lieu of providing services. The rationale for the endowment policy is that a private 
development imposes a burden on the local planning authority (either central or local 
government) in terms of public service provision (schools, hospitals, roads etc.) that 
would otherwise not be budgeted for. Where there is development of plots that are less 
than two acres, as is the case in low-income developments, the developer is required 
to provide piped water supply from an approved source at the developer’s cost and the 
water supply system is to be handed over free of cost to the responsible local authority 
(ibid.). 
 
This contrasts with the support system that has been inbuilt in other countries, e.g. 
South Africa, to facilitate both private and public entities which are interested in 
providing low-income housing. The government will practically guide the institutions 
interested in providing housing targeted at the primary and secondary target market 
until they are able to qualify for an institutional supply-side subsidy such as the pre-
accreditation and Gear-up Grant, Project Feasibility Grant, Specific Intervention Grant 
(CAHFF, 2012). This approach is also supported by (Kamete, 1998) who asserts that 
the key to the success of low-income housing projects is the role that the state plays 
through providing subsidies either via the local authorities or central government.  
 
The structural environment in Zimbabwe is therefore fraught with constraints, but 
there is a huge demand for housing that can still be served by private-sector developers. 
This situation then calls for adaptive developers who can mould their business models 
in response to the structural enablers and/or constraints in order to successfully develop 
low-income housing in Zimbabwe. Beside fiscal constraints cities in Zimbabwe, is 
facing a myriad of problems ranging from a deteriorating ecological situation, serious 
pollution, inadequate maintenance of wastewater treatment plants, poor infrastructural 
framework, garbage collection, dilapidated infrastructure in the CBD, deplorable state 
of the road infrastructure, rampant corruption and the abuse of loan facilities, poor 
street lighting, poor and uncoordinated housing delivery system, poor urban transport 
system, broken water and sanitation system and poor monitoring and enforcement of 
city by-laws (Mawonde, 2015). Whilst these can be viewed as constraints, local 
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authorities would be willing to partner with private players to find a way of solving 
these challenges. 
 
4.8 Prevailing Economic Environment in Zimbabwe 
The period prior to 2009 was characterized by severe hyperinflation which contributed 
to a highly unstable local currency that was eventually abandoned in favour of foreign 
currency in 2009, a situation that is termed “dollarization”. Since dollarization of the 
Zimbabwean economy in early 2009, there has been a marked increase in competition 
amongst various institutions in the issuance of personal loans and consumer credit. As 
at 31 December 2015, personal loans amounted to 24.28% of the total issued bank 
loans and was surpassed only by the manufacturing sector. But, lending towards 
construction and property, which is what might boost private developers willing to 
venture into the low-income housing production sphere has remained consistently 
subdued as shown in Figure 4-3. 
 
Figure 4-3: Sector distribution of credit as at 31 March 2018 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe [RBZ] (2018) 
 
The depressed lending to capital intensive sectors such as construction is reflective of 
the limited capacity of banking institutions to provide long-term funding due to the 
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reluctance by the public to commit funds for long periods (CAHF, 2015) has 
handicapped the financial institutions, resulting in survival tactics such as offering 
short term loans at high-interest rates. The construction industry is reeling from the 
effects of this worsening liquidity crisis, and this has been compounded by this heavy 
reliance on expensive short-term loans for capitalisation (Nkala, 2012).  
 
In a bid to encourage lending for construction and property, the minister of Finance 
and Economic Development implemented the exemption from income tax to receipts 
and accruals on all mortgage finance in the 2014 National Budget Statement with 
effect from 1 January 2014 (RBZ, 2014). Also, to incentivise the provision of new 
additional mortgage financing, the government waived stamp duty on the cession of 
mortgage bonds with effect from January 2015. This was meant to enhance the 
availability of resources towards financing housing programs. Access to reasonably 
priced long-term construction loans by the developers may be the key towards 
attracting private developers into the low-income housing sphere. As it is, limited 
availability of affordable long-term finance impacts negatively on the ability of low-
income housing developers to provide affordable terms to their clients as in business, 
the norm is to pass the high cost of borrowing to their customers. 
 
Mortgage lending is largely undertaken by the Central African Building Society 
(CABS), CBZ Bank, FBC Bank and ZB Building Society. The mortgage lending rates 
range from 15 -20% depending on the institution. Despite the high cost of funds, 
financial institutions have developed innovations to reduce the cost of borrowing for 
low-income clients. Some banking institutions have partnered with housing developers 
and are offering products designed for low-income groups. Examples are CABS, 
which offers a low-priced mortgage product for borrowers in high-density areas, for 
which an interest rate of 12% is charged as opposed to 15% that applies to borrowers 
in low-density areas. In an effort to enable low-income earners to access housing 
finance, building societies collaborate with employers to provide loans at subsidised 
rates. CBZ has introduced a product called ‘the Cash-Plus Housing Savings Product’ 
targeted at the informal sector. It involves the potential borrower saving with the 
institution for twelve months after which the client then qualifies for a loan equivalent 
to his/her savings (CAHF, 2015). 
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 The idea of securitizing mortgages to spur liquidity in the mortgage market is also 
mooted in the 2015 monetary policy statement. Securitization is the financial practice 
of pooling various types of contractual debt such as residential mortgages and selling 
their related cash flows to third party investors as securities, which may be described 
as bonds, pass-through securities, or collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). This 
securitisation process is however dependent on the existence of a secondary mortgage 
market. A secondary mortgage market allows financial institutions to sell mortgages, 
which would give financial institutions new funds to offer more mortgages to 
borrowers. Essentially, an efficient secondary mortgages market connects low-cost 
capital to housing projects, increases liquidity for lenders, and improves financial risk 
management for lenders and investors. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) 
governor, however, through the 2014 monetary policy statement, does recognize that 
an increase in lending to the property sector depends on banking institutions putting in 
place adequate risk management systems. Credit risk has remained an issue however, 
that dampens all the efforts to encourage long term lending. An unprecedented surge 
in loan defaults led to the chronic problem of non-performing loans (NPLs) and 
foreclosures. This undesirable scenario contributed to the propagation of instability in 
the Zimbabwean banking system. 
 
Figure 4-4 shows the trend of NPLs in the Zimbabwean banking sector where it can 
be observed that these loans grew consistently from 1.62% of the total issued bank 
loans in June 2009 to a peak of 18.49% in June 2014 before starting to decline to the 
last published level of 10.87% in December 2015. However, despite the declining 
trend in the level of NPLs, more still needs to be done to completely arrest the problem 
of chronic NPLs in the Zimbabwean banking sector. 
 
Figure 4-4: Non-performing loans trend 
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Source: RBZ (2015) 
 
The implication therefore for low-income developers is that in the current economic 
environment, those who have access to capital, either through savings or injections 
from partners, are likely to do well. Successful low-income housing development 
hinges on keeping costs low as much as possible and long-term loan capital in 
Zimbabwe is currently higher than in other countries. The targeted clientele for the 
housing development, i.e. the low-income groups are also unlikely to qualify for any 
loan schemes in the country. Most low-income earners in the country earn an average 
of 300 dollars and this figure is way below what building societies are willing to 
consider for long term mortgage and construction. For private developers, this implies 
that the capital base that a developer will be willing to invest in low-income housing 
has to take into account that the developer would have to offer funding to the target 
clientele, i.e. allow the target group to buy the housing on credit over a certain period. 
As of 2014, only 13.7 % of the economically active population was employed on a 
permanent basis. This number is likely to have gone down significantly as thousands 
of workers lost their jobs in the period from July 2015 after a Supreme Court ruling 
allowing employers to terminate contracts on notice. An estimated 20,000 workers 
were laid off within the month following the ruling (Dzirutwe, 2015). 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
Since independence, public provision of low-income housing in Zimbabwe has 
continued to face challenges of production, funding, targeting and cost recovery 
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(Kamete, 1998). This has led to a serious low-income housing gap and the creation of 
an untapped niche market that can be exploited by private-sector developers. These 
housing products would be designed in an environment where the government has no 
fiscal space for subsidies, there is a notable absence of donor activity, there is a 
dwindling supply of council-owned rented housing stock and more than 80% of the 
economy is employed in the informal sector due to economic challenges. 
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5. METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 Introduction  
A potential breakthrough to the low-income housing challenge is to find a formula of 
attracting private-sector developers to serve this hitherto shunned segment of the 
society. Fulfilment of this objective calls for empirical investigation and analysis of 
real-life contexts, where private-sector developers are serving the low-income group. 
In chapter 2, the structure-agency theory was adopted as the theoretical framework 
guiding this study, and a conceptual framework therefrom was developed. This chapter 
develops the methodology and demonstrates how the conceptual framework developed 
in chapter2, can be applied in studying private sector initiatives in low-income housing 
development. Section 5.2 teases out what needs to be accomplished in this study by 
reflecting on the objectives of this study and the associated methodological 
implications and challenges. Section 5.3 zooms in on ontology and epistemological 
issues in this research, all of which culminate in the methodology discussion in section 
5.4. Section 5.5 focuses on methodological issues stemming from the Structure-
Agency theory – basing on studies that have applied the Structure-Agency theory. The 
implementation of the conceptual framework that was settled on in chapter 2 is 
discussed in section 5.6. Section 5.7 discusses the research design and the chapter ends 
with a conclusion. 
 
5.2 Methodological Implication of this Study’s Objectives  
The objectives guiding this study call for qualitative research. Formal codified rules of 
the development process, culture, social norms and the various types of resources that 
are available to the private-sector developers are all qualitative variables that should 
be scrutinised to see the extent to which they constrain and/ enable low-income 
housing development by the private sector. That said, there can be no quantitative data 
that can be modelled via econometric models that can be applied to the first objective 
guiding this study that can help determine the structural enablers and constraints for 
low-income housing development in Zimbabwe. Instead, this study needs a 
methodology that is flexible enough to deal with contextual qualitative data that comes 
from detailing the operating environment and exploring how then these aspects of the 
operating environment impact developers. Object two, which looks at the strategies 
applied by developers to exploit enablers and to mitigate constraints requires again a 
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methodology that exposes the development process and allows scrutiny of market 
processes that are enabled by and or constrained by the contextual environment and 
how these developers react to these. The role of the government within the 
development process also calls for a detailed narrative which shows how the role of 
the government intersects with the activities carried out by the developers. Thus, a 
qualitative approach is needed to interrogate the effectiveness of policy levers as seen 
through formal rules and resources that the developers contend with in the 
development process.  
 
The methodological implication of these objectives is that private-sector developers 
who have ongoing projects have to be interrogated, with the aim of bringing out their 
views, drawing mostly on expertise acquired from being active in low-income housing. 
Healey and Barrett (1990) however warn that empirical research based on trying to 
decipher the strategies used by players in the development industry is likely to 
encounter challenging problems of research method and data sources. As she aptly 
puts “[such research] involves arenas where many powerful actors operate, where 
secretive strategies are part of the battle for competitive success, where data is scarce 
and produced in ways which are often difficult to penetrate, and where publicly 
available documentation and public talk is often deliberately distorted for the purposes 
of competitive advantage”. Despite these challenges, based on the narratives of the 
developers, the study needs to sift through all structural variables with the aim of 1) 
identifying those that directly affect private-sector developers, and 2) determining 
whether the identified variables are enablers or constraints to private-sector developers 
and 3) determine how the identified structural enablers are either exploited if they are 
enablers or dealt with if they are constraints.  
 
Housing research in general, this study included, is susceptible to relativity problems 
which underlines the difficulty of comprehending housing as a multidisciplinary 
scientific branch and highlights the need for proper theoretical frameworks for housing 
research (Erdoğdu, 2011). The first relativity problem is related to ideal solutions to 
research questions being highly dependent on primary mechanisms involved in the 
provision and control of housing i.e. the market, the planners and the state. Depending 
on which actors were included in the study housing problems may be defined 
differently, and thus ideal solutions may differ. The second relativity stems from the 
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fact that the function of housing is different for households, the state, and the 
developers. The third relativity is that solutions developed for housing may bring 
benefits to some while causing problems for others in the same society. Given the 
aforementioned, this study adopts a market-based approach to solving the low-income 
housing challenge. It is from this perspective of the private sector developers that the 
study problem has been designed and possible solutions to identified problems will be 
proffered.  
 
5.3 Ontological and Epistemological Perspectives in Housing Research 
Ontology refers to understandings about how the social world is reproduced, the nature 
of existence and the structure of reality (Bisaillon, 2012; Deveau, 2009). These 
assumptions about the researchers’ basic beliefs and worldviews lie behind their 
theoretical perspectives which reflect the form and nature of reality and therefore what 
can be known about it (Andrade, 2009; Bisaillon, 2012). This ontological perspective 
is important in understanding how a research problem has been conceived and the 
epistemology that is subsequently adopted should be consistent with the ontological 
view. There are three mutually exclusive metatheories that any study can adopt - 
positivism, interpretivism or critical realism (Sousa, 2010; Wynn & Williams, 2012). 
The next section is dedicated to fleshing out each of these metatheories and engaging 
with the suitability of each of in this study, which culminates in the adoption of critical 
realism as the best ontological stance that can be adopted compared to the other 
competing two.  
 
5.3.1 Positivism, Interpretivism or Critical Realism? 
The positivist approach is the philosophy of science that assumes positive facts, i.e. 
information derived from sensory experience, interpreted through rational or logical 
and mathematical treatments, form the exclusive source of all authoritative knowledge; 
and that there is valid knowledge (certitude or truth) only in this derived knowledge 
(Given, 2008). Positivists advocate an empirical realist ontology composed of 
observable, perceptible, measurable, and quantifiable phenomena, which are all 
assumed to be waiting to be discovered, sensed, and explained by humans (Sousa, 
2010). The key assumption behind this approach is that the world consists of social 
facts that can be uncovered using organised and systematic quantitative and empirical 
research methods (Allen, 2009).  
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This philosophical approach has been criticized when studying human behaviour, with 
the fundamental problem stemming from the assumptions underpinning the 
philosophy being that it ignores the complexity of the social world that is constructed 
through dialectical relationships between human agency and social structure. In other 
words, the positivist view presupposes an atomistic model of the human subject as a 
passive spectator of given phenomena (Bhaskar, 2013), and also assumes that there 
exists regularities or law-like generalisations in social settings that can be used for 
prediction (Easton, 2010; Given, 2008) through looking for statistically significant 
correlations between variables (Fitzpatrick, 2005; McEvoy & Richards, 2006). This 
strict nature of the positivist approach means it is constraining, given the more random 
nature of social processes (Ganderton, 1994). The approach also cannot address, still 
less reveal, causal links (Easton, 2010), and also bypasses the critical issue of 
explaining entirely why certain events occur (Easton, 2010; Fitzpatrick, 2005). In 
essence, the positivist approach to the social sciences negates the role of human agency 
or trivializes it to such an extent that it becomes meaningless (Bracken, 2010; Given, 
2008). It is also mechanistic and lacking in a depth and thus unsuited for providing 
insights into how individuals might co-author their identities.  
 
 Interpretivism which is a philosophical trend associated with postmodernism, which 
is also referred to as strong constructionism and also as constructivism (Satsangi, 2013; 
Sousa, 2010) views the social world as fully socially constructed by humankind. The 
ontological perspective considers reality as existing in the realm of experience, and 
rarely looks beyond the reality perceived by actors (Lawson, 2002). The interpretive 
researcher’s ontological assumption is that social reality is locally and specifically 
constructed by humans through their action and interaction and that understanding 
social reality requires understanding how practices and meanings are formed and 
informed by the language and tacit norms shared by humans working towards some 
shared goal. This ontological perspective is a contender in low-income housing 
research as it is suitable for research aiming for interpretation and understanding. The 
aim of understanding the subjective meanings of persons in studied domains is 
essential in the interpretive paradigm. The core idea of interpretivism is to work with 
these subjective meanings already there in the social world; i.e. to acknowledge their 
existence, to reconstruct them, to understand them, to avoid distorting them and to use 
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them as building blocks in theorizing (Goldkuhl, 2012). For an interpretivist study, it 
is important to understand motives, meanings, reasons and other subjective 
experiences which time and context are bound. 
 
One major critique of this perspective is that it denies the possibility of knowing what 
is real through suspending or bracketing objective social reality from epistemic 
consideration (Lau & Morgan, 2014). Each researcher provides his interpretation 
without any standard that can be used to judge if one interpretation is superior to the 
other and as a result, postmodernism rejects the possibility of discerning causality 
(Easton, 2010; Given, 2008). Given this research, which involves identifying pockets 
of private sector developers involved in low-income housing, postmodernism which 
asserts that a phenomena can be explained or reduced wholly to the interpretation of 
‘meaning’ (C. M. Nicholls, 2009) as given by the identified agents – who are the 
private sector developers in this study- would only focus on reality as perceived by the 
actors included in the study and not look beyond the realm of subjective perception 
(Lau & Morgan, 2014; Lawson, 2002) resulting in an overemphasis on agency over 
structure. This opens up the research to criticism as there is the possibility that the 
accounts of research participants may be partial or even misguided (McEvoy & 
Richards, 2006). What is not clear in the interpretivist approach is by what standards 
one interpretation is judged to be better than another. It is even more problematic when 
the interpretations are particularistic since this would appear to rule out not just 
regularity as a criterion but also any form of comparison (Easton, 2010). The inherent 
tendency of postmodernists to subjectivity, relativity and irrationality limit their 
potential for practical application through social policy measures, and the focus on 
individual agency can lead to the power of (macro) social structures being neglected 
(Fitzpatrick, 2005). 
 
For critical realists, the social world is an open system (Steffansen, 2016) whose 
existence is largely independent of any knowledge one may have, as the world is not 
just a reflection of human knowledge (Sousa, 2010). Realists concur with many aspects 
of the interpretivist critique of positivism – and in particular acknowledge the 
centrality of human perceptions and reasoning to the study of social science – but do 
not accept that social science can be reduced wholly to the interpretation of meaning, 
there is much more to the social world than agents understandings of it as real 
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structures can impose themselves upon agents both in a way they do not understand, 
and without the agents knowledge of their existence (Fitzpatrick, 2005). The aim of a 
research approach underpinned by critical realism is to produce causal explanations 
and theoretical perspectives on the production of certain outcomes and events through 
recognising that events occur due to a complex relationship of causation embedded in 
an entire interconnected social system. Many divergent factors interact that potentially 
can trigger and cause an outcome to occur. The developers under study thus do not 
have to recognize an object or mechanism affecting them for its presence to be real. 
Given this brief review, positivism and postmodernism are thus rejected a priori, and 
the rest of this chapter focuses on ontology, epistemology and methods, assuming a 
critical realist perspective is adopted. 
 
5.3.2 Critical Realism – the ontological and epistemological implication 
Critical realism, mainly based on the work of Roy Bhaskar(Lau & Morgan, 2014) 
proposes an ontology that assumes that there exists a reality “out there” independent 
of our knowledge of it (Easton, 2010; Fitzpatrick, 2005; C. M. Nicholls, 2009; Wynn 
& Williams, 2012) and distinguishes between three domains of reality- the empirical 
(consisting of what we experience directly or indirectly), the actual (where events 
occur whether or not we experience them) and the real (including both experiences, 
events and the causal powers producing the events (Easton, 2010; Næss, 2016; 
Satsangi, 2013; Steffansen, 2016; Zachariadis et al., 2013). Given that the most 
fundamental aim of critical realism is explanation, with answers to the question “what 
caused those events to happen” The relationship between theory and practice under a 
critical realist description is dialectic, with theory meditating between the real world 
and our empirical experience of it. This objective reality which is independent of 
human knowledge is however epistemically knowable (Lau & Morgan, 2014) which 
implies that despite the social phenomenon of private sector engagement in low-
income housing not being a well-studied field, and market provided solutions not yet 
well known, the reality is that there are such endeavours that are taking place out there, 
and market solutions exist, and this reality can be adjudicated on epistemic grounds.  
 
A critical realist ontology contends that structure and agency can be separated 
analytically to investigate their distinct influences and interaction. Social structures as 
used here denote overall economic systems, social hierarchies, legislation, social 
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institutions, material structures as well as prevalent norms and discourses (Næss, 
2016), whilst agency refers to the internal decision-making process that leads to the 
acts of a person or thing which produces effect (C. M. Nicholls, 2009). These social 
structures are dependent on human actors to reproduce them and people can also affect 
their transformation. At the same time, these pre-existing structures constrain and also 
enable human actions (Wynn & Williams, 2012), with some actors having more 
options allowed them by structures than others (Fitzpatrick, 2005). Critical realism 
thus provides a perspective for abstracting causal mechanisms that can emerge from 
the realm of dominant ideas, material resources and social relations (Lawson, 2010), a 
view which makes the perspective very compatible with the Structure-Agency theory 
that was adopted as the theoretical framework for this study.  
 
Another central tenet of realist theory is that it assumes that the world is structured, 
differentiated and stratified with no one strata assumed to be logically prior to any 
other with regard to social causation (Fitzpatrick, 2005). This framework is thus 
flexible enough to fully explore this study’s problem as it allows for the possibility 
that the “underlying causal factors” (C. M. Nicholls, 2009) for private sector 
engagement in low-income housing, which may be embedded in ideologies, material 
conditions, institutionalised power relationships (Lawson, 2010) or acts of agency. 
Agency is important to incorporate into a critical realist analysis of the causation 
because a large number of different intentional ‘mechanisms’ is based on agency (C. 
M. Nicholls, 2009). Causal factors may vary between different developers, but this 
ontological perspective is robust enough to study a phenomenon without succumbing 
to dualism which some studies applying the Structure-Agency theory have been 
criticised for though “retroduction” and “retrodiction”. Retroduction is explaining a 
phenomenon by identifying mechanisms and attempting to show their existence 
through explaining events by postulating and identifying mechanisms capable of 
causing them whilst retrodiction is using present information or ideas to infer or 
explain a past event or state of affairs (Satsangi, 2013). Causality, from this perspective 
when explanations of actual social events and phenomena are studied, is complex, 
nonlinear and emergent with intricate feedback loops linking multiple causal 
mechanisms (C. M. Nicholls, 2009). However, the presence of particular structures 
does not necessarily imply that agency will naturally be enhanced (Fitzpatrick, 2005). 
This implies that structures have inherent causal properties, but depending on 
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conditions, causal powers may not be activated, because there may be other 
contingently related mechanisms which may prevent correspondence between cause 
and effect (Wynn & Williams, 2012), which may explain the scattered incidences of 
private sector engagement in low-income housing. For realists, the varying 
circumstances of each developer engaged in low-income housing are to be expected in 
an open social system where a multitude of structures are contingently (and 
unpredictably) related, and where there is scope for human agency within the range of 
options that these structures enable. 
 
5.4 Critical Realist Methodology 
Critical realism supports the idea of an intransitive domain – reality which exists 
independently of our knowledge or perception of it. But the generation of new 
knowledge is a socially produced human activity which depends on the specific details 
and process of its production in the transitive domain (Steffansen, 2016; Wynn & 
Williams, 2012; Zachariadis et al., 2013). Critical realism, however, does not 
presuppose a specific set of methods (Steffansen, 2016), but argues for an 
understanding of knowledge about the phenomena under study as distinct from reality. 
There are different thought processes that can be applied in the generation of this 
knowledge, vis. induction, deduction, abduction, retroduction and abstraction. The 
assumption of the intransitive domain, where structures or powers of things may or 
may not be observable has methodological implications (Zachariadis et al., 2013). The 
goal of a critical realist study is explanation seeking to identify the causes of a 
particular phenomenon through stipulating the factors presumed to causes the 
phenomena under study (Wynn & Williams, 2012). For example, this study seeks to 
answer the question “What accounts for private-sector-led low-income housing 
development in a difficult context like Zimbabwe?” From the set of observable events 
in the transitive domain, the critical realist researcher attempts to answer the question 
“What must reality be like in order for this event to have occurred?” (Wynn & 
Williams, 2012). This reality in question takes place in an open system, and fully 
explaining the phenomena would include the identification of enabling conditions, 
stimulus conditions and releasing conditions (Wynn & Williams, 2012). Enabling 
conditions would be factors that encouraged private sector involvement in low-income 
housing production, whilst stimulus conditions would be those that triggered or 
reinforced private sector engagement, whilst releasing conditions would be factors that 
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removed impediments to the exercise of hypothesized powers and tendencies of the 
developers. This explanation involves moving from observed phenomena in the 
transitive domain to their underlying causes in the intransitive domain (Bergene, 
2007). 
 
A phenomenon under study can be broken down into events which constitute the 
outcome under study (Wynn & Williams, 2012). By identifying and explicating the 
events, a foundation is established for identifying the elements of structure and context 
from which these events emerge, as well as mechanisms that were enacted (Wynn & 
Williams, 2012). (C. M. Nicholls, 2009; Wynn & Williams, 2012). According to 
critical realist ontology, what happens in the world is a result of causal powers working 
via several mechanisms, some of which may be divergent (C. M. Nicholls, 2009), 
which if enacted would result in the events identified above (Næss, 2016). Mechanisms 
may or may not be enacted, and sometimes if enacted, may be counteracted by other 
mechanisms (Wynn & Williams, 2012). Uncovering causation from a critical realist 
perspective is about uncovering the different mechanisms that can explain certain 
outcomes, without asserting that these same factors will necessarily always lead to that 
outcome (C. M. Nicholls, 2009), for all private-sector developers included in this 
study. Causality can be explicitly described by detailing the means or processes by 
which events are generated by structures, actions, and contextual conditions involved 
in a particular setting (Wynn & Williams, 2012). 
 
The process of hypothesizing about causality is called retroduction, and it allows 
studies to move between the transitive domain to the intransitive domain. Retroduction 
is the core of the critical realist model and it is a form of inferences that seeks to meet 
the critical realist goal of explaining by identifying and verifying the existence of a set 
of mechanisms which are theorized to have generated the phenomena under study 
(Oliver, 2011; Wynn & Williams, 2012). These generative mechanisms exist at a 
deeper ontological level (McEvoy & Richards, 2006), are not always attributable to 
human actors, are not all observable, and are rarely experienced directly (Wynn & 
Williams, 2012). Researchers must depend on an ability to identify them by inferring 
their existence based on the observable experiences believed to have been caused by 
the mechanism, resulting in the need for a logical argument to explaining how the 
phenomenon of interest came to be through the emergent properties of the structure 
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interacting within the study context. One way to do this is to ask - What properties 
must be true for the phenomenon of interest to exist, as seen through the events that 
culminate in the occurrence of the phenomena, and to be what it is? (Oliver, 2011; 
Wynn & Williams, 2012). The result of this retroductive process culminates in 
mechanisms that may have, must have and could have caused the events (McEvoy & 
Richards, 2006). This retroductive approach embraces a wide variety of methods 
which implies that qualitative and quantitative approaches can be integrated in order 
to hypothesize and identify the mechanisms that cause the events seen in the transitive 
domain (Zachariadis et al., 2013). 
 
The emphasis on studying multiple, dynamic, and shifting relationships in context 
favours qualitative approaches capable of producing situated analytical explanations 
that might help reveal the potential mechanisms involved in observable events 
(Zachariadis et al., 2013). The key strength of qualitative methods, is that they are 
open-ended, and can thus be easily adapted to pursue alternative lines of inquiry in the 
search for retroductive explanations and can help to illuminate complex concepts and 
relationships that are unlikely to be captured by predetermined response categories or 
standardised quantitative measures (McEvoy & Richards, 2006).  
 
There are two broad types of research methods associated with critical realism: 
extensive and intensive research methods (Fitzpatrick, 2005). the former employs 
large scale survey and statistical analysis to look for patterns and similarities, although 
with limited explanatory power whilst the latter focuses on individual agents in context 
using interviews, ethnography and qualitative analysis, to produce causal explanations, 
which are however limited to the situation being studied. Intensive research methods 
are thus more suited to the understanding of low-income housing development in a 
developing country context. Context, in critical realism, is defined as relevant 
circumstances or external contingencies that affect the events that have occurred and 
form the frames of reference that allow researchers to choose the relevant elements for 
study (Easton, 2010). The importance of contextualisation in research is brought out 
better by critical realism. Approaches to context can be objectified or interpretive 
(Hjørland & Wikgren, 2005). In the former approach, the objective of research is to 
study the phenomena in a setting where various contextual factors are distinguished as 
objective realities. For example, in low-income housing in developing countries, the 
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PEST (political, economic, social and technological) environment prevailing in a 
developing country set up provides unique realities with associated constraints 
/opportunities that can affect the occurrence or instance of private sector low-income 
housing development. With interpretive approaches to context, the context itself 
creates meaning by sense-making i.e. understanding the context induces situational 
awareness and understanding in situations of high complexity or uncertainty. 
 
The case study research is argued to be the best-suited methodology for critical realist 
studies seeking to develop causal explanations of complex events (Easton, 2010; Wynn 
& Williams, 2012; Zachariadis et al., 2013). Case studies are often concerned with 
pinning down the specific mechanisms and pathways between causes and effects rather 
than revealing the average strength of a factor that causes an effect (Given, 2008). As 
Wynn and Williams (2012) cogently put it “the case study method, which is an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within 
its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident… is the best approach to explore the interaction of structure, 
events, actions, and context to identify and explicate detailed context-sensitive causal 
explanations of specific phenomena”. Bergene (2007) however argues for the use of 
comparative case studies instead of a single case study in the critical realist tradition 
as comparative cases provide an empirical foundation for retroduction. The argument 
is that systematic comparison might help the researcher identify structures, internal 
relations and contingent circumstances whilst simultaneously distinguishing between 
the different forms they might assume. A problem with comparative case studies might 
be that knowing what to look for requires extensive knowledge of the mechanisms 
involved in advance, which highlights the importance of theory in working out the 
research strategy prior to data collection (ibid.). Theories help to conceptualize objects 
and structures at the abstract level about necessary or internal relations (Zachariadis et 
al., 2013). Since the researcher is operating with a partly non-observable reality, 
theories may help us gain knowledge of structures and mechanisms, and should be 
used to formulate relevant research questions paying heed to specific contextual 
circumstances (Bergene, 2007). 
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Figure 5-1: Ontological and epistemological assumptions of CR and the 
methodological principles 
 
Source: Wynn and Williams (2012) 
 
5.5 Methodological Issues Stemming from the Structure-Agency Theory 
Giddens structuration theory has been proposed as a key example of realist social 
theory (Fitzpatrick, 2005) and it has been argued that they have complementary 
strengths and weaknesses. The Structure-Agency theory, which is the theory 
underpinning this study is derived from the structuration theory and if fully compatible 
with the critical realist philosophy that has been adopted in this chapter. Studies 
working under the “Agency-Structure” framework are of the view that social structures 
are conditions for and continuous outcomes of human agency, and as such, structures 
are endowed with causal powers (Sousa, 2010). Social structures from a critical realist 
perspective consist of individuals, groups and organisations along with the set of rules 
and practices (Wynn & Williams, 2012). In addition, the importance of ideology and 
how it can function both as a cause and a mediator of events, given that it has a shaping 
power has been emphasised by a number of studies (Bergene, 2007; Judd, 2005; 
Oliver, 2011) working from a critical realist perspective. These social structures both 
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enable and constrain social activities and are themselves produced or transformed by 
these activities. Applied to the housing development process, this view of structure is 
exactly the same as that adopted by the Structure-Agency theory which considers 
agency as constrained/ enabled by power which flows from structure via institutions 
(formal and informal rules) guiding the development process, ideologies and 
resources.  
 
A Scopus search for articles which had the words critical realism and housing 
generated 74 articles, spanning the period 2001 to 2018. None of these articles use the 
Structure-Agency theory or make reference to it, an observation which resonates with 
(Guy & Henneberry, 2000) who noted that the Structure-Agency model hasn’t been 
subjected to much theoretical challenge or empirical testing as there has been little 
substantive research on property development which acknowledges or extends the 
institutional model (Guy & Henneberry, 2000) and Drane (2013) who noted that the 
‘model remains in a state of incompletion, implying that there is need for more 
empirical studies that apply this theory and improve it. This leaves the study guided 
by theoretical research studies on housing and empirical studies on other issues such 
as homelessness. The aim of this section is two-pronged - to demonstrate the 
compatibility of the Structure-Agency theory with a critical realist perspective whilst 
at the same time improving the theory for application empirically by addressing the 
critique that the theory has been charged with. Efforts in this direction will add on to 
theoretical debates and development in the low-income housing field and hopefully 
encourage other critical realist researchers to apply the theory in their studies.  
 
The Structure-Agency theory and the conceptual framework that was developed in this 
study is in sync with retroduction, which is the core of a critical search realist research 
(Wynn Jr. & Williams, 2012) is the process of explaining a phenomenon by identifying 
mechanisms and attempting to show their existence through explaining events by 
postulating and identifying mechanisms capable of causing them (Satsangi, 2013) can 
be undertaken in four phases (Zachariadis et al., 2013) as follows:  
 
1. Description of the research situation, focusing on the identification of the 
composite events resulting in the study phenomenon.  
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2. Hypothesizing about the possible mechanisms or structures capable of 
generating the phenomena through abstracting and analysing objects in terms 
of their constitutive structures and causal powers. This enables the 
identification of the conditions and properties in the study context necessary to 
generate the event under study 
3. Critical assessment and elimination of the alternative explanations that have 
been produced by a comparison between the findings produced by the 
combination of methods. A complementary theory is also used to explain how 
different mechanisms interact under certain conditions and how they contribute 
to concrete social phenomena. 
4. Findings of the research findings are interrogated to see if the causal 
explanations uncovered are satisfactory to an “intended audience” with 
background knowledge and expertise. 
 
The conceptual model that was developed in chapter 2 prescribes five steps which can 
give both an empirical account of the low-income housing and if combined with the 
retroduction process described above, postulate generative mechanisms that led to 
low-income housing development by the private sector. 
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Figure 5-2: Link between retroduction and the Structure-Agency theory 
Retroduction Structure-Agency theory 
Description of the research situation, 
focusing on the identification of the 
composite events resulting in the study 
phenomena 
Step 1: Examine the role of the state in 
low-income housing 
Step 2: A mapping exercise to describe 
the events in the development process, 
identifying the role of the agent in the 
development process. 
 
  
Hypothesizing about the possible 
mechanisms or structures capable of 
generating the phenomena through 
abstracting and analysing objects in 
terms of their constitutive structures and 
causal powers. 
Step 3: Identify and examine the various 
institutions (political, social, 
economic and legal institutions) 
and their respective roles that the 
agents in step 2 interact with in 
carrying out the development roles 
identified in step 2. 
Step 4: Define the structure in which low-
income housing development 
takes place and the causal powers 
they possess 
 
  
Critical assessment and elimination of the alternative explanations that have been 
produced by comparison between the findings produced by the combination of 
methods: output of this step will result in the identification of enablers and 
constraints and the strategies that are used by the agents to exploit the enablers and 
mitigate the constraints that are identified as hypothesised in the intransitive domain 
 
Validation of the findings 
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The state plays a key role in low-income housing as it can shape competition between 
private and non-profit housing. As such the pace and scale of private sector provision 
of low-income housing hinges upon a facilitative urban development policy, which 
can influence the distribution of power between different groups in society, influence 
investment patterns and modes of housing consumption. (Lawson, 2010). As such, 
some mechanisms which can explain the success of low-income housing can be 
gleaned from analysing the role of the state. Historical documents can provide data for 
this exercise (Zachariadis et al., 2013). Generative mechanisms are enduring and trans-
factually active in the domain of the real (Bhaskar, 2013) and under appropriate 
circumstances are exercised in the domain of the actual, as long as the properties that 
account for the mechanism persist. Unlike many natural structures, social structures 
and the powers they possess are not necessarily enduring across periods of time or 
varying contexts, in large part due to the open systems in which they exist (Wynn & 
Williams, 2012). Only relatively enduring the most durable are argued to be those 
which lock their occupants into situations which they cannot unilaterally change and 
yet in which it is possible to change between existing positions (Fitzpatrick, 2005).  
 
Critiques of the Structure-Agency theory (Ball, 1998; Guy & Henneberry, 2000) point 
out that the analysis that was done using the Structure-Agency theory on a study on 
the transformation of Hebburn Riverside in Tyneside, UK by Healey (1992) failed to 
offer any deep insight into the mechanisms of market capitalism, or to identify in any 
detail how economic processes frame local development practice. … [making it] 
difficult to consider the ways in which locally contingent factors interact with wider 
forces to produce specific material outcomes. This critique can be addressed if a 
critical realist perspective and methodology is adopted, which specifies that causation 
is grounded in the understanding of mechanisms (Satsangi, 2013). Retroduction, uses 
causal mechanisms as the basis for explanation of a phenomena (Wynn & Williams, 
2012) and allows studies to move between the knowledge of empirical phenomena as 
expressed through events to the creation of explanations in ways that hold “ontological 
depth” and can potentially give some indications on the existence of unobservable 
entities and mechanisms in the domain of the real (Oliver, 2011; Zachariadis et al., 
2013). 
 
The second problem which is likely to face studies applying the Structure-Agency 
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theory is that rules to identify causality and to explain change are not well explained 
(Ball, 1998), with the resulting effect being the difficulty to move beyond the self-
interested justifications given by identified agents. Guy and Henneberry (2000) 
phrased this same concern as that the model tends to downplay any analysis of 
processes of economic structuring, in favour of a predominantly actor-oriented 
perspective. Again, a critical realist perspective can help solve this, as the central 
ontological assumption of realists is that the world is structured, differentiated and 
stratified (Fitzpatrick, 2005). Causation can thus be conceptualised as ontological 
stratified, which forces the research to look beyond the views of the agents and 
consider all mechanism as they exist in the domain of the real. Wynn and Williams 
(2012) refer to the ‘principle of explication of structure and context’, which is a process 
where critical realist research seeks to identify and analytically resolve the components 
of the structure that are causally relevant. Therefore, this critique falls away if critical 
realist ontology and methodology is adopted.  
 
Van der Krabben and Lambooy (1993) critiques the Structure-Agency model on that 
institutions and rules governing ownership and control over resources are seen as a 
static element to the model of the development process, which is too limited a notion 
of the institutional context. A more dynamic conception of the institutional context is 
advocated for, which will capture changes in the composition of institutions and 
organisations involved in the development process. But, housing is 
regarded as neither an isolated nor static object but surrounded and sustained by a 
local context of contingently defined emergent relations and 
dynamic institutions, which mediate housing markets (Lawson, 2002, 2010). 
Furthermore, critical realism vies to analyse the interplay of multiple mechanisms in 
an open system (Bergene, 2007; Næss, 2016; Sousa, 2010; Wynn & Williams, 2012). 
The openness of the world is corroborated by the world’s failure to meet the two 
conditions that would - close the system: first, entities and structures and powers 
making up the world are prone to change gradually or radically and second, 
contingencies (affecting both the exercise of causal mechanisms and configurations 
and resulting effects) also change over time (Sousa, 2010). Applying the Structure-
Agency theory combined with a critical realist perspective thus resolves this critique.  
 
 124 
 
5.6 Delimitations of the Study 
There are various agents in the property development sphere viz. developers, 
landowners, public agency planning officers, politicians, community groups, 
financiers etc. The study does recognise that each of these agents has an impact on 
how low-income housing development is carried out, but this research will concentrate 
on the perspective of low-income housing developers and how these agents impact on 
the developers’ ability to produce low-income housing. The actions of these agents 
can impose structural barriers or enablers, and this research will try to decipher the 
nature of these constraints and enablers and how the developers react to this structural 
environment in the form of strategies. 
 
5.7 Research Methodology 
As was discussed in section 5.5, the case study research is argued to be the best-suited 
methodology for critical realist studies seeking to develop causal explanations of 
complex events (Easton, 2010; Wynn & Williams, 2012; Zachariadis et al., 2013). A 
comparative case study design was settled for, which is a strategy that enables the 
distinction between internal relations and contingent circumstances when employing 
retroduction (Bergene, 2007). Combined with the Structure-Agency theory to guide 
the study, this comparison study design will also reveal how the common factors 
manifest themselves differently in different contexts. The general approach will be to 
select formal private sector developers who are involved in low-income housing 
development. It has been demonstrated by other studies that the case study method is 
the best approach to explore the interaction of structure, events, actions, and context 
to identify and explicate causal mechanisms, and emphasis should be on a limited 
number of cases, in a specific setting (Bergene, 2007; Wynn & Williams, 2012). To 
effectively do this, i.e. develop detailed context-sensitive causal explanations, 
developments within one local authority, Bulawayo City Council, were included in 
this study. This enabled the study to be focused by bounding the context so as to expose 
the causal mechanism and the specific structural/contextual factors that combined to 
generate private-sector engagement in low-income housing.  
 
5.7.1 Selection of developments and respondents 
The study set off by obtaining information from the local authority on private sector 
developers who have been active in the low-income housing sector. These developers 
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were then grouped into two groups based on the development roles that were being 
carried out, i.e. those who were only selling vacant developed stands and those who 
were selling finished houses to their beneficiaries. 
 
A local authority official in Bulawayo in a preliminary data collection interview 
session indicated that there are nine active private sector housing developments 
targeted at the low-income group, all of which were undertaken in the period 2003-
2016. The study allocated the letters A to I as identifiers and a survey was conducted 
in each of these housing developments as part of case selection.  With the aid of 
location maps that were obtained from the local authority, systematic sampling was 
applied in choosing respondents and every 4th household was included in the survey. 
The population and sample size that was included in the survey for each of the 9 
developments is shown in Table 5-1. 
 
Table 5-1: Active low-income housing developments in Bulawayo between 2003 and 
2016 
Development Area 
Target  
population  
Study 
population 
Sample Size  
A Cowdray Park 532 532 134 
B Cowdray Park 75 75 58* 
C Cowdray Park 274 274 69 
D Cowdray Park 126 126 32 
E Cowdray Park  983 392 98 
F Pumula South  253 253 64 
G Phelandaba 185 185 46 
H Mbundane 450 (estimate) 450 113 
I Emthunzini 3500 planned 471 118 
 
Total population sampling method was applied in Development B as the target 
population was small. This is a purposive sampling technique that involves examining 
the entire population. Out of the 75 households, a total of 58 households agreed to 
partake in the survey. This was a good response rate as the target was a minimum of 
30 respondent so that results could be generalisable to the population. In development 
G, construction is still ongoing, and even though there are 3,500 planned housing plots, 
data collection was limited to only a section where most houses had been completed 
and occupied. This reduced to study population to 471 households and systematic 
sampling with a sampling interval of 4 was also used.  
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After carrying the survey in all the nine housing developments, coding and doing 
preliminary data analysis, only five out of the nine housing developments were chosen 
for inclusion in this study. Case selection, according to Bergene (2007) should not be 
random but based on the basis of a belief that they exhibit the operation of structures 
and mechanisms delineated by the theoretical perspective chosen as the framework. 
Accordingly, for this study, only developments which exhibited the following were to 
be included: 
 
1. A significant proportion of the respondents confirmed that they bought a 
finished house from the developer. This proved very difficult in older 
developments where due to a property changing hands over time, most 
occupants had no knowledge if the original structure was built by the developer 
or the original owner bought a serviced plot and built 
2. Due to gentrification and regeneration pressures, most properties in the 
development had been improved to such an extent that the original structures 
built by the developer were no longer existent. As such, such areas, even 
though still classified as low income by the local authority, did not look like 
they were low-income areas. Another possible reason could have been a change 
in the economy, the low-income beneficiaries in the early 2000s had a different 
profile compared to the present-day low-income earners. So, in older 
settlements, where original purchasers had retired, the houses had been 
improved so much that they were no longer consistent with what this study 
conceptualised as a low-income house.  
 
The combination of land development and housing construction presents a unique 
opportunity set with different risk compared to those developers who concentrate on 
land development only. Most low-income earners also face affordability issues, which 
makes it imperative that developers who provide finished housing be the focus of this 
study. It is on this basis that the three developers with a total of five housing schemes 
( re-coded to Development 1,2,3,4 and 5) are included in this study as was summarised 
in chapter one. 
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5.7.2 Data collection and summary of household survey data 
Data was collected using observation, in-depth interviews, document search and 
household surveys. Government reports, housing policy and strategy documents and 
newspapers articles, which are a good source of data (Hoey, 2014; Whitehead, 2005) 
were reviewed to understand the role of the government in low-income housing and to 
locate the study within an existing body of literature. Given the diversity of institutions 
involved in low-income housing provision, in-depth semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with key informants in the low-income housing development sector vis. 
private sector developers, building societies, the local authority and the Ministry of 
Local Government, Public Works and National Housing. Government institutions 
were interviewed in their capacity as regulators whilst building societies were 
interviewed based on their role as financiers. The criteria for selecting respondents in 
each group of interviewees was purposive sampling combined with the snowballing 
technique. After the first interview, the researcher was asked to be directed to the next 
respondent if there were questions that the first respondent could not adequately 
answer. This strategy was especially useful with the local authority respondents whose 
responsibilities and knowledge are limited to the department or section that the 
respondent is employed in.  
A survey of 425 households was also carried out, with respondents drawn from each 
of the five housing schemes through systematic random sampling. This round of data 
collection was primarily concerned with objective one i.e. determining the extent to 
which these housing schemes are successful. This was achieved through designing a 
questionnaire looking at three issues as follows: 
 
• The beneficiaries of these housing schemes – in this case, this study had to 
have a sense of who the occupants of these houses are – are they owner-
occupied? Are they being rented out? By whom? The demographics of the 
occupants of these houses irrespective of their tenure status will be handy in 
this regard. 
• The physical properties of the housing units in question – Are they in line with 
the model building bylaws for low-income housing in terms of minimum plot 
sizes, building materials, site servicing (water and sewer connections, road 
construction etc.). Pictures of the housing developments, the state of the roads 
and other visible features that can be photographed will be useful in this regard. 
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Also, comments on defects in the superstructure by the occupants will be 
invaluable. 
• The standards for suitable housing in terms of access to basic amenities. 
 
Transcribed notes from the interviews were then analysed through the use of NVivo 
and survey findings were analysed using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS). 
 
The survey population included all the houses in all the 5 housing schemes which were 
spread out as follows: 
The survey included 425 households in the five housing schemes spread out as 
follows- 69 from Development 1, 46 from Development 2, 118 from Development 3, 
58 from Development 4 and 134 from Development 5.  All interviews conducted were 
recorded and transcribed and then organized using NVivo using themes that were 
derived from the research objectives - constraints facing speculative developers and 
the strategies employed to deal with these constraints. These constraints and enablers, 
from the conceptual framework are embodied in the structural environment as 
presented through resources and the regulatory framework that governs the actions of 
the various actors in the low-income housing development sphere. Survey results were 
coded and analysed using SPSS. This data yielded evidence relating to the target group 
that is served by the private developers in the housing schemes in terms of tenure 
status, affordability of the houses, quality of the houses and access to amenities. 
 
5.7.3 Validity, reliability and data analysis  
This study was conducted from a critical realist perspective, which endeavours to 
provide explanations of a social phenomenon through the identification of underlying 
causal mechanisms. The critical realist perspective acknowledges that not all causal 
mechanisms are attributable to human actors- ensuring that the study is robust enough 
to interrogate how the interplay between structure, context and human action result in 
private sector-led low-income housing development. Identification of mechanisms 
includes detailing conditions that encouraged, reinforced and removed impediments to 
low-income housing development, which addresses all the objectives of this study.  
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A combination of document analysis, interviews and observation was used to gather 
qualitative data. This involved transcribing data that was collected from interviews, 
revisiting the research objectives to identify the questions that could be answered 
through the collected data and identifying key terms and phrases used by the 
interviewees that could give key insights to the study objectives. NVIVO was used 
extensively in analysing this collected data to identify patterns and connections, most 
common responses to questions, and finding areas that can be explored further. 
 
After the screening process used for case selection outlined in the section above, 
survey data preparation and analysis was conducted, which included checking for 
completeness, data editing and coding in SPSS.  Even though the role of qualitative 
methods within critical realism is more profound as they are epistemologically valid 
(Zachariadis et al., 2013). Statistical descriptions are regarded as helpful 
simplifications from a critical realist perspective, as they may be used to develop 
reliable descriptions and accurate comparisons (McEvoy & Richards, 2006). Overall, 
attention was paid to how the study was designed and executed, data collection 
procedures and analysis, in order to get dependable, consistent, and plausible findings. 
These findings were used to make inferences about the underlying causal mechanisms, 
keeping in mind that empirical events are particular manifestations of the mechanisms 
that caused them, and may not appear in exactly the same in a different context 
(Zachariadis et al., 2013).  
 
5.7.4 Overview of developments included in the study 
A total of five developments under three different developers was included in this 
study. All these developments are in Bulawayo, and their location are shown in Figure 
5-3. 
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Figure 5-3: Location of the housing developments included in this study 
 
Source: Adapted from Google Maps 
 
5.8 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter, through reflecting on the objectives of the study and challenges in 
carrying out research in housing studies, adopted the critical realist ontology as the 
Housing Development 1,4 and 5 
Housing Development 2 
Housing Development 3 
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best fit. The methodology for this study was developed and strong ties between the 
critical realist perspective and the Structure-Agency theory were shown. This study, 
however, found that there are no studies that have combined the Structure-Agency 
theory with a critical realist perspective in the low-income housing debate, and a 
conceptual framework that was developed in a bid to extend the theory was shown to 
be also coordinated with retroduction and therefore applicable empirically. The 
following chapter presents and discusses empirical data for the study.  
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6 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the empirical findings of the study and is arranged in seven 
sections. Section 6.2 recapitulates the aims, objectives and hypotheses guiding the 
study. Section 6.3 presents the analytical stance adopted in this chapter, whilst section 
6.4 details the respondents’ profiles and a summary of the household survey 
respondents per housing scheme. Section 6.5 details the data presentation structure and 
section 6.6 is dedicated to presenting evidence of successful housing production in 
each of the five cases of housing developments included in this study. This is followed 
by a presentation of data which points to structural enablers, constraints and strategies 
in section 6.7. The penultimate section discusses the events in the development 
process, drawing on empirical findings to detail constraints, enablers and strategies 
that are used in response to the chapter ends with the conclusion which details the 
summary of findings. 
 
6.2  Aims, Objectives and Hypotheses 
This research investigated the structural enablers, as well as the constraints, for private-
sector low-income housing development in Zimbabwe. It particularly focused on how 
developers exploit the enablers and mitigate the constraints, in order to achieve 
successful outcomes. A number of objectives were set out at the beginning to guide 
this study, and these are: 
• To assess the extent to which the specific housing schemes have been 
successful and to derive appropriate lessons for general application.  
• To determine the structural enablers and constraints for low-income housing 
development by the private sector in Zimbabwe. 
•  To determine the strategies that developers employ to exploit the structural 
enablers and to mitigate the constraints. 
• To assess to the extent to which the agency of the private sector in the 
development of low-income housing in the Zimbabwean context could be 
enhanced, and to make appropriate policy recommendations in this regard. 
 
The main question related to these objectives was, what accounts for the success of 
market low-income housing developments in Zimbabwe despite the environment not 
being conducive for it? The two sub-questions flowing from this main question were 
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firstly, how does the structural environment enable and/or constrain low-income 
developments in Zimbabwe by the private sector? Secondly, what strategies do 
developers adopt in response to the structural enablers and/or constraints in order to 
develop low-income housing in Zimbabwe? Ways of mitigating and exploiting 
structural constraints and enablers respectively can thus be uncovered through 
scrutinizing the agency of private-sector developers.  
 
6.3 Analytical Stance 
The conceptual framework for this research was developed from the Structure-Agency 
theory. Structure refers to the interrelation of political, social, economic and legal 
institutions which make it possible for development activity to take place in a systemic 
form. Structure, as defined here, furnishes both the resources that make development 
possible and the formal and informal rules that guide the development process. 
Agency, which is the capacity of individuals to act independently and to make their 
own free choices, is conceptualised in terms of roles, strategies and interests that 
culminate in the attainment of specific objectives, which in this case would be the 
production of low-income housing. Structure can thus enable agency through 
providing conduits for implementing action that is necessary for development to take 
place or constrain through prescribing procedures that are at variance with what is 
deemed necessary for the efficient production of low-income housing. 
 
It has been noted in literature that the main impediment to housing the low-income 
group is the high cost of development relative to the income of the low-income group 
(CAHF, 2015; Chirisa, 2014; Magwaro-Ndiweni, 2013). A literature scope of the 
housing challenge in Zimbabwe showed that the two structural variables that are 
theorized in the conceptual framework, institutions and resources are the same 
variables that have been flagged as responsible for imposing high costs to the housing 
development process. These costs can be identified through looking at the resources 
needed for housing development in the form of factors of production, i.e. land, labour, 
capital, and can also be due to the effect of regulation on transaction and production 
costs that are embedded in the formal supply value chain for housing delivery 
(Chazovachii, 2011; Chipungu & Adebayo, 2013; Chirisa, 2014; Chitekwe-Biti, 2009; 
Chitekwe & Mitlin, 2001; Gumbo, 2015; Kamete, 2001a; Mashoko, 2012; 
Muchadenyika, 2015b; Rakodi & Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1990a; Zami & Lee, 2007). 
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Failure of public sector housing projects in Zimbabwe has been attributed to poor cost 
recovery to the government, making the projects and programmes not replicable 
(Kamete, 1998; Muchadenyika, 2015b). This failure implies that given the operating 
environment, the government finds it difficult to produce housing that is affordable to 
the target group and also conforms to the standards stipulated in the planning 
regulations (Zami & Lee, 2007). In response, there have been calls to the government 
to facilitate and enable housing development by other stakeholders such as the private 
sector to reduce costs and promote access (Gumbo, 2015).  
 
Predicated on this foregoing analysis, the analytical stance that is adopted in this study 
is simple and logical - if despite the adverse operating environment that exists in 
Zimbabwe, there are private sector developers who are providing low-income housing, 
then this entails that there must be structural enablers that are being exploited by the 
developers, and strategies that are used to mitigate the constraints to low-income 
housing. It also follows that these strategies must have one overriding objective - cost 
containment. This analytical stance provides, by force of reason, an objective way of 
closely examining the empirical evidence gathered for this study to provide an 
explanatory synthesis of the research problem. The study thus has two hypotheses – 
the first hypothesis is that despite the adverse environment there exists in Zimbabwe 
structural enablers that make market solutions to the low-income housing challenge 
possible. The second hypothesis states that developers have specific discernible 
strategies which they employ in response to the adverse operating environment to 
reduce development costs to levels that enable them to successfully provide low-
income housing. 
 
6.4 Respondents’ Profiles 
The primary research strategy adopted in this thesis is the case study. Five case studies 
of housing developments were conducted, with data for each of the five developments 
collated from documentation, in-depth interviews, direct observation and surveys. 
These multiple sources of data enable a systematic inquiry into a set of related events 
which aims to describe and explain a phenomenon of interest (Neale, Thapa, & Boyce, 
2006; Yin, 1981; Zucker, 2009). Given the diversity of institutions involved in low-
income housing provision, in addition to the developers and beneficiaries in each case, 
other interviewed key informants who were instrumental in providing multiple 
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perspectives and contextual information for the case studies were financiers, the 
Bulawayo Local Authority, and the Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and 
National Housing. The breakdown of the respondents for this study is shown in Table 
6-1. 
 
Table 6-1: Interview respondents included in the study 
Actor Number   Identifiers 
Private sector developers  3 Developer 1, 2, 3 
Building societies 5 BS1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 
Local authority 5 LA1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 
Ministry of Housing  2 MH1 and 2 
  
A survey of 425 households in the five housing schemes located in and around the 
second largest city of Zimbabwe, Bulawayo was also carried out. The number of 
respondents in each scheme is shown in Table 6-2. 
 
Table 6-2: Household survey respondents per housing scheme 
 Housing Scheme Frequency Per cent 
Housing Development 1 69 16.2 
Housing Development 2 46 10.8 
Housing Development 3 118 27.8 
Housing Development 4 58 13.6 
Housing Development 5 134 31.6 
Total 425 100.0 
  
6.4.1 Developer 1 
Developer 1 is a company that was founded in the year 2000, and the initial thrust of 
the company was construction activities directed mainly at servicing of residential 
stands as well as the development and construction of both residential and commercial 
buildings. In its portfolio, the company is actively involved in low and medium-density 
housing contracts, land development and commercial buildings. One of the guiding 
statements in the company’s vision is to provide affordable housing. In pursuit of this, 
the company has been active in the affordable housing sector since inception and has 
been involved in different housing projects with a combined potential of more than 
5,600 low-income houses in and around Bulawayo, not counting other housing 
projects outside Bulawayo. The company has more than 400 employees and it is also 
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a member of the Construction Federation of Zimbabwe (CIFOZ). An interview was 
secured with the chief accountant, who is head of finance for all the company’s 
divisions. 
 
6.4.2 Developer 2 
Developer 2 is a housing development company domiciled in Bulawayo. This 
company has over 30 years’ experience in the construction industry with quite a 
significant number of tender contracts being awarded to it by the Ministry of Public 
Works and National Housing since the early 1980s. Amongst its varied portfolio of 
clients other than the ministry, the company has built several schools and shopping 
centres in and around Bulawayo and also has medium and high-density housing 
schemes and individual contracts all over the country. The company diversified and 
branched into affordable- housing in 2006 when they entered into a partnership with 
the local authority to service and build 116 low-income housing units in one of the 
high-density areas of Bulawayo. Since then, the company has gone on to have their 
own affordable housing development with an expected 5,000 residential units. This 
company is a member of Zimbabwe Building Contractors Association (ZBCA) which 
is one of the two non-profit national organisation that is active in Zimbabwe together 
with CIFOZ and serve as a pseudo governing body for active contractors in the market. 
An interview was secured with the project's director.  
 
6.4.3 Developer 3 
This company has been active in affordable housing construction since 1996 when it 
was awarded a contract to service and develop 532 houses in one of the high-density 
areas in Bulawayo. Since then, the developer has been awarded contracts to develop 
residential stands and build houses in Chirundu, Chivi Growth Point, Gwanda, Gweru, 
Plumtree and Victoria Falls. In 2015, the developer also entered into a partnership with 
Beitbridge Town Council, to construct 700 two, three and four-roomed affordable 
housing units that would be sold on a cost-recovery basis. In Harare, the company has 
over the years constructed over 3000 affordable housing units targeted at the low-
income groups. The company is well diversified as in addition to the construction 
business, which includes medium-density and low-density houses, the company owns 
a wholesale business. An interview was secured with the chairman of the company.  
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6.4.4 Building Society: BS 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 
Bulawayo as the second-largest city has representation in terms of all registered 
building societies in Zimbabwe namely CBZ Building Society, Central African 
Building Society (CABS), FBC Building Society, ZB Building Society and National 
Building Society Limited. The study sought to interview all representatives of the five 
building societies in Zimbabwe. Separate interviews were held with a Mortgage 
Operations Manager at each bank, whose responsibilities include ensuring strict 
adherence to all compliance and regulatory requirements as well as department 
policies and procedures. 
 
6.4.5 Local Authority: LA 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 
Five key informants were included in this study from the Bulawayo Local Authority. 
LA1 was from the Housing and Building section of the Local Authority under the 
Housing and Community Services department. This section of the local authority deals 
with the provision and maintenance of houses, plan approvals and inspections. LA2, 3 
and 4 were from the Town Planning department, which handles development permits, 
applications for land, non-title and topographical surveys, investigations and resolving 
of boundary disputes and issuance of survey instruction to private land surveyors. LA5 
is from the water and sewer department which deals with the provision of trunk 
infrastructure.  
 
6.4.6 Ministry Local Government, Public Works and National Housing: MH1 and 
2 
There were two main departments that were of interest in this study that fall under the 
Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing- the Department 
of National Housing the Department of Physical Planning. Interviews were conducted 
with the officer in charge of National Housing and Social Amenities, MH1, and the 
provincial planning officer in the Department of Physical Planning, MH2. 
 
6.5 Data Presentation Structure 
The study findings are presented, analysed and discussed in terms of the four study 
objectives guiding this study. This study is based on prima facie evidence that there is 
successful low-income housing development by the private sector in Zimbabwe and 
accordingly, Section 6.6 is dedicated to addressing objective 1 through presenting 
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evidence that was gathered from each of the 5. The second objective is on the 
challenges and enablers constraining and/enabling low-income housing development 
and the corresponding strategies used to mitigate/exploit these. Empirical evidence is 
presented using the conceptual framework variables, vis. institutions, resources (land, 
labour and capital) and ideology in section 6.7. and interrogated using the analytical 
stance detailed in section 6.3. The role of the Government in the development of 
speculative low-income housing and the extent that this is enabling will be a by-
product of this analysis and will address the last objective. 
  
6.6 Evidence of Successful Low-Income Housing Development 
Evidence was gathered from the 5 housing developments on a case by case basis. 
Section 6.6.1 presents the criteria for success that is adopted for this study. Case studies 
1 to 5 are then presented consecutively from section 6.6.2 to section 6.5.6. In each 
case, details on when the land was purchased, pertinent information on development 
and construction progress and the extent to which these housing developments are 
successful is then addressed using the criteria of successes presented in section 6.6.1. 
 
6.6.1 Criteria used to measure the success of housing developments 
The complexity of defining term ‘low-income housing’ was discussed in chapter 1, 
and it was shown that there are clearly three levels of income groups that are catered 
for in the zoning of residential areas in Zimbabwe – high-income, middle-income and 
low-income. It is acknowledged that use of income only to define the ‘urban poor’ is 
misleading (Mitlin, 2004; Wratten, 1995) and the criteria used to identify the urban 
poor isn’t explicit and universal (Wratten, 1995), and this is even more pronounced in 
Zimbabwe, where, due to the nature of the economic environment, there are serious 
distortions in reported income and employment statistics as more than 90% of the 
economically active population is employed in the informal sector (BBC, 2017). 
Salary levels in the country are generally very low, with incomes for most civil 
servants falling well below minimum consumption expenditure requirements 
(Tawodzera, 2014), which catapults most of these workers into the low-income group 
as defined by the international poverty datum line which stands at USD2>10 for low-
income groups (Rizvi, 2016). The meaning that is therefore attached to the term “low-
income housing” has a profound effect on the issues that will be of concern in this 
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study, when looking at private sector provision, a concern which requires the term to 
be defined upfront. 
 
In the context of Zimbabwe, and in the context of this study, the term low-income 
housing is defined as housing which is situated in the high-density areas, which 
adheres to formal planning regulations and design stipulations as enshrined in the 
Regional, Town and Country Planning Act (RTCPA) and Model Building Bylaws. 
This type of housing has the lowest permissible standards, and any formal low-income 
housing development can’t be situated anywhere else except in the high-density 
locations. Emphasis is thus placed on the physical attributes of the properties in 
question as the quality of housing and access to basic services is a clear dimension of 
urban poverty (African Centre for Cities, 2011).  
 
If these developments adhere to formal planning regulations and design stipulations, 
the houses should have the following features relating to plot sizes, outbuildings, 
building materials and infrastructural facilities as espoused in the regulations (Chirisa, 
2014; Kamete, 1999; Zami & Lee, 2007): 
• Adhere to orderly parcelling of space in line with the city’s master plan 
• Plot sizes ranging from 70 to 200 square metres for houses built after 2004 
whilst for houses built before then the range is between 150 to 300 square 
metres. 
• Walls constructed of material approved as approved by the Department of 
Public Works including burnt clay brick or block, cement bricks or blocks and 
stabilised soil bricks or blocks whilst recommended roofing materials include 
asbestos sheets, clay tiles, and zinc. 
• The housing only constitutes (accommodates) a single family with no 
outbuildings permitted on the stands. 
• All plots should have an individual connection to a reticulated water supply 
network  
• Access roads should be gravel roads with a cross gradient of about 5% and 
gravel thickness of between 100 and 150 mm 
• Dish drains are to be used instead of piped culverts, to reduce costs. 
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The difficulties associated with the use of private capital for profit emanating from  
lack of mortgage funding for the target group (Lea, 2005; Moss, 2001), no credit 
records (Lea, 2005; Loxley, 2013; Moss, 2001; Stein & Castillo, 2005) and a host of 
other risks which include credit risk, liquidity risk, and cash flow risk (Binns, 2012; 
Kamete, 1997; Stein & Castillo, 2005) are acknowledged in literature and are the 
reasons put forth for the reluctance by private developer to invest. On this basis, the 
ability of private developers in Zimbabwe to produce housing that conforms to the 
formal planning regulations and design stipulations expounded in this section counts 
as success.  
6.6.2 Case 1: Housing Development 1 
Housing Development 1 was undertaken by Developer 1 in the high-density suburb of 
Cowdray Park in Bulawayo. Virgin land, with a capacity for a total of 274 planned 
plots was sold to the developer by the Bulawayo City Council in 2003. Project 
specifications included in the memorandum of understanding between the developer 
and the local authority stipulated that the developer was to construct roads, put in sewer 
and water lines as shown in the location map that was obtained from the Local 
Authority below depicted in Figure 6-1. 
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Figure 6-1: Housing Development 1 layout plan 
 
Source: Bulawayo City Council (2006a) 
 
Using this location map obtained from the local authority, a visit to the site showed 
that construction was complete, and all houses were occupied. The layout of the houses 
in the development tallied with the approved layout plan shown in figure 6-1. As such, 
there is orderly land parcelling in the housing development that conforms to the 
approved layout. The housing development is accessible from the main road, and all 
houses have vehicular access just as shown on the map. Of the 69 survey respondents 
in Development 1, the study recorded 26 homeowner respondents who confirmed how 
their properties were acquired. Their responses showed that over and above the 
memorandum specifications, Developer 1 had two product offerings in this housing 
development - completed housing and serviced plots. The predominant and preferred 
property acquisition method was, however, the purchase of completed housing as 
shown in Figure 6-2.  
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Figure 6-2: Property acquisition methods in Housing Development 1 
 
These findings confirm that there were no other developers active in the area other 
than Developer 1. Of interest also was the low levels of property sales by individuals 
in the housing development, which points to the absence of speculative activity. Even 
though the scheme was launched in 2003, beneficiaries seem to be holding on their 
properties. This trend can be explained by that 100% of the homeowner respondents 
reported that they do not own any other properties. Housing Development 1 thus 
extended the opportunity of homeownership to these beneficiaries who before moving 
into the housing development were either in rental accommodation (77%) or living 
with family (15%) with the remainder in alternate accommodation options. Figure 6-3 
depicts typical 2 and 4 roomed houses built by the developer in Housing Development 
1. 
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Figure 6-3: Typical houses built by the developer in Housing Development 1 
 
These houses were constructed on plot sizes in the 90-200 m2 or in the 200-300 m2 
range as shown in Table 6-3, which shows survey responses from a total of 54 out of 
69 respondent who could confirm their plot sizes 
 
Table 6-3: Plot sizes in Housing Development 1 
 Plot Size (m2) Frequency Percentage 
0-89 0 0 
90-200 34 62.67 
201-300 20 37.03 
above 300 0 0 
Total 54 100 
 
Housing Development 1 conforms to the stipulations of Circular Number 70 of 2004 
that gazetted new national housing standards for high, medium and low-density 
residential areas. Terraced housing, which is a row of houses sharing sidewalls, 
according to the circular is the only housing type that can be built on plot sizes that are 
below 89m2, and in line with these, there were no terraced houses that were observed 
in the five housing schemes. All the houses were standalone as shown in figure 6-2.  
Building materials that were used by the developer in all the houses were concrete 
blocks and burnt bricks with an asbestos roof. To avoid contamination of data, only 
findings from homeowner respondents, who purchased their house from the developer 
and had not made any structural alterations to their houses were considered. A site visit 
revealed that Housing Development 1 has been completed, with all allocated stands 
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having been developed. The housing scheme is fully occupied mainly because the 
houses are considered affordable as is shown in Figure 6-4. 
 
Figure 6-4: Key decision factors attracting beneficiaries into Housing Development 1 
 
For the homeowners, affordability was a major pull factor in the housing scheme, 
followed by flexible payments terms and lastly availability of documents of ownership. 
These findings imply that these market solutions are considered to be reasonably 
priced by the beneficiaries. The employment status of the household heads currently 
residing in this development shows that there is predominantly low-income people in 
this development as shown in Figure 6-5. 
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Figure 6-5: Nature of employment of household heads in Housing Development 1 and 
approach to property acquisition 
 
Of the homeowners who bought complete houses, the majority are the unemployed, 
civil servants and the self-employed, and these people are generally classified as low-
income earners especially in developing countries where most civil servants are 
amongst the lowly paid workforce (Lehmann, Dieleman, & Martineau, 2008). There 
is also very low onward selling of houses in the scheme as is seen through a very low 
figure of beneficiaries who acquire houses via individual sellers as shown in Figure 
6-6. 
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Figure 6-6: Approach to property acquisition in Housing Development 1 
 
This implies that there were no other developers that were active in this development 
other than Developer 1 and there is minimal speculative activity by the beneficiaries 
in this scheme, where individuals buy completed houses for resale. Furthermore, 100% 
of the beneficiaries do not own other properties other than the ones bought via this 
housing development. Thus, the beneficiaries in Housing Development 1 are first-time 
homeowners, who before this housing scheme were precluded from owning property, 
due to lack of affordable housing options with flexible payment terms. Table 6-4 shows 
that beneficiaries living in the housing development are fairly satisfied with the size of 
the rooms, roofing and quality of walls, with more than 75% of respondents in each 
instance saying they are satisfied.  
 
Table 6-4: Evaluation of the work of the developer in Housing Development 1 
Satisfied with: Count Percentage 
Size of Rooms 33 76.7% 
Roofing 33 76.7% 
Quality of Walls 38 88.4% 
Roads 11 25.6% 
Drainage 10 23.3% 
  
 
 147 
 
Of concern however is the roads and drainages, which scored very low percentages. A 
visit to the site showed that roads and drainages are yet to be constructed as per the 
standards stipulated in the regulations as shown in Figure 6-7. 
  
Figure 6-7: Access road in Housing Development 1 
 
Servicing in this housing scheme is also incomplete as shown in Table 6-5 which 
depicts access to amenities. 
 
Table 6-5: Access to amenities in Housing Development 1 
Access to Amenities Count Percentage 
Running Water 26 44.1% 
Sewer Services 26 44.1% 
Electricity 0 0.0% 
Refuse Collection 51 86.4% 
Nearby Schools 9 15.3% 
Nearby Clinic 21 35.6% 
Nearby Police Station 21 35.6% 
  
Less than 50% of the households included in this survey have access to reticulated 
water and sewer services, a situation, which implies that the developer is not yet done 
with land servicing. All other amenities included in Table 6-4 are not provided by the 
developer but help paint a picture of the quality of life in the housing development. No 
household has access to electricity, pending supply of infrastructure which should be 
provided by the government via the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority. A critical 
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need for proximal schools is also noted amongst other amenities such as clinics and 
police stations, whose provision falls under government.  
 
In summary, in Housing Development 1, construction of housing which adheres to 
building by-laws in terms of layout, plot sizes, and materials used is complete and all 
the houses are occupied. The current beneficiaries are the low-income group and they 
consider houses in this development affordable. It is however noted that more than half 
of the households in the development still do not have access to basic amenities like 
sewer and water, and roads are yet to be constructed to the required standards, which 
implies that land servicing is not yet complete. All households in this scheme have no 
access to electricity, and a critical need for nearby schools was noted. 
 
6.6.3 Case 2: Housing Development 2 
This housing development was also undertaken by Developer 1 in the high-density 
suburb of Phelandaba. Land for this development was bought from the local authority 
in 2006 and the company was given the go-ahead to start servicing the area in 200814. 
A location map accessed from the local authority showed that the development had 75 
stands as shown in Figure 6-8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 https://allafrica-com.ezproxy.uct.ac.za/stories/200811211013.html 
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Figure 6-8: Housing Development 2 location map 
Source: Bulawayo City Council (2009) 
 
The study confirms that the layout that was observed on site tallies with the approved 
layout plan in Figure 6-8. At the time of the survey, in November 2017, all the plots 
that are shown in the location map had housing that was 100% complete. Survey 
results recorded 67% owner respondents who confirmed that Developer 1 built most 
of the houses in the area, with a small fraction of the property being sold off as serviced 
vacant plots as shown in Figure 6-9. 
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Figure 6-9: Approach to property acquisition in Housing Development 2 
 
These findings indicate that there were no other developers who were active in the area 
other than Developer 2. Beneficiaries had the option to purchase serviced plots, but 
the most preferred product was completed housing. There is also very low speculative 
activity amongst the beneficiaries as is shown by the very low figures recorded of 
houses bought from individuals in Figure 6-9. This implies that beneficiaries who 
bought housing from the developer are holding on to their properties and not forward 
selling these houses. Of the 28 homeowner respondents, this study recorded 98% of 
the homeowner respondents as first-time homeowners who only managed to buy 
housing in Housing Development 2. Before they moved into their new homes, these 
respondents were either staying in rental accommodation or staying with family, 
except for the one respondent who was staying in his other house as shown in Table 
6-6. As such, the housing development enabled these respondents to penetrate the 
formal property market and move from renting to owning their own houses. 
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Table 6-6: Type of immediate-past accommodation of homeowner respondents in 
Housing Development 2 
Immediate-past accommodation Frequency Percentage 
Rented 19 65.6 
Staying with Family 8 27.6 
Own Alternative House 1 3.4 
Employer-Provided 1 3.4 
Total 29 100.0 
  
The key decision factors that influenced beneficiaries to choose to settle in this 
development are shown in Figure 6-10. For homeowners, affordability, flexible 
payment terms and documents of ownership were a pull factor. 
 
Figure 6-10: Key decision factors attracting beneficiaries into Housing Development 
2 
 
For tenants, the key consideration was the price of rentals, which were considered 
affordable. As shown in Figure 6-11, beneficiaries in the development are 
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predominantly the self-employed and civil servants, and, despite this, they consider 
these houses affordable. 
 
Figure 6-11: Nature of employment of household head in Housing Development 2 
 
Typical houses that we built by the developer in this housing scheme are shown in 
Figure 6-12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 153 
 
Figure 6-12: Typical houses built by the developer in Housing Development 2 
 
The plot sizes in the housing development are all less than 300m2, which shows 
adherence with the Bulawayo Local Authority’s zoning guidelines for low-income 
housing and Circular Number 70 of 2004 which gazetted revised national housing 
standards for high, medium and low-density residential areas. As shown in Table 6-7 
findings collected from 23 respondents who knew their plot sizes show that there were 
no plots in the scheme whose size was below 89cm2 and none above 300m2. It was 
observed that all the houses in the development are stand-alone houses that do not 
share any sidewalls. Such houses, according to the building bylaws should be 
constructed on plot sizes above 90cm2, and in this housing development, the smallest 
plot size was recorded at 200m2. 
 
Table 6-7: Plot sizes in Housing Development 2 
 Plot Size (m2) Frequency Percentage 
0-89 0 0 
90-200 11 47.83 
201-300 12 52.17 
above 300 0 0 
Total 23 100 
 
To check for the building materials used by the developer in the housing development, 
responses were filtered to look at homeowner respondents who bought from the 
developers and have not yet extended their houses. 100% of all these responses showed 
that houses in Housing Development 2 were constructed using concrete blocks and 
asbestos roof, all of which are listed as allowable building materials according to the 
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Zimbabwe Model Building By-Laws, Model Building (amendment) by-Laws,1980 
(No.1), (Amendment) By-Laws, 1981 (No.2). Table 6-8 shows the proportion of 
beneficiaries out of 42 respondents who are satisfied with the sizes of rooms, roofing, 
quality of walls, and drainages is fairly reasonable. There were no specific issues that 
were raised to substantiate why some of the beneficiaries were saying they are not 
satisfied with the roads and drainage.  
 
Table 6-8: Evaluation of the developers work in Housing Development 2 
Satisfaction with: Count Percentage  
Size of Rooms 27 64.3 
Roofing 31 73.8 
Quality of Walls 28 66.7 
Roads 24 57.1 
Drainage 30 71.4 
 
There were quite a number of comments regarding roads in the development with most 
of those who said they were not satisfied citing that the roads become impassable 
during the rainy season. This implies that roads and the drainages still need to be 
addressed. A picture of a typical road found in this development, shown in Figure 6-13, 
shows that the developer has only done bush clearing. As such, roads in this housing 
scheme are yet to be done in line with regulations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 155 
 
Figure 6-13: Access road in Housing Development 2 
 
The study also found that almost all households have access to running water and 
sewer, which shows that the housing development is connected to the Local authority 
trunk infrastructure. Other than water and sewer, the local authority also provides 
ancillary services that residents are billed for such as garbage collection, which shows 
that the Housing Development 2 is a formal settlement that is recognised by the 
Bulawayo Local Authority. Residents also have access to nearby schools and clinics, 
which is an indication of the quality of life led by the residents of Housing 
Development 2 as shown in Table 6-9. 
 
Table 6-9: Access to amenities in Housing Development 2 
Access to Amenities Frequency Percentage  
Running water 41 91.1% 
Sewer services 39 86.7% 
Electricity 0 0 
Refuse collection 36 80.0% 
Nearby schools 42 93.3% 
Nearby clinic 37 82.2% 
Nearby police station 39 86.7% 
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In summary, in Housing Development 2, construction of housing which adheres to 
building by-laws in terms of layout, plot sizes, and materials used is complete and all 
the houses are occupied. The current beneficiaries are the low-income group and they 
consider houses in this development affordable. It is however noted that there are a 
few households that still do not have access to basic amenities like sewer and water, 
and roads are yet to be constructed to the required standards which implies that land 
servicing is not yet complete. All households in this scheme have no access to 
electricity, but access to other amenities like schools, clinics and police stations was 
noted.  
 
6.6.4 Case 3: Housing Development 3 
The same developer who serviced virgin land and built low-income housing in Case 1 
and Case 2 is the architect behind Case 3. Land for this scheme is in the periphery of 
the Bulawayo administrative boundary, but within the Bulawayo master plan 
boundary. This land was purchased from an individual in 2008, and as a result, the 
Bulawayo Local Authority did not have the location map for this area. In lieu of this, 
a satellite picture of the area was obtained from Google maps and is shown in Figure 
6-14.  
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Figure 6-14: Location of Housing Development 3 
 
Source: Adapted from Google Maps 
 
The suburb is nested just on the edge of the city’s boundary, next to the well-developed 
suburb of Pumula in Bulawayo. The housing development has a potential of 3,500 
households, but at the time of the survey, the development was about 30% complete 
with most houses still at various stages of completion. The study confirms that even 
though the housing development lies just outside of the Bulawayo Local Authority 
administrative boundary, it is connected to the city’s well-developed road network. In 
the course of data collection, the housing development was accessed on one side from 
Khami Road, which is a major wide tarred road which goes all the way to Tsholotsho, 
an administrative district in Matabeleland North, and on the other side via the suburb 
of Pumula. In addition, within the housing scheme, there is orderly land parcelling, 
with houses constructed in rows which allow all plots individual vehicular access. It 
was however noted that the housing development does not yet have a compact look 
compared to the older suburbs as some houses are still in different stages of 
construction.  
 
From the survey results from 134 households, the study recorded 34% owner 
respondents who confirmed that properties in the area were acquired from the 
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developer, and beneficiaries had the option of purchasing either a completed house or 
a vacant plot as shown in Figure 6-15. 
 
Figure 6-15: Property acquisition options in Housing Development 3 
 
Only one recorded case in the development was recorded where a respondent bought 
a completed house from an individual. The low-level of recorded individual sales also 
point to very low speculative activities amongst the beneficiaries as they are not 
forward selling the properties purchased in the development. These findings also 
confirm that there are no other developers who are active in Development 3 other than 
Developer 1 and indicate that most of the housing in the area was built by the developer 
since the number of properties sold as vacant plots is less than that of completed 
housing sales. Even though construction is still ongoing, all the 134 households that 
were included in the survey were staying in completed housing as shown in Figure 
6-16. 
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Figure 6-16: Typical housing in Housing Development 3 
 
 
 
 
Construction materials that were used in this housing development by the developer 
were building blocks and asbestos roofing as shown in Figure 6-16. The houses are 
arranged in rows and there is provision for individual vehicular access to each plot. 
96% of the plot sizes in the development are between 120m2 and 300m2 with only 
three plots recorded which are above 300m2 as shown in Table 6-10. Further probing 
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revealed that plots that are more than 300m2 are typically corner plots that have 
irregular plot sizes. The smallest recorded plot size in the Housing scheme was 120m2, 
which is ideal for the stand-alone houses that were observed through the scheme. 
 
Table 6-10: Plot sizes in Housing Development 3 
Stand Sizes (m2) Count Percentage 
120 7 9.7 
180 3 4.2 
200 18 25.0 
225 17 23.6 
250 7 9.7 
300 17 23.6 
Above 300 3 4.2 
Total 72 100.0 
 
Survey finding showed that occupants in this housing development were mainly low-
income, with 40% of households occupied by homeowners whilst 60% had tenants. 
Occupations of heads of households in the two tenure subcategories included the 
unemployment, self-employed, civil servants and in the other category was included 
respondents who were employed by private companies and individuals as security 
guards, cleaners, gardeners, and a few in white-collar jobs as shown in Figure 6-17. 
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Figure 6-17: Occupation of Housing Development 3 residents 
 
The beneficiaries in this development conform to the profile of the low-income as is 
seen through the predominance of unemployed and self-employed household heads 
who make up more than 60% of the respondents. The plight of civil servants has also 
worsened over the years in Zimbabwe due to inflationary upward pressures on the 
poverty datum line that is not accompanied by increases in salaries. As a result, most 
civil servants are now classified as low-income. Most of the jobs recorded in the other 
category are menial jobs which do not pay much.  
 
What has attracted most of the occupants into this housing scheme is affordability as 
shown in Figure 6-18. However, for owner-occupants, the major reason for buying 
into the scheme was flexible payment terms, which combined with the affordable 
price, made it easier for them to penetrate the housing market. 
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Figure 6-18: Key decision factors attracting beneficiaries into Housing Development 
3 
 
One measure of the success of these housing developments is affordability. From the 
perspective of the beneficiaries, Housing Development 3 is providing affordable 
housing options for both tenants and homeowners. For tenants, rentals charged in the 
development are affordable and were the major pull factor. Owner-occupants were 
mostly interested in affordability in terms of the purchase price, flexible payment terms 
and availability of documents of ownership. Only 2 out of a total of 40 homeowner 
respondents said they own another property. These findings, when combined with the 
job categories of the household heads presented in figure 6-16 despite the beneficiaries 
are low-income, they have managed through Housing Development 3, to be first-time 
homeowners. This development thus shows the possibilities of extending 
homeownership to people who have low-income jobs. Table 6-11 shows that 
beneficiaries in the development are generally satisfied with the size of the rooms, the 
roofing and quality of walls.  
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Table 6-11: Evaluation of the work of the developer in Housing Development 3 
Satisfaction with: Count Percentage 
 Size of Rooms 84 82.4 
Roofing 76 74.5 
Quality of Walls 59 57.8 
Roads 18 17.6 
Drainage 14 13.7 
 
A notable decrease in satisfaction with the work of the developer was however seen in 
roads and drainages. A site visit showed that the housing scheme is accessible, but 
most of the roads have just been bush cleared as shown in Figure 6-19 and drainages 
are yet to be constructed. 
 
Figure 6-19: Access road in Housing Development 3 
 
Residents in this development, however, do not have access to running water, sewer 
services and other ancillary services as shown in Figure 6-12. 
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Table 6-12: Access to amenities in Housing Development 3 
Access to Amenities Count Percentage 
Sewer Services 14 18.40 
Running Water 0 0 
Electricity 0 0 
Refuse Collection 0 0 
Nearby Schools 55 72.40 
Nearby Clinic 48 63.20 
Nearby Police Station 46 60.50 
 
Residents access water from communal boreholes that are strategically placed around 
the development and can also buy tap water from people residing in the adjacent 
suburb of Pumula. The developer also transports drinking water once a day using a 
bowser. MH3, however, revealed that: 
 
“The developer laid all sewer and water pipes, but due to certain administrative 
challenges, between Bulawayo Local Authority and UMguza RDC, the development 
still hasn’t been connected to trunk infrastructure. The developer funded those sewer 
ponds, just to make sure the discharge doesn’t go into the river. They will be closed 
with time when the area is connected to the Bulawayo trunk infrastructure since 
Bulawayo has its own sewer treatment plants, SAST 1 and 2.” 
 
As such, even though the development is not yet connected to trunk infrastructure, 
some residents do have access to the sewer infrastructure. The sewer ponds found in 
Housing Development 2 are shown in Figure 6-20. 
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Figure 6-20: Sewer ponds in Housing Development 3 
 
In summary, in Housing Development 3, construction of housing which adheres to 
building by-laws in terms of layout, plot sizes, and materials used is still ongoing, but 
all completed houses are occupied. The current beneficiaries are the low-income group 
and they consider houses in this development affordable. It is however noted that 
despite the developer having laid pipes in the completed sections all the households in 
this housing development are not connected to the local authority trunk infrastructure 
and thus there is no access to reticulated water and sewer services. Sewer ponds, 
constructed by the developer are used as an alternative low-cost waste treatment option 
whilst residents get water from boreholes dotted across the development, bowsers 
brought in by the developer and from the nearby suburbs. Roads and drainages in 
sections where there are completed units are also not complete, implying that the 
developer is not yet doe with land servicing.  
 
6.6.5 Case 4: Housing Development 4 
This housing development is in Cowdray Park a high-density suburb in Bulawayo. 
Land for the development was allocated by the Bulawayo Local Authority in 1994. 51 
households were successfully surveyed from 75 plots. Of the 51 respondents, 59% 
were homeowner respondents, and these confirmed that the developer’s product 
offering included serviced plots and completed housing as shown in Figure 6-21. 
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Figure 6-21: Property acquisition options in Housing Development 4 
 
These findings also show that there was no other developer who was active in the 
housing development other than Developer 2. The study recorded homeowner 
respondents who bought into the scheme as far back as 2007, but despite this, the very 
low levels of individual sales in the development point to beneficiaries who bought 
into the scheme, not for speculative reasons but want to hold on to their properties. 
Only 5 out of the 30 homeowner respondents reported that they own other properties 
and further probing revealed that 4 of the 5 were referring to undeveloped plots in 
other newly developing areas. These findings show that Housing Development 4 
provided a chance for over 96% of the homeowner respondents to be first-time 
homeowners and to upgrade their tenure status from tenants to homeowners. At the 
time of the survey, all the houses had been completed and were occupied. Typical 
housing that was built by the developer is shown in Figure 6-22. 
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Figure 6-22: Typical housing in Housing Development 4 
 
In the housing development, the study confirms that there is orderly land parcelling 
that tallies with the layout map that was obtained from the local authority and shown 
in Figure 6-23 . All the plot numbers that were listed on the map in the region bound 
by the bold black line in Figure 6-23 were present and the layout plan was the source 
document that was used for systematic sampling in the study. 
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Figure 6-23: Layout plan for Housing Development 4 
Source: Bulawayo City Council (2006b) 
 
As can be seen on the layout pan, all the individual plots in the housing development 
have vehicular access and the housing development is connected to the main road 
infrastructure. Key decision factors that attracted beneficiaries to this housing 
development were affordability for both the tenants and the homeowners and 
availability of documents of ownership as shown in Figure 6-24. 
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Figure 6-24: Key decision factors attracting beneficiaries to Housing Development 4 
 
More than 64% of the current beneficiaries are either unemployed, self-employed or 
retired as shown in Figure 6-25 whilst the rest include civil servants and other job 
categories which are generally low income. The job categories presented here attest to 
the success of the housing development in targeting the low-income group. But, 
despite this, the beneficiaries consider the housing options availed to them via this 
housing development as affordable.  
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Figure 6-25: Employment status of household heads 
 
The beneficiaries are generally satisfied with the work of the developer in the housing 
scheme in terms of the size of the rooms, roofing and quality of walls, but a marked 
decrease was noted with regards to roads and drainages as show inTable 6-13. 
 
Table 6-13: Evaluation of the work of the developer in Housing Development 4 
 
 
 
A site visit showed that roads and the associated drainages are not yet complete as 
shown in Figure 6-26. So far, bush clearing has been done, and even though the roads 
are functional, and houses are accessible, the developer is yet to construct the roads as 
per the required standards. 
Satisfaction with: Count Percentage  
Size of Rooms 38 74.5 
Roofing 47 92.2 
Quality of Walls 34 66.7 
Roads 10 19.6 
Drainage 23 45.1 
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Figure 6-26: Typical road in Housing Development 4 
 
Residents in this development mostly have access to basic amenities such as water and 
sewer services and other local authority provided services such as refuse collection 
schools clinics and police stations as shown in Table 6-14. This shows that the housing 
development is a formal development that is acknowledged by the local authority as 
residents are charged for these services.  
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Table 6-14: Access to amenities in Housing Development 4 
Access to Amenities Count Percentage  
Running Water 41 70.7 
Sewer Services 41 70.7 
Electricity 0 0 
Refuse Collection 55 94.8 
Nearby Schools 28 48.3 
Nearby Clinic 24 41.4 
Nearby Police Station 48 82.8 
 
Land servicing in this housing development is still ongoing, as seen through roads 
which are not yet complete and a section of the residents who are still not connected 
to the local authority trunk infrastructure. There is also still no access to electricity in 
the housing scheme. Electricity provision, however, lies with the government via its 
parastatal.  
 
In summary, in Housing Development 4, construction of housing that adheres to 
building by-laws in terms of layout, plot sizes, and materials used is complete and all 
the houses are occupied. The current beneficiaries are the low-income group and they 
consider houses in this development affordable. More than 29% of the households in 
the development however still do not have access to basic amenities like sewer and 
water, and roads are yet to be constructed to the required standards, which implies that 
land servicing is not yet complete. All households in this scheme are still not connected 
to electricity, and the housing development could benefit more from having a nearby 
school and clinic.  
 
6.6.6 Case 5: Housing Development 5 
Land for Housing Development 5, situated in the suburb of Cowdray Park, was sold 
to the Developer by the Bulawayo Local Authority in 1996 and servicing started in 
2001, with a total of 532 plots and roads with a total length of 140km to be serviced 
and developed by Developer 3. From 134 respondents, the study recorded 66 
homeowner respondents who confirmed the property acquisition options that were 
available to them in the housing scheme as shown in Table 6-15. 
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Table 6-15: Approach to property acquisition in Housing Development 5 
Property Bought 
From 
Bought Plot 
and Built 
Bought a 
Complete House 
Inherited 
Complete House 
Total 
Developer 23 36 1 60 
Individual Seller 1 5 0 6 
Total 24 41 1 66 
 
 
The findings confirm that there were no other developers active in the area except 
Developer 3, and beneficiaries had the option to purchase either a serviced plot or a 
completed house. The low rate of individual sellers who are active in the development 
shows that there is no evidence of speculative as most property sales are through the 
developer and beneficiaries buy and then hold on to their properties. 
 
 At the time of the survey, all the houses in the housing development were complete 
and occupied. Typical housing that was built by the developer is shown in Figure 6-27. 
 
Figure 6-27: Typical housing built by the developer in Housing Development 5 
 
A layout map, obtained from the Local Authority shows orderly parcelling of space, 
with houses arranged in rows that allow vehicular access to each individual plot, and 
access roads that connect the housing Development to the main road infrastructure as 
shown in Figure 6-28.  
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Figure 6-28: Layout plan for Housing Development 5 
Source: Bulawayo City Council (2015) 
 
This study confirms that the houses in the housing development were built as per the 
layout plan and the plot numbers on the map tallied with what was observed. From a 
total of 134 households who partook in the survey, 90 could conform their plot sizes. 
Findings indicate that most of the plot sizes in this development were 200m2, though 
beneficiaries had the option to buy smaller or bigger plots sizes depending on what 
they could afford as shown in Table 6-16. 
 
 175 
 
Table 6-16: Plot sizes in Housing Development 5 
Stand size (m2) Count Per cent 
below 100 0.0 0.0 
100-120 12 13.33 
200 58.0 64.44 
200-300 13 14.44 
above 300 7.0 7.79 
Total 90 100.0 
 
These findings indicate that plot sizes were in line with the zoning guideline for high-
density suburbs, where plot sizes are normally below 300m2. Exceptions are however 
made for corner stands, which can be slightly bigger than the recommended plot size. 
From both the owner and tenant respondents’ point of view, the housing scheme was 
affordable, but in addition to that, homeowner beneficiaries were interested in flexible 
payment terms and also security of tenure as documents of ownership were available 
as shown in Figure 6-29. 
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Figure 6-29: Key decision factors attracting beneficiaries into housing Development 
5 
 
These beneficiaries who were attesting to the affordability of houses in this scheme 
are mainly low-income earners as shown in Figure 6-30. The figure shows that more 
than 53% of the current beneficiaries spread across the two tenure options are either 
unemployed or self-employed or retired, thus essentially falling into the low-income 
category. That said, this housing development is successfully serving the low-income 
group.  
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Figure 6-30: Nature of employment of household head in Housing Development 5 
 
More than 75% of all beneficiaries were satisfied with the size of the rooms, roofing, 
and quality of wall, which shows that the Housing development delivered an 
acceptable product to the beneficiaries as shown in Table 6-17. 
 
Table 6-17: Evaluation of the work of the developer in Housing Development 5 
Satisfaction with: Count Per cent 
Size of Rooms 98 77.8 
Roofing 109 86.5 
Quality of Walls 107 84.9 
Roads 18 14.3 
Drainage 58 46.0 
 
 
 It was however noted that the rate of satisfaction significantly went down with respect 
to roads and drainages. A site visit showed that the developer has not yet completed 
road construction to the required standards and lack of drainages makes the roads 
unpassable during the rainy season as shown in Figure 6-31. 
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Figure 6-31: Typical road in Housing Development 5 
 
Compared to the all the other case presented above, land servicing is almost complete 
in this housing development, although it is noted that there are still a few households 
which are yet to be connected to trunk infrastructure so they can get access to 
reticulated water and sewer services as shown in Table 6-18.  
 
Table 6-18: Access to amenities in Housing Development 5 
Access to Amenities Count Percentage 
Running Water 106 79.7 
Sewer Services 106 79.7 
Electricity 113 85.0 
Refuse Collection 104 78.2 
Nearby Schools 94 70.7 
Nearby Clinic 99 74.4 
Nearby Police Station 103 77.4 
 
In summary, in Housing Development 5, construction of housing that adheres to 
building by-laws in terms of layout, plot sizes, and materials used is complete and all 
the houses are occupied. The current beneficiaries are the low-income group and they 
consider houses in this development affordable. About 20% of the households in the 
development however still do not have access to basic amenities like sewer and water, 
and roads are yet to be constructed to the required standards, which implies that land 
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servicing is not yet complete. 85% of houses in this development have access to 
electricity unlike in the other schemes where all households are not yet connected to 
electricity. Access to amenities is also relatively good compared to the other housing 
developments. 
 
A summary table showing the characteristics of these 5 developments is shown in 
Table 6-19 
 
Table 6-19: Summary characteristics of the 5 housing developments 
 Development 1 Development 2 Development 3 Development 4 Development 5 
Status as 
at April 
2018 
Sold out Sold out Ongoing Sold out Sold out 
Size of 
the 
scheme 
274 plots 185 plots 185 plots 75plots 532plots 
Product 
offering 
Serviced plots 
plus 2 and 4 
roomed houses 
Serviced plots 
plus 2- and 4- 
roomed houses 
Serviced plots 
plus 2-,3-and 
4- roomed 
houses 
Serviced plots 
plus 2 and 4 
roomed houses 
Serviced plots 
plus 2 and 4 
roomed houses 
Land  
Sourced from 
the local 
authority 
Sourced from 
the local 
authority 
Bought from 
an individual 
Supplied by 
the local 
authority as 
part of the PPP  
Sourced from 
the local 
authority 
Finance 
Developer 
financed 
Developer 
financed 
Developer 
financed 
PPP model 
Underwritten 
by 2 building 
societies 
Houses 
Construction 
completed, and 
all houses fully 
occupied 
Construction 
completed, and 
all houses fully 
occupied 
Construction 
still ongoing 
Construction 
completed, and 
all houses fully 
occupied 
Construction 
completed, and 
all houses fully 
occupied 
Roads 
and 
drainages  
Incomplete Incomplete Incomplete Incomplete Incomplete 
Sewer 
services 
44.1% 91.1% 18.4% 70.7% 79.7% 
Running 
water 
44.1% 86.7% 0% 70.7% 79.7% 
Electricit
y  
0% 0% 0% 0% 85% 
 
 
6.7 Structural Enablers, Constraints and Strategies  
The above case studies showcase the efforts of private developers to provide market 
housing solutions for the low-income group. The act of transforming urban land into 
both low-income housing and sites for low-income housing, when occurring through 
the market mechanism, takes place through agents who strive to convert factors of 
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production to produce a predetermined outcome at a profit, which in this study is low-
income housing. The conceptual framework developed in this study postulates that 
structure which is the interrelation of political, social, economic and legal institutions 
impinges on the agents’ ability to produce housing as it contains prescriptions that both 
forbid and permit action. As such, structure was conceptualised as a set of rules and 
resources that provide the critical link between the action realm and the institutional 
realm and thus can enable and/or constrain agency. Given that institutions enable and 
constrain through governing the way material resources are accessed and used, this 
section looks at the structural variables that were identified in the conceptual 
framework, resources (land and land use rights, capital, labour), and using the 
analytical stance described in section 6.3, analyses the extent that institutions (planning 
regulations, building standards, procedures in getting land use rights, informal 
institutions) enable or constrain access to and use of these resources and the strategies 
employed by the developers in response. Ideology, which is also a structural variable 
in the Structure-Agency framework, was taken as constant from the developers’ 
perspective since they are all profit-oriented, but this study acknowledges the 
ideological orientation of other role players in the housing development process as 
having a constraining or enabling effect on the developers.  
 
This section will address the first and second hypothesis by highlighting how 
developers are able to have successful housing developments as seen through the five 
case studies presented above, given the adverse operating environment. This is attained 
through analysing the constraints and enablers embedded in the operating environment 
– and all the structural variables in the conceptual framework can either constrain or 
enable agency. Strategies that are then implemented in response to these enablers and 
constraints by the developers in each of the five case studies are then inferred. 
Strategies can only be implemented if there are resources available to the developer, 
the rules permit implementation of such a strategy and the ideological stance of the 
state and other role players is consistent with market solutions to the low-income 
housing challenge. For the low-income households where housing affordability is a 
challenge, it is evident that resources are the key to successful housing provision. Local 
realities, as reflected in the institutional environment, however, impose unique barriers 
to access and use of resources (Derossett, 2015; Gopalan & Venkataraman, 2015). 
Unavailability of construction resources may lead to project delays, which tend to 
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result in cost overruns (Hwang, Zhao, & Ng, 2013; Marzouk & El-Rasas, 2014) and 
magnify perceived risk that is embedded in housing projects targeted at the low-
income groups. 
 
6.7.1 Land suitable for low-income housing 
The most important development resource in low-income housing is land. The 
conceptual framework recognises that unavailability of land would hinder agency of 
developers, as, without land, no development can take place. Similarly, if land is 
available but is expensive, housing options that can be developed by the market 
become skewed in favour of higher-income groups at the expense of low-income 
housing. Scarcity of adequately located and properly planned land has been cited as a 
barrier to low-income housing solutions the world over (Ibem, 2011; Moss, 2003) and 
the high cost of land has also been identified as one of the leading causes for 
affordability problems in developing countries, (Childress & Alliance, 2015; Du & 
Peiser, 2014; Turner, 1967). This shortage of land gives rise to land mafias, illegal 
encroachments and corruption (Gopalan & Venkataraman, 2015) and these issues vary 
with local realities. Land is usually under the purview of the government, either central 
government or local government, and this makes this valuable resource subject to 
political and ideological influences – socialism, communism, neoliberalism and other 
such variants (Childress & Alliance, 2015; Claussen, 2015; Derossett, 2015). 
 
The supply of land for low-income housing in Zimbabwe has always been considered 
as a public-sector responsibility via the provision of land by local authorities (Brown, 
2001; Chitekwe-Biti, 2009; Chitekwe & Mitlin, 2001; Kamete, 1998; Muchadenyika, 
2015b) to individuals, cooperatives and private developers. Residential land can be 
situated under either an urban local authority or a rural district council, and the 
processes and procedures that are followed to access this land and the associated 
development permits differ, thus presenting different structural enablers and 
constraints. Within the Bulawayo administrative boundary, developers could only 
purchase land after having their development proposals approved by the local 
authority, thus making the local authority’s credence of market solutions to the housing 
problem a structural enabler. If land for housing development is to be bought from the 
local authority, the developer must apply for land, and this application must be 
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accompanied by a proposal, which can be rejected, as was revealed by LA1 who 
explained that: 
  
“All these developers got land from the Council, except for Developer 1, who used his 
own private land under uMguza RDC for Housing Development 3. But for all the other 
developments under him, he was offered the land by the Council. The developer 
approaches the Council with a proposal…… if the application is approved, we do not 
however sell them the land at a subsidized cost. We have our own standard rates that 
we use, [when] selling virgin land to these developers. Meaning that they would then 
have to service the land on their own.” 
 
Thus, in four of the five developments, the land was purchased from the Bulawayo 
Local Authority. Issues that came up from this response were that supply of land that 
is suitable for low-income housing within the Bulawayo Local Authority boundary can 
only be supplied by the local authority. Since the local authority determines who gets 
access to this land, when and for how much, land acquisition within the Bulawayo 
administrative boundary is a non-market process. As such, access to this land hinges 
on the ideological orientation of the local authority, the processes that are followed in 
the allocation of land and the efficiency with which the local authority can make such 
land available. Land for Housing Development 4 was acquired through a public-
private partnership arrangement, with the Bulawayo Local Authority bringing to the 
table land, and the developer, land servicing finance for the housing development.  
 
Land for Housing Development 1 and 5 was purchased from the local authority and 
allocated in 2006 and 1996 respectively without any notable constraints. The value of 
this land according to both developers was insignificant “due to inflation” and wasn’t 
a key issue in fixing the selling prices in the developments. 
 
 In Housing Development 2, land for the development was initially allocated in Pumula 
South, and work commenced on the site. However, because of bad terrain and 
numerous landfills in the construction area, the developer felt it was uneconomic to 
build low-income housing in the area. The local authority then had to look for an 
alternative area for Housing Development 2, which was allocated in 2008 as was 
explained by Developer 1: 
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“We realised that the site that was allocated to us had to be rehabilitated first before 
construction could begin and we could not keep costs low. So, we had no choice but to 
go back to the local authority and request for a site that is suitable for low-income 
housing construction. It took time for us to get the replacement, but it was better to 
wait than to construct on the original site.” 
 
Housing Development 2 thus highlights that for low-income housing, suitable land not 
only makes reference to the location of the land. Other important factors that should 
be considered is the quality of the land – with land that will not require extensive work 
on it to convert it to useable land being ideal. The soil type, bedrock in the area, water 
table, slope of the land and natural drainage are some of the factors that have to be 
closely considered by a developer before the land is purchased to minimise costs.  
 
Land for housing development 4 was allocated in 2004, through a partnership deal 
entered into by Developer 2 and the Bulawayo Local Authority as was explained by 
Developer 2: 
 
“…We really got a foot in the door in the [low-income housing] business when we 
started being subcontracted by the local authority to service virgin land in the 90s. 
After that, building on the experience we had amassed, we were able to land a 
partnership with the local authority to service virgin land and build housing…that was 
really a game-changer for us. Our housing development had 75 plots, but we had to 
service a total of 113 plots as part-payment in lieu of land purchase cost.” 
 
 Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) were popular in Zimbabwe in the 1990s, mainly 
driven by donor funding -especially the USAID and the World Bank (Chipungu & 
Adebayo, 2013) and represent a complex organisational arrangement where each 
sector does what it can do best (Kamete, 1998). PPPs have been undertaken by the 
local authorities in all urban areas in Zimbabwe, Bulawayo included, with various 
stakeholders - private developers, financiers, cooperatives, employers, donor 
organisations, the community and human rights groups such as Dialogue on Shelter, 
Zimbabwe Homeless People’s Federation, Shack/Slum Dwellers International, 
(Magwaro-Ndiweni, 2013; Mashoko, 2012; Muchadenyika, 2015a, 2015b). The urban 
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councils provide virgin land and the developer provides the required infrastructure, 
thus limiting the role of the local authority to land allocation and development control 
rather than ownership of housing projects (Muchadenyika, 2015a).  
 
However, a resolution taken by the Bulawayo Local Authority to stop selling land to 
private developers in 2009 represents a shift in the implementation of the underlying 
ideology of embracing market solutions by the Bulawayo Local Authority and has 
since become a constraint to low-income housing development. The local authority 
has stopped selling land to private developers was explained by LA1: 
 
“We have since moved away from selling virgin land to the private developers. Council 
is now running its own program of preselling stands directly to the beneficiaries. 
Under this program we have our stands that are not yet serviced, we dispose of the 
stands exactly like the private developers were doing and then we service using the 
funds raised.” 
 
 All developers, who have plans for new low-income housing developments, who did 
not buy land from the local authority before 2009 can no longer access land from the 
local authority. As a strategy to counter this shift which is negatively affecting the 
developers, land for Housing Development 3 was purchased in the periphery areas of 
Bulawayo which falls under Bulawayo according to the master plan but is yet to be 
incorporated. Enabling factors that make this strategy possible is the Bulawayo master 
plan, which came into effect in 1994, resulting in the urbanisation of some sections of 
uMguza Rural District which will eventually be incorporated into the Bulawayo Local 
Authority. MH2 explained that: 
 
 “In Zimbabwe, we have two tiers of local authorities, urban and rural. Land that falls 
within each local authority is delimitated by a political/administrative boundary. Then 
you have the master plan boundary, which details the direction of growth of a bigger 
local authority which inevitably leads to a bigger local authority encroaching into a 
smaller usually rural authority. Rural land that is within the boundaries of the master 
plan changes from being rural land to urban, but is still under the purview of the rural 
authority…so for example, uMguza has one urban portion, being the Rangemore area, 
because it was urbanized through the Bulawayo master plan in 1994, and landholders 
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in that area are now obliged by the master plan to comply with urban standards as set 
by the Bulawayo Local Authority…Some landholders who can’t comply simply sell to 
private developers.” 
 
This land which lies on the periphery of the city falls under uMguza RDC and is mostly 
land that is privately held. The political environment which has pushed some 
individual landowners who own large tracts of land in this area to sell combined with 
lack of access to resources by the Bulawayo Local Authority to purchase this land 
gives private developers a fair chance to access the land via the market process on a 
willing buyer willing seller basis, which is how land for Housing Development was 
acquired as was explained by Developer 1: 
 
 “There is land on the periphery. Since we couldn’t get land from the local authority, 
we approached the owner of a large tract of land under uMguza. He was scared of the 
land grabs, and that was a good incentive for him to sell. He was seeing what was 
happening. You know that most of the land is owned by whites? We approached him, 
and we offered him a good price. He gave us a portion of it, and the other potion he 
kept for himself. I believe the potion that he kept for himself was gazetted [for 
redistribution].” 
 
The political environment that was prevailing in the country mainly the land reform 
programme opened opportunities for the developer to access formerly privately owned 
land in the periphery of the city that would otherwise not have been accessible at a 
reasonable price. The programme intended to alter the ethnic balance of land 
ownership, officially begun in 1980, progressed from willing buyer-willing seller to 
compulsory acquisition in 1992 and then fast track land reform in 1999 eventually 
forcing some landowners to sell off their land holdings (Muchadenyika, 2015a). All 
the land that has been urbanised by the Bulawayo master plan, currently under uMguza 
Rural District Council, will eventually be incorporated into the local authority 
purview, as it is already planned for under the local Master plan as high-density 
residential areas. There already are provisions for service provision for such areas 
under the master plan, but the Local Authority, due to a shortage of funds, has not been 
able to buy the land that has been gazetted as residential land under the master plan as 
was explained by LA4: 
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 “If you look at areas such as Emthunzini and eMbundane in uMguza, they are all 
within Bulawayo in terms of the master plan. The master plan says that these areas 
are to be developed as high-density residential areas, but we are not buying due to 
shortage of funds.” 
 
The resource constraints faced by the local authority to purchase land this land that has 
been gazetted has resulted in the emergence of a “capitalistic mode of land supply” 
(Sivam, 2002), as seen in this study through the developers having to scout for 
privately owned land in the periphery of the local authority areas with the intent to 
subdivide and develop the land. This development is a symptom of the inability of the 
conventional land delivery process to meet the demand for land (Sivam, 2002) in this 
case by the local authority. The land problem, identified in this study emanates from 
refusal to sell land by the local authority. Potential urban land within the Bulawayo 
Local Authority administrative boundary that can be released to willing developers 
lies frozen as the local authority tries to unlock funds to develop the land itself despite 
the myriad of challenges that it is faced with, which has seen the actual number of 
developed stands filtering through to the low-income group dwindling to nothing in 
the last several years.  
 
Acquiring land from the market, as was done in Housing Development 3, the study 
concludes, is a viable land acquisition strategy that can enable developers to continue 
being active in low-income housing development in Bulawayo. It may not necessarily 
lower costs, but it allows the developers to continue being active in the low-income 
housing space. This study contends that ordinarily, access to local authority land would 
be the cheaper and most preferred option, but it is not available now. Given the 
circumstances that are prevailing in Zimbabwe, it is still possible for developers to get 
land from the private sector at a reasonable price because of political dynamics. The 
political and economic environment prevailing in Zimbabwe ensures access to the land 
at bargain prices as landowners who are selling to the developers have to comply on 
one hand with political pressures of the land redistribution and apportionment exercise, 
with all landowners found with large tracts of land losing them to the government at 
little or no compensation. On the other hand, legal ramifications that come with failure 
to comply with zoning requirements, now that the Rangemore area in uMguza RDC 
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has been urbanised through the Bulawayo master plan, also force the landowners to be 
open to negotiations with developers. This strategy though outside the cases presented 
in this study was also noted with Developer 2, who also mentioned that he is currently 
working on a bigger housing development in uMguza RDC. If a developer wants to 
have a low-income housing development in Bulawayo now, if there is no change in 
the policy stance of the local authority, the developer would have to purchase land on 
the periphery of the city as was done in Housing Development 3. 
 
Despite the decision by the Local authority to stop selling land for low-income housing 
which changed the operating environment for the private-sector developers and 
became a structural constraint, developers are still able to produce low income housing 
because they have resources that enable them to buy land from the market and the 
political environment makes it possible for them to get this land at a reasonable cost 
as is seen through Housing Development 3. Purchasing such land would then imply 
that the developers as the landowners, have to adhere to the master plan requirements 
through subdividing their landholding into high-density low-income housing as has 
happened with Housing Development 3 under Developer 1. Developer 2 is awaiting 
subdivision permits for another low-income housing development also under uMguza 
Rural District Council. Developer 3, does not currently have any private landholding 
in and around Bulawayo, and other than Housing Development 5 and cannot have any 
other housing development unless if the local authority reverses its decision. As a 
result, he has expanded his operations into other local authority areas that are still 
willing to work with private developers. By positioning themselves in this manner, the 
developers locked in the option to develop low-income housing and have 
circumvented a constraint that presented itself via a policy shift by the local authority, 
even though market solutions are still encouraged.  
 
The disjuncture between official prices charged by the local authority and market-
adjusted prices given the prevailing inflation rates meant that the price of land in all 
the housing developments where land was purchased from the local authority was 
negligible. Prices of land lagged behind inflation significantly. Even though it is 
acknowledged that land is the costliest component in low-income housing, this study 
found that this was not the case in Housing Developments 1, 2, 4 and 5, where land 
was purchased from the local authority. In Housing Development 3, the land was 
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bought in 2008 from the market, at the height of hyperinflation, which culminated in 
the abandonment of the local currency in favour of the use of other foreign currencies. 
Cost benefits from Housing Development 3 were realised mainly in land valuation 
challenges for tax purposes. Where land being disposed of was acquired after the 1st of 
February 2009, capital gains tax is chargeable at the rate of 20% of the capital gain, 
but for all land that was acquired before 1st February 2009, capital gains tax is 
chargeable at the rate of 5% of the gross capital amount realized from the sale 
(ZIMRA, 2018). The selling price of housing units in the housing development 
includes a component of capital gains tax, and a positive spin-off, the low capital gains 
tax cost which is pushed forward to the developers is low, which lowers the overall 
cost of housing units. The combination of low real land values and the lower capital 
gains tax that is loaded in the sale price results in relatively affordable housing units. 
 
The evidence above shows that land costs in the five cases were kept low due to a 
combination of factors that kept land costs low despite there being no subsidies. In 
summary, this was due to the disjuncture between official prices of land and inflation-
adjusted values, which resulted in negligible costs of land, low capital gains tax due to 
land valuation challenges post dollarization and in Housing Development 3, negotiated 
low cost of land in uMguza RDC due to land reform pressure and the need to comply 
with the Bulawayo master plan, which resulted in some landowners deciding to sell 
off parts of their landholding. 
 
6.7.2 Formal and informal institutions 
In the conceptual framework, formal and informal institutions were defined as the 
rules that govern the way material resources are used and thus inherently contain 
prescriptions that both forbid and permit action and/or outcome. This section 
presents evidence on the impact of formal and informal institutions on the success of 
the housing developments presented above. This is achieved via analyzing the extent 
that rules guiding access to development rights, land servicing of peri-urban land, 
development control and transfer of properties were constraining or enabling agency 
of the developers in the five housing developments.  
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6.7.1.1 Access to development rights 
From the conceptual framework, another important resource in low-income housing 
development, other than land, is the associated land rights viz. subdivision and 
development permits and certifications that allow developers to go through the 
development process (Carrillo, 2014; Marzouk & El-Rasas, 2014; Odeyinka & Yusif, 
1997). Access to land is in part dependent on the subdivision process (Rakodi & 
Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1990a) and all housing sub-divisions should have planning 
permissions that follow an approved layout plan for development to be considered as 
legal, which is the master plan (Kamete, 1999, 2001b). Without planning permission, 
development or construction does not generally take off in Zimbabwe, which ensures 
compatibility of proposed developments with the required use of land and space in 
question (Chirisa, 2014). Criticisms have been directed at the planning process with 
charges being that it is too elitist and static, rigid, narrow-minded, too regulatory 
(Kamete, 1999), cumbersome, bureaucratic, and inefficient (Chirisa, 2014; 
Muchadenyika, 2015b). One aspect which is now mandatory for any major project, 
adding on to the number of institutions involved in the planning process is the 
undertaking of an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in line with the provisions 
of the Environmental Management Act of 2002 (Chapter 20:27) (Chipungu & 
Adebayo, 2013). As such, the effect of regulation on access to development rights and 
costs of development becomes pronounced. Inefficacy and bureaucracy are some of 
the points that were raised by the developers, which stifle private sector participation 
as was aptly highlighted by Developer 2:  
 
“We are currently working on another affordable housing development, and our 
subdivision permit still hasn’t been approved even though it has been in the system 
since 2013, and the reason given is that issuance of subdivision permits was suspended 
by the government in 2013. That’s the only reason why we haven’t started on this 
project because we can’t process our papers. The turnaround time for permits really 
frustrates! For example, I submit for subdivision right, then I have to resubmit the 
same thing with drawings for sewer, water reticulation and road designs to get a 
development permit. Why can’t I submit everything at once, with my drawings and 
everything, for me to say this is what I propose to do? Then I get one result at once” 
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The main bottleneck that negatively impacts agency is the time taken to process these 
permits. To deal with this, the developers claim that the only strategy that works is to 
bribe government officials as was explained be Developer 2:  
 
“The system is really skewed in favour of those with connections at the Local 
Authority. So, we know that it takes three months for a subdivision permit to be issued. 
But you get developer X coming in, buying land in March for example, and in June, 
Developer X is done with servicing and construction and they are already selling, and 
everything seems to be in order. How would they have done it?” 
 
This points to corruption within the planning process, fuelled by inefficiency built into 
the system which also influences some developers to look for ways to beat the system. 
Regulation also plays a part in dictating the upfront costs that must be borne by 
developers. For example, Section 39 of the Regional Town and Country Planning Act 
states that there shall be no subdivision of property without a permit (GOZ, 1976). In 
the same act, Section 40 (5) (a) (ii) stipulates as one of the conditions for a subdivision 
permit that the applicant lodges in survey records with the Surveyor-General within 
the period specified in the temporary subdivision permit. From a sample subdivision 
permit that was obtained from the Physical Planning department [attached in appendix 
4], this period is twelve months, which implies that developers who buy land in the 
periphery of Bulawayo are initially given one year to get their land title surveyed, 
thereby creating an independent title to the newly created land parcel. If the developer 
is unable to comply with this condition within the given period, the temporary 
subdivision permit expires, unless if they apply for an extension. Developers thus 
cannot apply for development permit before they have raised funds for title surveying 
upfront as part of the conditions of getting a permanent subdivision permit. Getting 
land title surveyed is however expensive as explained by LA4: 
 
“If a developer buys land from or partners with a private landowner, the land will have 
to be subdivided, and after that, they would have to do a title survey, of which the cost 
is steep.”  
 
In Housing Development 3, Developer 1 acknowledged the high cost of getting land 
title surveyed, and at the same time, noted that without a subdivision permit, they could 
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not apply for a development permit. This process is not negotiable as it is enshrined in 
the regulations, but, due to information asymmetry flowing from a whole chain of 
actors involved in the issuance of subdivision and development permits, the developer 
was able to get a development permit without fulfilling the conditions of the temporary 
subdivision permit. Developer 1explained that: 
 
“After subdivision, there is another type of survey, which is called a title survey. Right 
now, all the land used for Housing Development 3 is not, yet title surveyed. It’s a bit 
expensive, so eeish, right now our plots are not title surveyed. We built in the cost of 
the title survey into the price, but the truth is, title surveying is not at the top of our 
priorities right now. Once we got our development permit, we were good to go.” 
 
 This study finds that the processes and procedures to be followed to access 
development rights differ, depending on the location of the land in question- within 
the Bulawayo administrative boundary or within the Bulawayo master plan boundary. 
For the housing developments located in Bulawayo (Housing Development 1, 2, 4, 
and 5), the developers bought land that was planned for and title surveyed. However, 
land that was bought for Housing Development 3 was an unplanned block, that had to 
be subdivided and title surveyed, with the Department of Physical Planning being the 
planning authority overseeing this process in place of the RDC, as the RDC does not 
have a planning office. Development permits and development control, however, lie 
with the RDC, whilst trunk infrastructure is provided by the Bulawayo Local Authority 
creating a chain of different actors involved in the accessing land and development 
rights in the Bulawayo periphery as summarised Table 6-20. 
 
Table 6-20: Administrative bodies in the land development process 
 Bulawayo Bulawayo periphery 
Land allocation Bulawayo Local Authority Market process 
Planning and title 
surveying 
Bulawayo Local Authority Developer 
Responsible authority 
for subdivision permits 
Bulawayo Local Authority 
Ministry- Department of 
physical planning 
Responsible authority 
for development permits 
Bulawayo Local Authority uMguza RDC 
Responsible authority 
for trunk infrastructure  
Bulawayo Local Authority 
Bulawayo Local 
Authority 
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There is thus a lot of information asymmetry where there are different administrative 
bodies involved in the land development process, which presented a fertile ground for 
the developer in Housing Development 3 to work around the system as seen through 
the developer getting a development permit for Housing Development 3 without 
fulfilling the requirements of the temporary subdivision permit. MH2 explained that 
there were administrative challenges faced by the government which resulted in the 
government suspending the issuance of subdivision permits:  
 
“We suspended the issuance of subdivision permits in 2013 and resumed in 2017 due 
to in-house administrative issues that I am not at liberty to disclose, but some 
developers had temporary subdivision permit, valid for one year, and those expired, 
and due to the suspension, couldn’t renew. This situation that we see here, that is a 
result of shortcuts. There is a challenge there. Some developers somehow got perpetual 
development permits, on the strength of a temporary subdivision permits, but you see, 
I can’t tell you how, because development permits are issued by RDC, we only handle 
subdivision permits.”  
 
 Despite it being known that private sector provision of low-income housing hinges upon a 
facilitative urban development policy, it took the government more than four years, to 
resolve the issues that resulted in the suspension of these permits and this attests to the 
inefficiencies that characterise public sector offices that have been a concern in the 
academic field (Al-Ahbabi, Singh, Gaur, & Balasubramanian, 2017; Brinkerhoff & 
Brinkerhoff, 2015; Klein & Price, 2015; Lewis & Fall). The only way around this challenge 
according to the developers is through “oiling the system” through bribes, quid pro quos 
and kickbacks as was admitted by Developer 1 who said: 
 
“Well corruption comes in a lot of ways, and sometimes we are forced to. Of the records, 
we had challenges with our permit, for Housing Development 3 and we had to do 
something! Permits for subdivision were suspended by Physical Planning in 2012, but in 
other areas, they are still developing. This office here in Bulawayo, they were saying it was 
very corrupt. Right now, there is no one with a development permit here in Bulawayo. Even 
in uMguza, they were suspended, and all works were suspended. But people are still 
developing. I don’t know whether we can call it corruption, or it’s something bigger. But 
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to me, the major downfall is on the monitoring - it’s not there.” 
 
The pace and scale of private sector provision of low-income housing hinges upon a 
facilitative urban development policy, and the Government plays a significant role in 
determining the institutional environment that guides the development process via 
planning and regulating the development process (Buckley & Mathema, 2007; Sivam, 
2002). Regulation complexity, it has been argued influence land and housing costs as 
complicated procedures and steps for obtaining permits make it difﬁcult for developers 
to quickly respond to changing housing demand (Chirisa, 2014; Chitekwe-Biti, 2009; 
Sivam, 2002). This study finds that regulatory bottlenecks which are embedded in 
formal institutions, via the planning process affects the rate at which developers access 
their permits, but informal institutions, coupled with access to resources to bribe 
officials provide a channel through which developers can fast-track permit 
applications. There is a strand in corruption literature that suggests that in the context 
of pervasive and cumbersome regulations in developing countries, corruption may 
actually improve efficiency through reducing delays in moving files in administrative 
offices and in getting ahead in slow-moving queues for public services (Bardhan, 
1997). Thus, bribery or corruption as a strategy will minimize the waiting costs 
associated with the queue and overall minimise opportunity costs of time for the 
developers. 
 
It is also argued that the legislation that guides subdivision of land in Zimbabwe, which 
was initially enacted in pre-independent Zimbabwe discourages the transfer of land 
and introduces bureaucratic hurdles to timely subdivision and transfer of land (Zhou, 
2002). The housing policy acknowledges bottleneck in the housing delivery process, 
specifically lack of policy coherence regarding rural-urban integration, inadequate 
investment by the public in the housing sector, lack of policies to enable effective 
participation of other actors in housing development and regulatory bottleneck in the 
land delivery process (GoZ, 2012). Chitekwe-Biti (2009) however noted that 
Zimbabwe’s urban housing policy is often “full of good intentions and reads like most 
conventional housing policy documents fashioned on UN–Habitat’s enabling ethos, 
[placing] great emphasis on government creating an enabling environment for 
stakeholder involvement in the housing delivery process but, despite the policy 
principles of ensuring secure tenure, none of these intentions have been put into 
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practice.” It can thus be concluded that there is no political commitment to solve the 
issues that hinder private sector engagement in low-income housing provision. 
Housing policy, planning, politics are identified as causal mechanisms that constrain 
low-income housing development.  
 
Inefficiency in processing permits, which results in developers having to wait for 
months before they can commence development results in project delays, which tend 
to result in cost overruns (Hwang, Zhao, & Ng, 2013; Marzouk & El-Rasas, 2014) and 
also magnify perceived risk that is embedded in housing projects targeted at the low-
income groups. The institutional framework, which stipulates that title surveying 
should be done before one can apply for a development permit, also increases the 
upfront costs that must be borne by a developer. All development processes, however, 
converge at the Local Authority, and local authority personnel are prone to abusing the 
system for personal gain. Developers thus use this channel to minimise costs 
associated with such project delays. As was shown above using evidence gathered 
from Housing Development 3, informal channels were used to mitigate these 
bottlenecks that hinder access to development permits as they allow developers to 
engage in bribery, which reduces costs, associated with delays in accessing permits. 
By managing to get development permits without adhering to the condition of title 
surveying, the developer also postponed the costs of title surveying to a later stage 
whilst simultaneously fast-tracking access to development permits. 
 
6.7.1.2 Land servicing of peri-urban land 
Rules guiding service provision to rural land that has been urbanised via a master plan 
but has not yet been incorporated, this study has shown, have a great impact on the 
success of housing developments. Survey findings revealed challenges in access to 
amenities in Housing Development 3 where out 118 households that were surveyed in 
this study, it was noted that no household had access to running water, and only 12% 
of the respondents said they have access to sewer services as was shown in Table 6-12. 
Urban sanitation standards are set and controlled through a variety of legislative 
mechanisms from the Housing Standards set by Ministry of Local Government, Rural 
and Urban Development, the Public Health Act enforced by the Ministry of Health and 
Child Welfare and the Water Act enforced by the Ministry of Lands and Water 
resources. Mudege and Taylor (1997) however noted that in Zimbabwe, there is 
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usually confusion of regulatory and implementation roles of government as 
responsibility for sanitation does not fall clearly within any government agency. They 
further note that local authorities are tasked with responsibility for service provision, 
but they do not have any technical agency to resort to for advice and policy guidelines 
or other technical support. It is also accepted in literature that land is a political 
resource and the impact of politics is felt more in the conversion of land from 
agricultural to urban land under formal procedures (Ding, 2007; Sivam, 2002) and 
political pressures compound legal, administrative and technical problems in provision 
of on-site and off-site infrastructure in new developing urban areas (Turk, 2008). 
Responses from Developer 1 and LA4 showed that Housing Development 3 could be 
more successful if these issues were addressed. Developer 1 felt the local authority and 
the government were not doing anything to redress the challenges faced and explained 
that: 
 
“At the moment, because of the economic and political environment, everyone is just 
turning a blind eye on the situation….”  
 
LA4 in response, however, pointed out that local authorities also need guidance with 
how to handle service provision to households on land that is yet to be incorporated as 
follows: 
 
“Mind you we are politically governed, so because of politics, that’s why you find that 
uMguza has been refusing to adhere to incorporation. How are we supposed to provide 
services when all those households are not administratively under us? Planning and 
politics go together, you can’t separate the two.”  
 
LA5 also echoed the same sentiments and added that incorporation would imply that 
the Bulawayo local authority could mobilise the resources that are needed to maintain 
the sewer:  
 
“If as Bulawayo Local Authority we connect those households which are under 
uMguza RDC, how then will we be able to collect the money from those residents? 
Keep in mind we don’t get any funds from the government, as such, we can’t afford to 
provide services for free.” 
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In the face of these constraints in providing access to sewer and water, in Housing 
Development 3, Developer 1 has resorted to using sewer ponds. These sewer ponds 
are one of low-cost natural wastewater treatment methods suitable for developing 
countries (Gijzen, 2000; Nhapi & Gijzen, 2004). A picture of the sewer ponds taken 
from the site was shown in Figure 6-20. The existence of these sewer ponds explains 
why some respondents in the development said they have no access to running water, 
but they have access to sewer services. This was the lowest cost strategy that the 
developer could implement pending the two local authorities sorting out the 
administrative and political issues affecting service provision to the housing 
development. Communal water sources such as boreholes have also been put in by the 
developer, who has also undertaken to bring in drinking water on a daily basis using a 
water bowser to mitigate the effect of lack of access to reticulated water as was 
explained by MH2: 
 
“The developer has plumbing that was put in place in those houses, and there are 
bowsers that the developer brings in …he suppliers drinking water to the people in 
that area. So, they use buckets when they are bathing, and they can flush their toilets 
using buckets…The developer funded those sewer ponds, just to make sure the 
discharge doesn’t go into the river. They will be closed with time when the area is 
connected to the Bulawayo trunk infrastructure since Bulawayo has its own sewer 
treatment plants, SAST 1 and 2.” 
 
Development 3 thus presents as a case where a cursory glance shows a development 
with hundreds of households with no access to water and sewer services. However, 
this study shows that the developer has come up with a workaround that can work 
meantime until the government has sorted out the impasse between the two local 
authorities. These are issues which are outside the control of the developer, but 
Housing Development 3 is evidence of the innovativeness and commitment of the 
developer in coming up with acceptable housing solutions to the low-income group. 
In Zimbabwe, national policy dictates that the urban local councils should provide 
water and sanitation services to the residents (Chinyama, Chipato, & Mangore, 2012), 
but this is not happening in the upper Rangemore area. The plight of thousands of 
people who have houses in these areas, including Housing Development 3, has been 
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reported in the press since 2007 with the government not responding to these calls. For 
Housing Development 3, the study has shown that the developer has had to step in to 
provide solutions to the water and sewer crisis in the housing development, at the 
lowest cost possible. These costs being faced by the developer would not have been 
necessary had the government placed urgency in dealing with the administrative issues 
conflicting the two local authorities. As such, this study argues that the housing 
development is successful but there are drawbacks that are being faced as was shown 
in this section, which if addressed would make the development even more successful. 
 
6.7.1.3 Development control and rules guiding the transfer of properties 
In Housing Development 5, challenges emanating from in-adherence to formal 
procedures by stakeholders involved in the development process were noted. Issues 
raised were multiple beneficiaries allocated to one plot and in some cases, multiple 
title deeds on one property were issued to several beneficiaries. Several houses were 
encroaching onto the next plot, which was only noted when construction had been 
completed and residents wanted to put up perimeter walls. According to Developer 3, 
some of these issues were just a symptom of the inefficiency that characterised service 
provision by the local authority and government service departments and the 
development would have been a resounding success if these challenges had not been 
faced. Developer 3 explained that: 
 
“Just as much as I, the developer was answerable, so was the local authority as they 
were the monitoring body. Some of these issues could have been easily picked up and 
rectified during inspections whilst still at trench level. Normally, the inspector should 
measure the distance from the perimeter water to the structure, and this distance 
should not be less than one metre. I had signed proof from the local authority 
personnel that they had inspected the site, and they had given us permission to 
continue with construction.” 
 
There were also errors at the Deeds Registry Office. Beneficiaries who bought into the 
development at inception were given title deeds to enable them to qualify for mortgage 
finance. In cases where a beneficiary defaulted on their mortgage payments, the 
property in question was repossessed by the developers on the strength of a high court 
ruling and allocated to someone else. The deeds office, however, would issue new 
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deeds in favour of the new beneficiary without processing the cancellation of the first 
deed. This resulted in some properties having multiple deeds and ownership of such 
properties was contested. Section 8(1) of the Deeds Registries Act, [Chapter 20:05] 
provides “Save as is otherwise provided in this Act or in any other enactment, no 
registered deed of grant, deed of transfer, certificate of title or other deed conferring 
or conveying title to land, or any real right in land other than a mortgage bond, and 
no cession of any registered bond not made, as security, shall be cancelled by a 
registrar except upon an order of court.” Despite this provision, Developer 3, with the 
registrar of deeds and the city of Bulawayo being the second and third respondents 
have been taken to court due to some properties in Housing Development 5 having 
multiple title deeds. The developer, however, still has the appetite to continue being 
active in the low-income housing and has had a fresh start in other local authorities, 
where he has even bigger low-income housing projects, with the latest being a project 
launched in 2015 to construct a total of 700 two, three and four-roomed housing units 
in Beitbridge. 
 
6.7.3 Finance 
This section looks at finance for low-income housing developments, which includes 
funding for land acquisition, development and end-user funding. The government can 
be a significant source of finance for low-income housing development and this can 
be achieved via purchase of privately held land that can be allocated for low-income 
housing by local authorities, providing subsidy support to both developers and end-
users, supplementing local authority funds via treasury allocations, and loans to local 
authorities for low-income housing. However, due to the treasury being insolvent and 
broke, the government in Zimbabwe has inadequate resources to channel towards 
housing (Chipungu & Adebayo, 2013; Zinyama & Takavarasha, 2014). This lack of 
fiscal space is one of the major forces behind the failure of most public housing 
programs that have been implemented in Zimbabwe (Chipungu & Adebayo, 2013; 
Chirisa et al., 2014; Potts, 2006; Zinyama & Takavarasha, 2014). As such, developers 
operating in the low-income housing space are operating in an environment where they 
can only use private sources of finance as the government has no capacity for subsidy 
support. Land for Housing Developments 1, 2 and 5 was sold at unsubsidized rates as 
was explained by LA1: 
 
 199 
 
“We sold land to these private developers [for Housing Development 1, 2 and 5], but 
not at subsidized costs. We had our own standard rates that ensured we recoup on a 
cost-plus basis that we used when selling virgin land.” 
 
The removal of subsidies in housing was part of trying to reduce the budget deficit 
(Brown, 2001; Chirisa et al., 2014). Unavailability of suitable mortgage products on 
the market was also lamented on by Developer 1 and 2 who said they do not have 
access to reasonably priced, long-term mortgage funds that they can use to finance the 
housing developments. Developer 1 explained that: 
 
“We have never, not even once, received a long-term loan from our banker. They say 
as a matter of policy, they don’t lend to the construction sector, as it is too risky. So, 
for Housing Development 1, 2 and 3 I did not get any loan from the bank. This makes 
it hard for us to make it in this construction business. We have a very good relationship 
with our bankers, and we have been using the same banker for the past 15 years, and 
we give him very good business especially if you look at the moneys that go through 
our bank accounts.” 
 
When queried on why they were not lending out to low-income housing developers, 
financiers raised the issue of risk, and in addition, concerns about risk management as 
the major deterrent for them in extending loan finance as was explained by BS5: 
 
“With these private developers, it’s an absolute no-no, we don’t offer loan finance. 
The risk is just too much. We think they are not disciplined in managing their funds.” 
 
Some financial institutions, in principle, do lend to low-income developers, but 
because of the perceived risks, the lending criteria that is used for the developers is so 
rigorous that no low-income housing developer makes it through the initial screening 
process as was explained by BS1: 
 
“We do have corporate loans, but the lending criteria is so stringent that most of the 
developers are not able to qualify for loans. We do value proposition, i.e. look at what 
business they are giving us, and their financial statements. But the main thing that 
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makes it difficult for the developers to qualify is the issue of collateral. What we don’t 
want is to be exposed without anything that we are holding onto if the client defaults.” 
 
Interviews with the local authority revealed that even when the developer has fully 
paid for land, as is the case in Housing Development 1, 2 and 4, the local authority 
does not issue title deeds to the developer but will instead wait until the developer has 
fully serviced the land, adhering to all conditions set by the local authority. Title deeds 
will then be issued but in the name of the final beneficiary who would have purchased 
from the developer. This leaves the developers with no collateral that they can use to 
look for funding from financial institutions, unless if they have other properties that 
have nothing to do with the project at hand as was expounded on by LA5: 
 
“The Local Authority doesn’t give developers title deeds before they are done 
servicing the land, and even when they are done, title deeds will only be given to the 
final beneficiary.” 
 
The reluctance of financial institutions to voluntarily participate in low-income 
housing has been noted before (Gumbo, 2010; Kamete, 1997, 2001a), with the criteria 
for eligibility and lending terms generally not suitable for the low-income group, 
unless there are loan guarantees from external organisation such the government or 
donor institutions which reduce the perceived risk exposure to the financial 
institutions. Building societies have only been active in low-income finance where 
there have been supporting schemes by either the government, or donor agency 
programs such as USAID, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
enabling the building societies to offer loans at a lower rate due to availability of loan 
guarantees (Chitekwe & Mitlin, 2001; Gumbo, 2015; Kamete, 1997, 2001b). 
Developer 1 and 2 did not get any loan funding for Housing Developments 1, 2, 3, and 
4. Housing Development 5 did get funding as was explained by Developer 3: 
 
“We lined up financiers and we figured that with higher numbers of potential 
beneficiaries came economies of scale and on paper, the proposals were really good, 
there was potential for profits, which is why we were able to get two building societies 
to sign up for this.” 
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With the concept of Housing Development 5, Developer 3 approached these 
developers and asked them if they were willing to provide end-user finance upfront. 
The developer, with the help of the local authority, transferred proof of ownership of 
the property to those beneficiaries who qualified for mortgage finance before land 
servicing was done to pave the way for the registration of mortgage bonds in favour 
of the building society advancing the mortgage loan. In return, the financier agreed to 
fund the cost of the land and the construction work for the qualifying beneficiary. 
Given that land for Housing Development 5 was allocated to Developer 3 in 1996, 
poverty levels back then were relatively lower compared to that of the same target 
group ten years later when the country was in the throes of hyperinflation. Combined 
with the government guarantees and donor support, this explains why it was possible 
for the Developer to arrange funding for the development in this manner. This study 
thus finds that this is the only housing development where this deviation from 
procedure was allowed. Housing Development 1, 2, 3 and 4 had no financial support 
from both central and local government and also no recourse on the market. The 
institutional environment, via rules guiding the issuance of title deeds for high-density 
land sold to private developers and stringent conditions guiding loan issuance to 
developers left the developers with no access to mortgage funding. The question then 
that this study sought to answer was, how did these developers minimise costs of 
financing given that they were not getting any subsidies or assistance of any kind from 
the government, and did not have viable financing options on the market?  
 
Three strategies were noted - off the plan selling and upfront deposit-taking combined 
with developer provided finance. All these strategies are implemented upfront, before 
the developer has broken ground, thus raising the much-needed finance for 
development at minimum cost. Off-the-plan selling strategy involves marketing and 
selling a proposed development, without any development having taken place at all. 
The deposits that the clients would have paid are then used to kick-start the projects. 
That way, even if the risk associated with the target group is high, the developer does 
not necessarily have to put down all the capital other than the unavoidable land 
purchase cost and preliminary costs to get the land development rights. The study finds 
that the rate at which finished projects are rolled out reflects the efficiency and speed 
with which the funds raised are utilised, which is what differentiates the private sector 
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developers with the local authority which has tried to adopt the same strategy but with 
little success. 
 
To raise the money needed for Housing Development 4, Developer 2 revealed that 
they made sure that the deposit that the clients put down covered all the costs that the 
developer was likely to incur. This meant that Developer 2 did not need to borrow 
money for the construction of the housing units, and the deposit acted as a show of 
commitment from the beneficiary, thus effectively reducing the risk associated with 
serving the low-income group. 
 
Developer 2:  
“We eventually came to the realisation that we don’t really need external funding 
because you find that for things like servicing, and the initial construction costs you 
can find means and ways of raising the funds. In Housing Development 4, we made 
sure that the deposit that the clients put down covered all the costs that we would have 
incurred. For low-income developments, which are typically in the high-density areas, 
servicing costs are usually around USD3 dollars to 3.50 per m2. This won’t exceed 
USD700 or so per plot. And then for construction costs, we can be talking of maybe 
USD5,000 per unit. That means that the deposit that we asked for from the 
beneficiaries, USD7,500 was enough to cover all our costs. Even if the risk associated 
with the target group is high, we did not necessarily have to put down our own money. 
From experience, we have learnt a lot. And for one to survive in this market, you can’t 
just apply textbook knowledge.” 
 
The high deposit that was payable upfront in Housing Development 4 was acceptable 
to the beneficiaries as the developer had marketed the Housing Development to 
potential beneficiaries who had just retired or were about to retire and were still not 
homeowners and other workers who could access lump sums from work. Survey 
findings showed that Housing Development 4 had the highest number of homeowner 
respondents who indicated that they were retired compared to the other housing 
developments. Targeted marketing was the main strategy used in this Housing 
Developers as was explained by Developer 2:  
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“There are very few people locally of course who can afford the deposits that we were 
asking for, but with us, the key was advertising our housing development in the right 
places. We have a lot of clients e.g. pensioners, someone who would have gotten his 
payout or just about to retire who still didn’t own a house. We also had customers who 
were with the National Railways of Zimbabwe. I have forgotten what scheme it was, 
but the company owed them a lot of money from accrued salaries, and they were able 
to buy into our scheme without any hassles after being given lump sums from work.” 
 
For Housing Developments 2 and 3, Developer 1 managed to raise development funds 
through selling land and the housing ‘off the plan’. The developer explained that once 
the subdivision process was completed, the developer would immediately start selling, 
with the beneficiary choosing the product type they want between a serviced plot and 
a finished house. To get an agreement of sale, the beneficiary had to pay a deposit 
upfront, with the balance payable over several years ranging between 10 and 15 years. 
This strategy enabled development funds for Housing Developments 2 and 3 to be 
successfully raised at minimum cost as was explained by Developer 1:  
 
“So, with the drawings on a map, before we started working on the project, we 
advertised the project for people to come and start buying before anything had been 
put up. Those who had faith in us obviously were given a discount. They chose a plot 
from the plan and the type of house that they want based on the site plan and the floor 
plans that we had in the office and then they paid a deposit. Keep in mind that on the 
ground, nothing had been done. This is how we financed these two housing schemes 
[Housing Development 2 and 3]. There was no other way.” 
 
The houses are sold on a first come first serve basis using this off the plan method and 
the aim is to sell as much as possible, to raise money for developments. Actual 
development, however, did not follow the first come first serve approach, but the land 
was serviced, and houses built sequentially, irrespective of whether the land in 
question had been bought and paid for or not. The developer likened the approach to a 
revolving fund, with the company being seen continually churning out developments, 
whilst receipts from the sale of new housing go towards funding work in progress. 
Since the beneficiaries also do not have access to affordable long-term mortgages, the 
developer also offers payment plans that range between 10- and 15-years negotiable 
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on a case by case basis. Developer 1 explained that:  
 
“With these developments, we just disregarded everything we know about shadowing 
the mortgage process, compounding and mortgage calculators and all those things. 
The instalments that we charge, they don’t have a formula. We just say… Uhm if the 
client can afford 100 dollars per month, then ok let them pay 100 dollars.”  
 
Emphasis in coming up with the monthly instalments is on ability to pay by processes 
of negotiation. The developers suit the payment terms to whoever is before them, 
which shows a degree of flexibility.  
 
The target group, according to the building societies can only access mortgage loans 
provided they have a property with title deeds that can be used to guarantee the loan, they 
take out mortgage life protection, house owners insurance, and they are in formal 
employment on a permanent contract. If the required loan is to cover building costs, then in 
lieu of title deeds, the client is expected to produce a certification of compliance from the 
Local Authority, a verification survey certificate from the surveyor-general, a site plan 
showing all the neighbouring plots, a bill of quantities and a copy of the approved plan. 
LA4 explained that:  
 
“A certificate of compliance is given to a developer after he has completed a project and 
the project team comprising interdepartmental members from the local authority, mainly, 
town planning, sewer and water, an engineer, a representative from the contractor and a 
plumber, is satisfied. The list of things that the developer must do to be issued with the 
certificate varies, depending on the project’s specifications. But in the case of private 
developers who start working on virgin land, they would be expected to first service the 
land in terms of water, sewer and roads. If the developer has met all the terms and 
conditions of the project specification, the developer is issued with the certificate of 
compliance.” 
 
A verification survey certificate is a confirmation that the property in question has been title 
surveyed. As part of the conditions to get a permanent subdivision permit, all developers 
who subdivide a block of land are supposed to lodge proof of title survey with the local 
authority or the relevant planning office. A site plan is a general diagram, not necessarily 
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drawn to scale, which shows the location of the property in question relative to other 
properties in the vicinity. As such if the developer has adhered to all codified rules in the 
development process, beneficiaries should be able to access all these documents to support 
mortgage loan applications, if not from the developer in question, then from the local 
authority. 
 
Developers are however unable to furnish their clientele with these documents as pre-
selling means the developers would not have fully complied with the local authority land 
servicing requirements when they sell to beneficiaries. As such, in all the housing 
developments included in this study, the developers will not be having certificates of 
compliance or title deeds and in the case of Housing Development 3, no survey certificate. 
This implies that beneficiaries in these housing developments are unable to access mortgage 
finance via the formal financial systems. The presented findings show that developers have 
no access to finance, and in turn, the beneficiaries as an indirect result also do not have 
access to mortgage finance, a situation that magnifies the effect of lack of resources on 
agency. Given that most of the clients do not qualify for loans as per the above discussion, 
what private-sector developers then do is to offer their clients payment terms that mirror 
mortgage loans offered by financial institutions as shown in Table 6-21. 
 
Table 6-21: Payment terms offered by the developer 1 over 15 years for Housing 
Developments 2 and 3 
 
Because these loans are offered in-house, Developer 1 waived the requirements that 
are normally asked for by financial institution when advancing mortgage loans, vis. 
title deeds or certificates of compliance, site plans and or verification of survey 
certificate, bill of quantities, and copies of approved plans. Instead, the requirements 
that prospective homeowners were asked to adhere to are: 
 
• USD5 registration fee 
No. of Rooms Deposit Instalment by Plot Size 
  200m2 225m2 250m2 300m2 350m2 400m2 450m2 
2 $1,500 $130 $145 $160 $195 $220 $240 $260 
3 $1,500 $190 $210 $220 $235 $250 $270 $290 
4 $1,500 $205 $225 $255 $270 $280 $305 $320 
5 $1,500 $330 $345 $360 $380 $400 $420 $435 
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• USD1,500 deposit 
• 4 certified copies of the National Identity Card 
• 2 witnesses with 2 certified copies of ID each 
• 1 guarantor with proof of income. 
 
Developer 1 was quick to point out they do not specify the relationship between the 
potential beneficiary and the guarantor. As such, the guarantor could be any1, from an 
employer, family member, friend or acquaintance. Housing Development 2 and 3 were 
thus open to anyone who could pay the USD1,500 non-refundable deposit irrespective 
of their employment status. This made the housing developments easily accessible by 
the target group. Without mortgage finance, the target group would not able to afford 
the housing products offered by the market, but this strategy makes it easy for the 
developers to presell their developments, thus raising funds which would otherwise be 
scarce whilst simultaneously serving even the lowest echelons in the low-income 
group as seen through homeowner respondents in the survey who are unemployed and 
those active in the informal sector.  
 
Offering developer funding allows the developers to circumvent regulatory measures 
put in place by the local authority. It is thus possible for a developer to raise funds for 
low-income housing development through bypassing financiers, thus removing any 
external pressures to comply with the local authority requirements. As such, in all the 
five cases, developers built housing on partially serviced residential plots and gave the 
target group permission to reside in those houses without the developer having gotten 
a certificate of compliance and a certificate of occupation from the local authority. 
Evidence to this effect was presented in section 6.6 as seen through households who 
do not have access to sewer and sewer services and incomplete roads in all the five 
housing developments. This strategy also allows the developer to avoid title survey 
costs. This cost, according to LA2, has to be borne by private developers who buy land 
at the periphery of the local authority area, as was the case in Housing Development 
3. Given that beneficiaries in the housing developments are given up to 15 years to pay 
and are not entitled to title deeds before payment is finished, Developer 1 can thus 
afford to defer the title survey costs, creating room to use funds intended for one 
project to finance other projects. 
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With these relaxed qualification requirements, the developers attract both salaried and 
non-salaried low-income earners who are willing to work hard to afford a home. Proof 
of commitment is the USD 1,500, which is not refundable, but whatever instalments 
would have been paid towards the scheme are refundable should the beneficiary decide 
to pull out before he has been allocated a house. The rationale behind adopting this 
approach to low-income housing is that the low-income group does not take lightly 
any opportunities to access homeownership housing. The USD1, 500 non-refundable 
deposit is a lot of money to the low-income group, and if someone has managed to 
save that much and they are prepared to put it up as a down payment, they will make 
sure that they do not lose that investment. Therefore, the company does not do any 
credit checks at all to check on the credit history of the applicant, as it is aware that the 
client cannot claim ownership to the house in question before the client has paid in 
full. There have been a few defaults that have been experienced according to the 
developer, and in all the cases, there is recourse to the civil courts under the high court. 
On the strength of the signed contract of sale between the developer and the 
beneficiary, where it is clearly stated that deposits paid are non-refundable, and the 
route to be taken in case of default, if the developer proves that there has been default, 
and the client acknowledges such default, judgement in the civil case is always against 
the clients and the developer is able to repossess the house in question and allocate it 
to someone else. Instead of paying back all the instalments paid, the developer claims 
part of these as rental, depending on how long the client had been staying in the house 
in question. 
 
 In Housing Development 1, 4 and 5, clients were also given payment terms, but these 
were relatively short term compared to those offered by Developer 1 in Housing 
Development 2 and 3. Since Housing Development 2 and 3 payment terms were easier 
than in the other housing developments, the consequences of that were that the 
beneficiaries in these two schemes were relatively worse off from an income point of 
view compared to the other housing development beneficiaries.  
 
The interest of the developer in the face of limited capital is to ultimately bring down 
production costs through efficient allocation of resources and internal synergies. At 
the same time, the developers need to create an effective market for their product and 
they do this by offering affordable payment terms that are similar to rent to buy 
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arrangements. Access to finance for the target group circumvents the problem of lack 
of financial resources, which is recognised as one of the biggest contributors to the 
low-income housing challenge (El Sakka, 2016; Mukhtar, Amirudin, Sofield, & 
Mohamad, 2017; Sivam, 2002). Flexible payment terms also mean that the developer 
can attract more buyers into the scheme which keeps the project liquid, with those 
joining in later helping to finance housing that is currently being constructed as 
expounded on by Developer 1: 
 
“In a nutshell, this thing is more of a ‘revolving fund’, don’t know if that’s the term. 
It’s like people pooling their resources together and then we manage those resources 
and make decisions with that. Housing in the scheme is built chronologically, and we 
do not look at the payment records as we build, so you may find that payments being 
made by customer 100 in the scheme are being used to finish up housing for customer 
50. We just build, and customers have to await their turn. We believe if there is 
affordable housing on the market, we will get more and more customers coming to us 
…. demand outweighs supply in this market.” 
 
This process of selling off the plan goes against what the local authority had in mind 
when they started selling virgin land to the developers. The idea behind was that the 
private developers have resources that the local authority does not have access to, and 
as such, could afford to develop land and sell the developed land meant for low-income 
housing in the high-density areas at a faster rate than what the local authority could as 
was explained by LA4: 
 
“What was expected from the private developers, when we started selling virgin land, 
was for them to finance the servicing of the land…But unfortunately, what they would 
do is that they would start by selling the plots.”  
 
The logic behind opening up land servicing to private developers form the local 
authority’s point of view was that the developers have access to resources that the local 
authority does not. It was thus unexpected that the developers would then start selling 
virgin land before development has taken place, and this practice was seen throughout 
the five housing developments. Even though the Local authority is aware that 
developers, presell the plots before any development on the ground has taken place, 
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this practise is likely to continue uncurbed as the developers are not directly 
accountable to any regulatory body as was explained by LA4: 
 
“But what I am saying is that the sale of plots, isn’t councils’ baby…. but the contract 
signed in the sale of the plot will be between the developer and the person purchasing 
the plot from the developer.” 
 
However, as befits the role of the local authority, the Bulawayo City Council still wants 
to ensure that there is proper targeting of the beneficiaries. The council does this 
through maintaining systems and structures from the period when the local authority 
was providing serviced land and housing and would use a housing waiting list and 
insist on updated housing forms in any housing transactions. The Local authority has 
stopped allocating land using the housing waiting list, but it insists that private 
developers use the waiting list in allocating housing, if the housing developments are 
located in the high-density areas. LA2 explained that: 
 
“Long back, we used to, for low-income housing, give first preference to people with 
the older housing forms. Being on the waiting list for so long was a sign that the person 
was struggling and could not afford to look for housing solutions on his own. We as 
the Local Authority have since stopped allocating land in that manner, plots were now 
being advertised, and we are now using the first come first serve basis. We really need 
the money. If someone comes with enough money, they are now allocated a plot there 
and then. If someone comes with a form dating back to 1980, we ask how much money 
they have. If the person does not have enough money for the deposit, we ask them to 
wait but yes, we do insist that private developers should only sell to beneficiaries who 
are on the waiting list…but that is just a money-making scheme by the local authority, 
I don’t see how it protects the low-income group.” 
 
All the developers acknowledge this requirement in their housing schemes, but simply 
push on the administrative burden and cost to the beneficiaries as was explained by 
Developer 2:  
 
“Yes, when someone comes through to us, we ask for their housing waiting list form. 
But, if someone does not have, we encourage them to go and get one. It’s just a matter 
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of just going to get one. So, you can buy from us before you get the form and then you 
then go and get the form. Because whenever that’s going to be, when the time comes 
for registration, you will need a form. Whether u joined today, or you joined a few 
years back…it doesn’t matter to us.” 
 
The Local authority also insists on limiting purchasers of housing in the western high-
density, with each person only allowed to own one residential property. This 
requirement affects developers, who should then only sell to an individual who does 
not own a plot or house in the high-density areas. Developer 1, however, said they do 
not have the administrative capacity to check if their beneficiaries own other houses 
or not and explained that:  
 
“At the moment we don’t have the administrative capacity to check if they own more 
than one house. As a company we also don’t limit our customers to just one property, 
but, the municipality does not allow that. So, we talk to them. We tell them that they 
can buy as many houses as they want, but when it comes to registration, they will have 
a problem. They will have to register the property in other names.”  
 
There is no law that directly prohibits developers from implementing the off-the-plan 
strategy as a way of mobilising developer finance, and the local authority has no 
capacity to enforce that developers only sell to clients who are already registered on 
the local housing waiting list. This regulatory loophole combined with the huge 
demand for low-income housing makes it possible for the developers to successfully 
raise the much-needed finance to service the land and construct low-income housing 
units from the beneficiaries themselves. In summary, it was shown that developers and 
beneficiaries have no access to reasonably priced funding from the market and there 
are no subsidies that are available on the market, Funding for development if thus 
raised by the developers through preselling developments, with developers required to 
pay deposits upfront. In all the five cases, these deposits represented the first 
significant inflow of funds to kick-start the development process, with Housing 
Development 1, 4 and 5 charging large deposits that were enough to cover land 
servicing and construction. Other than deposits, the developers also extended payment 
terms to the beneficiaries, and in Housing Development 2 and 3, the payment terms 
mimicked mortgage-funding payable of -15 years. These inflows represented a steady 
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flow of funding into the housing developments, ensuring that the housing 
developments were liquid.  
 
6.7.4 Labour 
From the conceptual framework, labour is the cost of bringing things together, and 
examples of these are the costs of laying infrastructure, the laying roads and 
construction costs. Labour, which includes building material costs, technical capacity 
and skills, availability of financially sound contractors to choose from during 
construction projects, good onsite project managers and technical professionals such 
as surveyors (Hwang et al., 2013), can also determine affordable-housing project 
success (Gopalan & Venkataraman, 2015; Hwang et al., 2013; Poon, Yu, Wong, & 
Cheung, 2004; Turner, 1967). Issues that crop up in this area in developing countries 
are limited access to reliable services (Altmann, 2011) due to serious brain drain, as 
technically skilled people usually leave developing countries in search of better 
opportunities elsewhere. The cost of hiring specialist labour was lamented on in 
Housing Development 3, where a huge block of land was bought at the periphery, 
which had to be subdivided and then title surveyed. The strategy used to deal with this 
high cost of title surveying was to use informal channels to acquire a development 
permit without fully adhering to the requirements of the temporary subdivision permit 
as was discussed in section 6.5.2 which resulted in the developer postponing title 
surveying the land. To lower costs associated with hiring contractors, the strategy 
noted across all five housing developments was for the developers is to manage their 
low-income housing developments as main contractors. This significantly reduced 
costs in Housing Development 2 as was explained by Developer 2:  
 
“The structure itself, we did that ourselves instead of subcontracting out. We also have 
a qualified plumber in-house who is on our payroll, which worked out much cheaper 
than looking for a specialist plumber who would have charged us per man-hours. For 
specialist jobs like roofing, we hired out a company that specialises in roofing. But as 
the main contractors we were in charge of the project i.e. the standards, quality, health 
and safety, all of that, that was our main purpose, that’s why we are referred to as the 
main contractor. Our main task was to mobilise other suitably skilled contractors to 
get the job done, at the lowest cost possible.” 
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The same trend was noted in Housing Developments 1, 2 and 3 as was explained by 
Developer 1 who revealed that where possible, they cut out the intermediary and 
handle all their projects in-house including all land servicing requirements from road 
construction, brick moulding and superstructure construction without subcontracting 
any work out. Holding all other things constant, for the same level of quality that is 
codified in building bye-laws, where everything is done above board, subcontracting 
might have been more efficient and resulted in lower costs. But, given the volatile 
operating environment that was prevailing in Zimbabwe, where, as part of managing 
the situation, developers had to cut corners, this study finds it logical that the 
developers would want to maintain a tight rein on what corners to be cut and how. An 
external contractor might not exactly have a ready grip on how to use informal 
channels if need be to get things done, making it more cost-effective for the developers 
to be the main contractors. Given the volatility of the operating environment, being the 
main contactors meant that the developers were holding on to the option to change 
things as they go. 
 
 According to the model building by-laws, local authority building inspectors should 
carry out regular inspections of any building structures being put up in the city during 
various stages of construction (Zami & Lee, 2007). The local authority should work 
with the private developer right from the time the developer has the subdivision permit 
and drawing plans for sewer and water reticulation as was revealed by LA5: 
 
“Once the drawings for water and sewer works have been approved, [the developer] 
will be given clearance to start working on the site…. When the developer is 
proceeding with sewer and water reticulation he must liaise with the council as much 
as possible, so the council can inspect and correct if need be.” 
 
As can be seen above, building regulation enforcement should begin right from the 
time the developer starts servicing the land. These inspections then should continue 
during the various stages of inspection including setting out, excavation, slab level, 
window level, gable level, roofing timber/sheets, plumbing open test, plumbing final 
test, plastering and flooring, finishes. These stage inspections are mandatory according 
to the model building bye-laws but the Bulawayo Local Authority, due to 
understaffing, is not able to carry out these inspections on time. LA4 explained that: 
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“We have challenges as the Local Authority, sometimes no inspections would have 
been done. Like I told you, we are understaffed. We do certain tests that we term 
regularisation in cases where housing would have been built without any inspections 
being done. The developer is asked to pay a fine, and then we do our tests. E.g. we can 
dig a small trench to check if the foundation meets our specifications, but we do admit, 
that there are things that are hard to correct e.g., if the material used is substandard, 
the house would have to be destroyed. But we are human, we understand that there is 
a housing challenge, so we try to strike a balance between costs incurred and insisting 
on certain standards.” 
 
These labour challenges thus mean that local authorities are not able to carry out their 
development control function as stipulated in the regulations. Developers are thus able 
to implement cost-cutting strategies such not fully complying with the memorandum 
of agreement terms in land serving, using untested alternative building materials and 
avoiding inspections, and reducing standards to reduce costs during land servicing and 
superstructure construction. Developer 1 acknowledged flouting of procedure in that 
they do not adhere to stage-by-stage inspection requirements that are enshrined in the 
building bylaws and explained that:  
 
“Inspections? No, not all the time. But it’s not always our fault as developers, take for 
example Housing Development 3, it is under Bulawayo, but is being administered 
under uMguza RDC. UMguza doesn’t have the resources or the manpower to 
supervise an urban settlement since they are an RDC. Even if uMguza were to want to 
inspect, they don’t have engineers to work with, so we do our own inspections and 
proceed with the developments.” 
 
The Bulawayo Local Authority also has the same challenges as uMguza RDC in 
carrying out inspections, and the reasons given boil down to lack of resources to 
employ adequate staff to carry out inspections as was explained by LA3: 
 
“Council should inspect [the work being done by developers], but at the moment, we 
don’t have an in-house engineer……we don’t have capacity to employ as posts were 
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frozen…we only have one surveyor for the whole local authority…we are seriously 
understaffed…”  
 
Developers working on low-income housing projects are aware that the local authority 
is not able to effectively carry out its role as gatekeeper of housing standards, and they 
are capitalising on the situation. In all the five housing developments, the three 
developers have not adhered to the stipulations by the local authority that they should 
finish servicing before they start building, have inspections carried out at each of the 
various stages of superstructure construction, and also apply for certificates of 
occupation before allowing beneficiaries to move into the constructed structures.  
 
 In Housing Development 5, Developer 3 cited the difficult operating environment, 
which made it difficult for him to complete land servicing. The hyper-inflationary 
period in Zimbabwe which peaked in the period 2008 – 2009 crippled the operations 
of Developer 3, and Housing Scheme 5 was subsequently not serviced to completion 
during this hyperinflationary period as per the memorandum of agreement signed with 
the local authority. Developer 3 explained that:  
 
“Land for Housing development was allocated in 1996 and were given until 2003 to 
complete the project. But in 1997, with ESAP on one hand, and government paying 
huge pay-outs to the war veterans, the economy started spiralling downwards and 
there were serious inflationary pressures and we missed our deadlines.” 
 
In reaction to these challenges, Housing Development 5 was then done in phases, with 
the developer trying to secure contractors at prices that were close to the initial budget 
estimates as was explained by Developer 5:  
 
“Decision making just had to be done on the fly. There was no time to dilly-dally as 
the time lag between planning and implementation meant that prices would have 
moved, and execution would be impractical. It was a rat race for me in this scheme. 
But the biggest cost in servicing the land is doing the roads. Roads take up 
approximately 60% of budgeted funds, and gravel alone, can be expensive and that’s 
before we look at other materials. We also had no equipment and had to hire 
excavators, front-end loaders and tipper trucks. You also need to compact the road, 
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and to engage local authority guys to do what we call soil tests. But what hit us the 
most was the cost of hiring the equipment…prices kept going up…and we just couldn’t 
keep up.” 
 
In order to deliver this housing in Housing Development 5, given the unconducive 
operating environment, priority was given to housing delivery over regulatory 
compliance as explained by Developer 3:  
 
“We were in a bit of binder. Oh well, at the end of the day, we had to make a decision 
- disappoint hundreds of customers and face lawsuits, or renege on the servicing and 
finish housing construction and then deal with the local authority later.”  
 
The same approach to housing provision was noted in Housing Development 1, where 
priority was placed on housing provision over the completion of land servicing as was 
explained by Developer 1:  
 
“All the houses were fully paid for, and the inflationary environment made it relatively 
easy for the beneficiaries to pay off their dues. We were however adversely affected. 
We are still not yet done with the scheme, as the roads still need attention and the 
stormwater drains are not yet done, which makes this scheme a liability in our books.” 
 
The inflationary environment thus depleted the resources that had been accumulated 
by Developer 1. A visit to the site showed that construction of the houses was finished 
as there were no undeveloped plots, and all the houses were occupied. Thus, despite 
the difficult operating environment, the developers managed to construct and deliver 
all housing units. Developer 1 also explained that:  
 
“We will be charged penalties I suppose when the time comes, but for now there is 
absolutely no regulation. Absolutely nothing. The only thing that I have seen these 
guys doing is doing a good job when evaluating applications for permits…that’s done 
by the physical works department. But the moment one gets the permit, I haven’t seen 
any government or local official involved. We are just doing the best we can to provide 
housing for our clients.” 
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This study thus concludes that roads and drainages are the costliest components in land 
servicing. Left to their own devices, as there is little or no development control by the 
local authority due to staffing challenges, developers resort to constructing houses 
before they are done with land servicing. This allows developers to postpone land-
servicing costs to a later stage and priority is given to house construction. This study 
thus notes the use of temporary roads in lieu of properly done roads that meet the 
development standards stipulated in the regulations to reduce costs. All the housing 
schemes are connected to other existing residential areas, the city centre and the rest 
of the city through these temporary roads.  
 
Construction materials and equipment are also an important part of labour whose 
absence can hinder agency (Carrillo, 2014; Hwang et al., 2013; Marzouk & El-Rasas, 
2014). Once a developer has land, development rights and finance to commence work 
on-site, the next step is land servicing and construction of houses. In carrying out this 
development, the key to providing an end-product which is suitable for the target group 
according to the developers is keeping costs low. One reason it’s possible to keep costs 
low in Zimbabwe is that there are no rigorous health and safety regulations that the 
developers are obliged to comply with, as was revealed by Developer 2:  
 
“The reason why it can’t be done in other countries e.g. South Africa, for example, is 
that there are health and safety regulations which make low-income housing less 
profitable. A developer would have to pay for lots and lots of permits. Here in 
Zimbabwe, once I got my building plans approved [for Housing Development 4,] it 
was all systems go.” 
 
The real resource cost of compliance consists of three elements: costs associated with 
the purchase, installation, operation and maintenance of new equipment; changes in 
the inputs or mixtures used in the production process; and the capture of waste products 
that can either be disposed of, sold or reused (Windapo, 2013). Due to forex shortages 
in the country, it has significantly become difficult for the developers to import 
earthmoving equipment into Zimbabwe, giving those who have been in the field for 
long first-mover advantages. As such, the lax health and safety regulations are not 
resulting in there being need to purchase new equipment. All the developers in the 
study affirmed that they serve the target group mainly because they have access to 
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earthmoving equipment and have resorted to backward integration to enable cost-
cutting and consolidation of resources that can be made available in-house. All these 
are coping mechanisms in reaction to the unavailability of loan capital.  
 
In Housing Development 3, the study found that in-house manufacturing of 
construction materials significantly cut down on building materials costs. The 
developer has experimented with alternative materials, specifically using block bricks 
that were made using coal ash in Housing Development 3. Instead of the traditional 
stones, cement and sand, they also throw in coal into the mix when they are 
manufacturing their block bricks. However, no tests are done to check on the quality 
of the bricks used, and once plastered, the difference in the materials used would not 
be visible at all as was explained by Developer 1:  
 
“With our bricks, we are using coal ash. Look at this brick, it's dark greyish, but 
ordinarily, these bricks should be grey due to the granite. The dark spots that you are 
seeing here, that’s the coal ash…. We don’t know if they are stronger, coz we did not 
do any quality testing. On the internet, we see in other countries, they use what they 
call coal ash, but it certainly does bring down production costs.” 
 
Developer 1 has a manufacturing division that has its own registered company name 
that sells its production output to the Housing Development 3 project. The division, 
which has two brick manufacturing plants, manufactures building materials such as 
clay and concrete bricks, roofing tiles and pavers among other products. The division 
was formed and funded from the proceeds paid through by the Housing Development 
3 beneficiaries as was explained by Developer 1: 
 
“Where do you think the capital for such investments is coming from? From our 
conversation, you can figure that one out. Of course, the idea was pretty noble. What 
we are saying is that when doing a low-income housing project, I wouldn’t want to be 
going to these well-established companies to buy bricks. This, which we are doing, is 
like backward integration, it lowers costs.” 
 
The in-house production of building material not only keeps down costs but also 
ensures speedy completion of projects thus reducing costs that may arise due to project 
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delays. Some of the bricks are manufactured on-site, which not only reduces stockout 
costs but also cuts down on transport costs for the bricks. The developer is also directly 
in control of product quality, which is also determined by the quality of materials used. 
 
Developer 2 has a long record of accomplishment in the construction sector, which 
spans over 30 years. The developer has thus amassed in addition to the many years of 
experience a lot of construction equipment and vehicles, which help, minimise on 
equipment hire costs in Housing Development 2. In summary, cost-cutting measures 
that were noted in this study can be summarised as follows: in-house manufacturing 
of bricks to reduce material costs, transport costs and project delays and backward 
integration to enable consolidation of and efficient use of construction equipment, 
consolidation and efficient allocation of equipment and human resource and bypassing 
cumbersome regulation.  These findings are summarised in  Table 6-22. 
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Table 6-22: Summary table -Developer strategies used in each housing development to ameliorate constraints 
Constraint  
Strategies used in each housing development 
Housing Development 1 Housing Development 2 Housing Development 3 Housing Development 4 Housing Development 5 
Failure to 
access 
suitable land 
from the 
local 
authority 
 
The developer stopped 
working on the site and 
entered into fresh 
negotiations with the local 
authority. After a lag of 2 
years, developer was 
eventually allocated another 
site which has fewer issues 
The developer bought a block 
of land at the periphery of the 
city but within the local 
authority master boundary, 
subdivided and proceeded 
with the development.  
 
Enablers-land reform, master 
plan and financial resources 
to buy. 
  
High cost of 
land 
Not an issue as land prices 
lagged behind inflation 
significantly 
 
 
Not an issue as land prices 
lagged behind inflation 
significantly 
 
Low capital gains tax due to 
land valuation challenges 
post dollarization 
Land reform and masterplan 
zoning layout pushed 
landowners to sell and the 
developer was able to 
negotiate price downwards 
 
Low capital gains tax due to 
land valuation challenges 
post dollarization 
PPP arrangement – developer 
serviced plots as payment in 
lieu of land purchase cost 
 
Low capital gains tax due to 
land valuation challenges 
post dollarization 
The land was paid for using 
long term mortgage finance  
 
 
Difficulties 
in accessing 
development 
rights 
  
Informal channels used to 
bypass procedure. The 
developer got a development 
permit without fulfilling the 
requirement of a subdivision 
permit 
  
No Financial 
support from 
the 
government 
and financial 
institutions 
Off the plan selling  
 
Deposit taking 
 
The developer provided 
short-term finance 
Off the plan selling  
 
Token deposit  
 
The developer provided long-
term finance 
Off the plan selling  
 
Token deposit  
 
 
The developer provided long 
term finance 
Off the plan selling 
 
 Significant deposit paid 
upfront by the client   
 
The developer provided 
short-term finance 
Off the plan selling to adjust 
for inflationary pressures 
 
Inflation-adjusted payment 
terms offered on outstanding 
balances 
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Constraint  
Strategies used in each housing development 
Housing Development 1 Housing Development 2 Housing Development 3 Housing Development 4 Housing Development 5 
High cost of 
land 
servicing  
Prioritise housing 
construction over land 
servicing 
 
Allow clients to occupy 
completed houses without 
getting clearance from the 
local authority  
Prioritise housing 
construction over land 
servicing 
 
Allow clients to occupy 
completed houses without 
getting clearance from the 
local authority 
Prioritise housing 
construction over land 
servicing 
 
Allow clients to occupy 
completed houses without 
getting clearance from the 
local authority 
Prioritise housing 
construction over land 
servicing 
 
Allow clients to occupy 
completed houses without 
getting clearance from the 
local authority 
Prioritise housing 
construction over land 
servicing 
 
Allow clients to occupy 
completed houses without 
getting clearance from the 
local authority 
High cost of 
labour 
Developer managed the 
development as the main 
contractor. 
road construction and 
superstructure construction 
handled inhouse without 
subcontracting 
 
In-house production of 
building material used in the 
development 
Avoided title surveying and 
used informal channels to get 
a development permit 
 
road construction, brick 
moulding and superstructure 
construction handled inhouse 
without subcontracting 
 
In-house production of 
building material used in the 
development 
Developer amassed over the 
years  a lot of construction 
equipment and vehicles, 
which helped minimise 
equipment hire costs 
The developer was ill 
prepared for the high cost of 
labour and is still struggling 
with finishing the 
development. 
Lack of 
amenities e.g 
water, sewer 
services, 
electricity 
  
Use of boreholes, water 
bowsers and 
Septic ponds to make the 
development more attractive 
to the target group 
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6.8 Discussion of Findings 
The first objective in this study was to assess the extent to which the five housing 
developments have been successful and to derive appropriate lessons for general 
application. The study finds that these housing developments are successful in the 
sense that:  
 
• The typology of the houses, in terms of location and plot sizes, conform to low-
income housing as per zoning regulations. 
• The extent of land servicing that has been done, the layout of the houses and 
building materials used all fit in with the criteria used to describe formal 
housing. 
• There are predominantly first-time homeowners in all the housing 
developments who are penetrating the homeownership market for the first 
time. 
• The current beneficiaries of the housing developments as shown through 
survey findings - both homeowners and tenants are relatively low- income.  
• These low-income beneficiaries are buying market provided housing solutions 
by the developers, which shows that market housing solutions are reaching the 
low-income group.  
• The key decision factor influencing the beneficiaries to buy these market-
provided housing solutions is affordability. This implies that from the 
beneficiaries’ perspective, these housing developments are within their means. 
• There is very little speculative activity in the housing developments as 
beneficiaries buy these houses and hold on to them because they own no other 
house other than the house bought via these housing developments. This is seen 
through very little recorded cases of individual property sellers in the housing 
developments, which shows that people are not buying from the developers for 
onward resale.  
 
That said, the success of these housing developments is not unqualified. Even though 
these housing developments have provided thousands of completed housing units and 
beneficiaries are getting onto the formal property ladder through the developments, 
there are critical failures that still need to be probed and addressed to make market 
solutions to the housing challenge even more successful. The inability of the 
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developers across all the five cases to develop roads and drainages as per regulatory 
requirements points to a need for regulatory reforms via a focused review of the 
standards guiding roads and drainages in consultation with the developers. Resource 
constraints faced by the government are also identified as the main reason behind lack 
of access to basic amenities such as water and sewer services, electricity, garbage 
collection, schools and clinics. As such, the failure by the government to complement 
the efforts of the developers is a critical issue that detracts from the success of the 
housing developments and reduces the overall quality of life of the beneficiaries in the 
housing developments.  
 
The first hypothesis guiding this study is that despite the adverse environment there 
exists in Zimbabwe structural enablers that make market solutions to the low-income 
housing challenge possible, as seen through the five cases that were presented. The 
second hypothesis states that developers have specific discernible strategies that they 
employ in response to the adverse operating environment to reduce development costs 
to levels that enable them to successfully provide low-income housing. The running 
thread throughout the empirical findings in this chapter was that low-income housing 
production requires innovation to minimise costs. Access to land, it is shown in the 
study findings, is a critical factor which provides entry into the low-income housing 
sector. The high cost of land is documented as a barrier to market solutions to the 
housing challenge (Ibem, 2011; Makinde, 2014; Moss, 2003). This study confirms that 
access to land is a critical enabling factor as, in all the five cases, developers were able 
to cut down on land costs due to several factors. The real value of the land sold by the 
local authority to the developers was eroded to an insignificant component due to the 
hyperinflationary period that prevailed in the country from the late 1990s to 2009. This 
low value, compounded by the adoption of a basket of foreign currency as legal tender 
by the government, meant that there were also valuation challenges on land 
transactions thus attracting a lower capital gains tax. Land for the housing 
developments on the periphery of the city, was sourced from the market and this study 
notes that even so, land values were low due to shocks such as pressure on white 
landowners to sell land due to the land reform program and resource constraints which 
incapacitated the local authority from bidding for this land that has been urbanised via 
the master plan. Land is indeed the most critical resources in low-income housing 
provision as whoever owns it would have locked in the option to develop the land. 
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Although the circumstances which resulted in low land values in this study may not be 
exactly replicable in any other setting, these study findings show that adverse 
economic environments that are so characteristic of developing countries may contain 
hidden structural enablers which may be exploited by developers. Inflationary 
environments, resource-constrained governments, political pressures pushing for land 
reforms are a few examples of issues which may be found in most developing 
countries. Within such environments, developers can scan the environment to look for 
opportunities that can reduce land costs. 
 
What can be deduced from the presented findings is that the cost of servicing land, 
particularly constructing roads, is very high, due to the high standards that DOI in the 
model building laws. These same findings have been echoed in other studies, which 
lament the high cost that comes with strict adherence to orderly parcelling of space, 
provision of water, sewer and roads infrastructure before construction and certification 
of housing units before occupation (Chirisa, 2014; Gumbo, 2015; Kamete, 1998; 
Rakodi & Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1990a). Despite formal rules that are enshrined in the 
Zimbabwe Model Building Bylaws, the five cases in this show that housing 
construction was done before land servicing was completed as a cost-cutting measure 
due to a number of enabling factors: 
 
1. Regulatory loopholes. The withholding of certificates of compliance by the local 
authority if private-sector developers have not fulfilled their mandates as 
stipulated under the memorandum of association signed by the two parties doesn’t 
preclude construction of housing from being undertaken. 
2. Lack of budgetary support to the local authorities by the government resulting is 
understaffing which makes it difficult for the local authority to carry out their 
development control function. As such no inspections in ongoing developments 
are done. 
3. Information asymmetry due to many stakeholders in the land development 
process. This is the case in uMguza RDC where subdivision permits are issued by 
the department of physical planning under the Ministry of Housing, whilst 
development permits and development control is under the RDC and trunk 
infrastructure is provided by the Bulawayo Local Authority. 
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4. Inefficiencies built in the urban housing system due to political interference. Rural 
district councils do not have the expertise or the capacity to manage urban 
settlements, but government via the physical planning department approves 
subdivision plans in such areas. This effectively leaves the developers without any 
supervision.  
5. Fines that are not deterrent, as the developers prefer to flout regulations in 
preference for speedy completion of the housing projects. 
6. Corrupt personnel within the development system who make it possible for 
developers to bribe if need be to fast-track access to subdivision and development 
permits and to bypass formal cumbersome procedures. 
 
The principle of bypassing regulation that is viewed as cumbersome for ideal market 
solutions to the low-income group can be implemented by developers in any 
developing country where there are regulatory loopholes, inadequate development 
control by the local authority, non-deterrent fines and informal channels that can be 
used to bribe personnel and evade scrutiny. Despite there being codified rules that 
guide the development process, this study finds that in a bid to minimise cost, the 
prescribed rules were not followed but instead, from the five housing developments, 
the following development process was observed: 
 
• Finance for the land is sourced 
• Land comes forward 
• Land is subdivided into plots 
• Subdivided plots are sold and allocated to beneficiaries to raise money for the 
developments 
• Services are partially provided 
• Buildings constructed 
• Buildings are allocated to beneficiaries and occupation immediately takes 
place 
• Services continue to be provided 
• Formalization then takes place – certificates of compliance, certificates of 
occupancy, title deed documents and in some cases, title surveying etc. 
 
Events occur simultaneously 
Sequence can be interchangeable  
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The events that were identified in the development processes show that the processes 
that are followed in low-income housing development by private developers are 
diverging from the processes that are stipulated in building bye-laws. Circular Number 
70 of 2004 stipulates that it is a standard requirement that all plots are to be connected 
to a reticulated water supply network before construction of the superstructure can 
commence (Chirisa, 2014). As such, current regulation follows the traditional planning 
servicing-building-occupation (PSBO) framework, which has proved to be very 
ineffective and inefficient in most developing countries (Gumbo, 2014, 2015). In all 
the five cases, there was evidence pointing to people settling in the housing 
developments in the absence of full basic services like water and sanitation, roads and 
electricity. These findings clearly point to building construction and occupation 
occurring before servicing of the stands is complete. Gumbo (2015) identifies three 
approaches to land and housing delivery- the formal land and housing delivery 
sequence which follows the planning-servicing-building-occupation (PSBO) 
framework, the informal land and housing delivery sequence which follows the 
Occupation-building-planning and servicing (OBPS) framework and what he terms 
the bridged innovative land and housing delivery sequence which follows the 
Planning-Occupation-Building-servicing (POBS) framework. These study findings 
point to a fourth framework that follows the following sequence – planning-building-
occupation-servicing (PBOS). The outcome from this innovative framework is large-
scale standard and cheaper housing provided to the low-income groups at a pace that 
is faster than what can be achieved when beneficiaries are building for themselves. It 
also avoids problems to do with inadequate spaces being left for servicing which are 
experienced in the POBS and the OBOS framework as the developer puts in place 
sketchy infrastructure and respects boundaries in the building of the houses. This 
strategy where people settle in developments in the absence of basic services like water 
and sanitation, with roads and electricity provided later is termed “parallel 
development,” (Chirisa et al., 2014). This study notes that whilst parallel development 
is recognised as the most viable option in incremental housing by housing cooperatives 
and other informal builders, in formal housing schemes, developers are expected to 
first complete land servicing before house construction. The sequence of events listed 
above is thus evidence of developers again bypassing regulation in order to enable the 
most practical and cost-effective process flow given the target market.  
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Bureaucratic procedures in planning are argued to be the cause of inefficiency in the 
general urban system as seen through time taken to process development permits. 
Developers in this study also faced the same challenge and the only strategy that they 
have is to “oil the system” if they want to avoid the red tape that surrounds the 
development sector and to cut costs associated with such problems. The study notes 
that informal institutions enable corruption and regulatory evasion, which helps deliver 
low-income housing, but all these strategies come at a cost. There is a need to reform 
the system to ensure that the benefits that arise from all these antics are maintained 
whilst trying to sort out the root causes that make developers resort to such.  
 
Housing policy has economic and social implications as it affects housing supply and 
demand forces via prices, physical conditions, levels of investment, tenure choice, and 
residential mobility (Mayo & Angel, 1993). This study shows that due to the concerted 
homeownership drive that has characterised housing policy in Zimbabwe, developers 
have a viable market for low-income housing schemes as there are no other housing 
options that are available. Although the homeownership drive is however not 
supported by complementary market provided mortgage funding, with financiers 
giving varied reasons such as lack of security of tenure, high cost of administering 
loans and fear of high default rates, developers fill this gap through selling housing on 
payment terms that mirror mortgage finance whilst simultaneously lowering their own 
cost of capital. In summary, this study has shown that the various stages of the land 
development and housing production process arguably lead to substantial increases in 
costs. In reaction to these, developers use informal institutions to fast-track 
development permits and to evade cumbersome regulation and are innovative in 
amassing resources that are critical for low-income housing development such as land, 
finance and labour at the lowest cost possible. All these strategies result in cost 
reduction, and the result is a product that is acceptable to the target group, which 
supports all the two hypotheses that guide in this study.  
 
The study thus concludes this discussion segment by affirming that despite the adverse 
environment in Zimbabwe, there exist structural enablers that make market solutions 
to the low-income housing challenge possible. The specific strategies that are 
employed in response to the adverse operating environment to reduce development 
costs have also been detailed, together with the challenges that make it difficult for the 
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developers to achieve more successful outcomes.  As such, the overall aim of the study, 
which was to investigate the structural enablers, as well as the constraints, for low-
income housing development in Zimbabwe, to determine how developers exploit the 
former and mitigate the latter, to achieve successful outcomes has been fully met. 
6.9 Implications of findings to literature 
This section scrutinizes the findings presented in this chapter from a theoretical 
perspective and attempts to answer the question- does neoliberalisation work in 
Zimbabwe? The mission under neoliberalism is to facilitate conditions for profitable 
capital accumulation even in domains that have been formerly regarded as off-limits 
to the calculus of profitability such as low-income housing (Harvey, 2007; Hyslop, 
2016; Schipper, 2015). To achieve this, Governments have at their disposal according 
to Mayo & Angel (1993) enabling instruments that address demand-side and supply 
side constraints - developing property rights, developing mortgage finance and 
rationalizing subsidies, providing infrastructure for residential land development, 
regulating land and housing development and organizing the building industry to 
create greater competition in the building industry. As such, under a neoliberal housing 
policy, the role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework that is 
appropriate and conducive for engaging the private sector in home building programs 
for the lower end of market and providing serviced plots at affordable levels (Harvey, 
2007; Mooya & Cloete, 2007; Thahane, 1993).   
 
The study findings however point to “defacto neoliberalism” instead of a planned 
deliberate drive by the state as supported by enabling instruments that are at the state’s 
disposal. There is no subsidy support for both developers and the target group because 
of fiscal constraints, formal mortgage finance is not available to the target group as 
there are no government guarantees available to ameliorate the inherent risk that would 
be faced by financial institutions, the macro economic environment is fraught with 
uncertainty- a situation that ordinarily discourages investment of private capital. The 
government is also failing to carry out its development control function because of 
inadequate resources- a situation which has resulted in local authorities failing to 
provide land for low income housing, being understaffed and unable to conduct onsite 
inspections and incapacitated to enforce codified development standards and 
procedures. This inability has resulted in all beneficiaries in housing developments 
1,2,3 and 4 having no title deeds.  The state is also failing to complement the efforts 
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of the developers as local authorities are failing to provide basic sewer and water 
service to some residents in private-sector developed housing schemes. In all the 
development, most residents also don’t have electricity as the parastatal responsible 
for electricity provision doesn’t have adequate funds, which drastically reduces quality 
of life for the beneficiaries in the developments.  
 
The study thus concludes that neoliberal policy in Zimbabwe would work to the benefit 
the low-income group if the government adopts a more proactive stance and works in 
creating a conducive environment through addressing housing finance availability, and 
regulatory reform.  In this study, it was shown that financiers were wary of the risk 
that the low-income group presents, and this was evident in the discriminatory 
mortgage qualification criteria used to screen applicants.  Without long-term housing 
finance, the number of beneficiaries to the housing schemes presented in this study 
would reduce drastically to a subset of those either with adequate savings or those 
retiring and entering the property market for the first time through using their pension 
pay-outs which was a negligible number. These findings paint a very gloomy picture 
about housing options that are available to the low-income group at the present 
moment and in the near future should strides not be made to rope in the financial sector.   
 
Developer funding has provided a canvas on which government can see the feasibility 
of extending mortgage funding to the low-income groups and this model can be 
upscaled and snowballed across the country if the government offers guarantees to 
financial institutions. Indeed, most of the informally employed low-income earners 
have either no credit history at all or a poor credit history, which poses a high risk to 
the private investor (Lea, 2005; Loxley, 2013; Moss, 2001; Stein & Castillo, 2005), 
and this study has shown that these characteristics are even more prevalent in a 
developing country context where informal sector employment can be even higher 
than formal sector employment. As was shown in the study, this target group does take 
on long term binding financial obligations which can be used to create credit records. 
The ability to pay rentals consistently and/or monthly repayment to developers as seen 
in this study can be a solution around the lack of credit records.  
 
Critics of the existing model building bylaws in Zimbabwe state that the housing 
market is characterised by high, rigid, and outdated building standards as entrenched 
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in the Town country and model building bylaws (Chirisa, 2014; Chitekwe-Biti, 2009; 
Davies & Dewar, 1989). The paper finds that cost minimization was achieved through 
non-compliance with regulation with regards to road standards, drainages and permits 
and in some developments, though the use of untested building materials mainly due 
to lack of regulatory enforcement and enabling informal institutions which allowed 
developers to employ bribery as a means of managing the red tape associated with 
urban housing development. This study findings adds on to the debate about the impact 
of regulations on urban housing markets in developing countries especially when the 
state is not able to enforce such regulations. The impact of unrealistic formal 
regulations may drive developers into engaging in certain activities e.g. corruption, 
and there is need to question various planning and building regulations.  To reduce the 
cost of development, there is need to look carefully at the regulatory environment, and 
this is a critical point and answer the question: Can affordable formal housing be 
produced within the current regulatory environment? This study findings point to the 
contrary, which shifts the debate to the following: if formal housing in low income 
housing cannot be produced within the law, can the law be changed to suit what the 
people can afford?  These settlements which have gone for years without access to 
water sewer, electricity, roads and drainage systems are symptoms of failure to enforce 
existing regulations. This view is supported by Monkkonen (2013) who showed that 
Indonesia has lower rates of access to water and sewerage infrastructure than 
comparable countries like Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam due to lack of, or 
inconsistency in enforcement of regulations. Cases where building regulations are 
flouted are also highlighted by Glaeser and Henderson (2017).  
 
In conclusion, the study findings raise important questions which should be tackled 
from a theoretical and empirical perspective. Given the inability to enforce regulations, 
how can enabling mechanisms for increased market-driven low-income housing be 
framed to also ensure developer accountability and consumer acceptable delivery 
outcomes in developing countries? Solutions to this question would harmonize the 
financial and economic interest of the private sector with the political and social needs 
of the government and that can only happen through policy intervention. This study 
presented empirical evidence that shows bottlenecks in the planning process, the extent 
that developers are affected by the bottlenecks and the workarounds that are used to 
overcome these constraints, which points to the resilience of the private sector 
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developers and willingness to provide housing solutions to the low-income group. The 
government can capitalise on this entrepreneurial and enterprising spirit by addressing 
the stated constraints, which would create a conducive operating environment in line 
with neoliberal policy approach. 
  
 231 
 
7. SUMMARY, CONTRIBUTION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
7.1 Summary of The Thesis 
The main aim of this study was to account for the success of private sector led low-
income housing developments in Zimbabwe, despite the environment not being 
conducive for it. It was premised at the beginning of the study that these developments 
represent successful adaptation to the structural environment and it was the hoped that 
at the end of the study, the research would have uncovered how the structural 
environment enables and/or constrains low-income group developments in Zimbabwe, 
and the strategies then used by the developers to exploit the enablers and to mitigate 
the constraints. 
 
The study was carried out in Zimbabwe and therefore cast in a setting that is typical if 
not slightly worse than most developing country contexts. Given the recent debates 
surrounding the appropriateness of neoliberal policies in the low-income housing 
sphere, this study yields insights into the feasibility of having successful low-income 
housing developments when the macroeconomic, political, legislative and regulatory 
environments are less than ideal. Zimbabwe is a classic textbook case of a developing 
country that has an acute housing challenge on one hand and a difficult operating 
environment on the other. It has all the challenges that have been noted by studies that 
have espoused the challenges of providing housing via the market mechanism to the 
low-income group vis., lack of collateral, inadequate mechanisms for credit history 
checks, high housing standards and no government subsidies due to limited fiscal 
space. Zimbabwe also suffered from severe hyperinflation pre-2009 and is now 
working in a dollarized economy, which has also brought its own unique challenges, 
chief amongst which is lack of confidence in the banking system, resulting in 
disintermediation. Financial institutions thus work with short term funding, which 
makes it difficult to lend long term. Unemployment rates are also very high, with more 
than 80% of the population involved in informal sector activities as a means of 
survival. How then do private-sector developers navigate these challenges when 
serving the low-income group? 
 
The thesis consists of seven chapters altogether. Chapter 1 gave the background to the 
low-income housing challenge and explained the empirical puzzle under study, i.e., 
that despite the adverse macro-economic environment, there appear to be successful 
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low-income housing developments taking place. The aim of the study was thus to 
uncover that which accounts for the successful developments through interrogating the 
structural environment and teasing out the strategies that developers adopt in response 
to the structural enablers and constraints. Chapter 2 looked at the key theoretical 
perspectives for low-income housing development by the private sector in developing 
countries, and this review culminated in the adoption of the Structure-Agency theory 
as the best theory that can be used to conceptualise the problem under study. A 
conceptual framework was then developed using the six variables that are the 
cornerstone of the structure –agency theory – institutions, resources, ideology, 
interests, strategies and roles. 
 
Chapter 3 placed the neoliberal ideology in low-income housing into perspective. The 
neoliberal doxa has shaped housing policy, and the importance of housing policy 
cannot be overemphasised in low-income housing. The evolution of low-income 
housing policy was traced with the point of explaining how neoliberalism got to be 
established as a dominant policy framework. Key elements of a neoliberal housing 
policy and how it relates to low-income housing were discussed together with the 
criticisms against neoliberalism in housing policy, all of which help frame the findings 
within the neoliberal discourse. 
 
A socio-economic profile of Zimbabwe was given in chapter 4. The evolution of the 
housing policies and how these contributed to the housing problem in Zimbabwe was 
detailed. The regulatory environment, prevailing macro-economic environment and 
opportunities for private sector low-income housing development were also discussed. 
At the end, the chapter ties this all by looking at the housing development process that 
has to be adhered to in Zimbabwe, giving a comprehensive picture of the operating 
environment for low-income housing development.  
 
Chapter 5 discussed the ontological perspectives in housing research, and critical 
realism was shown to be the best ontological perspective to help explain what causes 
low-income housing development by the private sector to take place despite the 
unfavourable contextual environment. Research methods arising from the various 
ontological positions were also considered in chapter 5 and chapter 6 presented the 
research findings, analysis and discussion. 
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7.2 Main Findings and Conclusions  
Despite critiques that abound in the literature on the cons of neoliberal housing policy, 
this study showed the success and capacity of a market-oriented approach to housing 
the low-income group. From the five housing developments that were included in this 
study, four completed developments, Housing Developments 1, 2, 4 and 5 saw private 
developers developing and building housing that satisfies regulatory stipulations of 
what a low-income housing unit is, in terms of location, physical attributes and the 
socio-economic profile of the beneficiaries on a total of 1,066 plots. The same applied 
to Housing development 3, which has a potential of over 3500 houses and is still 
ongoing. The local authority has attempted to replicate the same strategies that are 
being used by the developers, but bureaucratic processes, understaffing challenges and 
deference to the central government for tender processing significantly weigh down 
the local authority resulting in the land development process being absurdly slow. The 
study, however, noted that though housing solutions to the low-income group are being 
provided by the market, from the planning system, institutional framework and access 
to land, finance and labour, which still need to be probed and addressed to make market 
solutions to the housing challenge even more successful. Of note were planning 
failures, resulting in high costs associated with constructing roads and drainages, time 
taken to process development permits, resource constraints faced by the government 
resulting in lack of access to basic amenities such as water and sewer services, 
electricity, garbage collection, schools and clinics in some developments, policy 
inconsistency regarding incorporation of urbanised rural land and lack of access to 
developer and end-user finance. To deal with these constraints, developers in all the 
housing schemes applied strategies that all had an overarching aim of bringing down 
development costs. Departure from prescribed processes that are stipulated by 
regulations that guide the development process was noted. This regulatory evasion was 
enabled by regulatory loopholes, incapacitation of the local authority due to lack of 
funds to enforce development control, information asymmetry amongst the many 
stakeholders in the land development process, and informal channels that enable 
bribery as a strategy. To lower financing costs three strategies were noted - off the plan 
selling, upfront deposit-taking, and developer provided finance. Other notable 
strategies were in-house manufacturing of construction materials and developers 
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doubling as contractors. These strategies ensured that developers had firm control over 
the quality of material used and speed with which projects were completed.  
 
7.3 Policy Recommendations 
It has been noted in this paper that the state enters the development processes via 
sectoral policies, as a development intermediary itself, and to safeguard particular 
interests and values (Healey and Barrett, 1990). However, the financial and economic 
interest of the private sector need to be harmonized with the political and social needs 
of the government and that can only happen through policy intervention. There are 
frictions that have been noted in the low-income housing sector, which the government 
should iron out if more private players are to be involved in the low-income housing 
sector. Bottlenecks in the planning process have been noted and acknowledged by the 
government, with the 2012 housing policy listing in detail the key problems that 
constrain housing delivery in Zimbabwe, including lack of policy coherence regarding 
rural-urban integration, inadequate investment by the public sector in the housing 
sector, lack of policies to enable effective participation of other actors in housing 
development, unreliable supply of affordable building materials, and bottlenecks in the 
land delivery process. This study has raised the same issues, which is evidence that 
these bottlenecks have not been addressed to date. In addition, this study presents 
empirical evidence that shows the extent that the developers are affected by the 
bottlenecks and the workarounds that are used to overcome these constraints, which 
points to the resilience of the private sector developers and willingness to provide 
housing solutions to the low-income group. The government can capitalise on this 
entrepreneurial and enterprising spirit by addressing the stated constraints. Given that 
the government is currently working on a land developers bill, this research comes at 
an opportune time to make policy recommendations, which are listed below, aimed at 
redressing the highlighted challenges which if resolved would reduce housing 
development costs and pave way for more successful private sector solutions to the 
housing challenge. 
 
7.3.1 Development control and standards 
The land shortages that were noted in this study partially stem from lack of resources 
by the local authority to enforce regulatory compliance via development control, which 
has resulted in the local authority, as a mitigatory measure, deciding not to involve 
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private developers in the low-income housing market. This study recommends that 
there is need for a more cost-effective approach to development control so that all 
stakeholders benefit – the developers get land that has been planned for and title 
surveyed from the local authority, which significantly reduces development costs to 
be borne by the developer, and the beneficiaries get access to even more affordable 
housing at a faster rate.  
 
Development control tools that the local authority relies on such as permits, 
inspections and penalties are not effective at all if they are left as currently structured, 
as shown in this study. Instead, these development controls result in opportunities for 
corruption and delay the delivery of housing to low-income groups. For example, the 
complicated procedures and delays in obtaining subdivision permits that were raised 
by Developer 1 and 2 create barriers to entry and make it difficult for the private 
developers to quickly respond to the needs of the low-income group, resulting in there 
being need to redo cost-benefit assessments given the volatile economic climate that 
the developers are operating in. This challenge can be fixed if the government irons 
out the institutional framework surrounding development permits. The willingness by 
developers to make illegal payments to expedite and avoidance of inspections is just a 
symptom of the underlying problems in the development process, which if not fixed, 
would take the earmarked land out of the market for a long time and would make the 
whole process too risky for the developer given the amount of capital outlay that is 
needed to complete both land development and house construction (Chirisa, 2014; 
Sivam, 2002).  
 
The local authority problems that are cited in this research are not unique to Bulawayo 
only, but have been cited in other urban councils (Chirisa, 2014) and the reasons that 
are cited are lack of adequate resources by the local authority to carry out their 
development control functions and the inability or willingness by the government to 
make any financial contribution to local authorities towards urban housing 
construction programs (Brown, 2001; Chipungu & Adebayo, 2013; Chitekwe-Biti, 
2009; Kamete, 1997). It is not only private-sector developers who have resorted to 
sidestepping the development control process but all civic society groups that are 
active in low-income housing are affected. For example, in Harare, Mavambo savings 
scheme under Zimbabwean Homeless People’s Federation started building houses in 
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November 2000 without building plan approval, as the local authority was taking too 
long to process the plans and the whole group ended up deciding that they could not 
wait (Chitekwe & Mitlin, 2001).  
 
From this research, the local authority redefined their role from a provider of housing 
to only a virgin-land allocator and regulator of private and co-operative housing 
developments and this has changed once again with the local authority stopping all 
allocation to private developers and cooperatives, thus redefining their role again. This 
is despite that the main advantage of private-sector participation is that it enables the 
public sector to draw on the ﬁnancial, managerial and technical capabilities of the 
private sector by placing decision-making on private contractors and investors who 
have the incentive to pursue maximum efﬁciency (Sivam, 2002). It has generally been 
accepted that the conventional housing delivery methods in which the government and 
local authorities provide services stands and complete housing units are no longer 
possible and marginalize the low-income groups (Muchadenyika, 2015a; Rakodi & 
Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1990b), but the underlying reason why the local authority wants to 
continue doing so is because they are incapacitated from effectively carrying out their 
development control and enforcement role. As Zami and Lee (2007) cogently put it 
across, “the legislation and enforcement of high standards may be well-intentioned, 
for they are meant to guarantee high-quality shelter for the rich and poor alike but, if 
enforced, frequently lead to the ironic conclusion that the latter are priced out of the 
market and get no housing at all”. It is this study’s contention that it’s not just the 
standards that can result in the pricing out of the low-income groups like the high 
standards of roads, but insistence on complex and rigid land and housing delivery 
systems without the resources and infrastructure in place to make sure that the process 
can be carried out expeditiously. Investment into the building inspectorate departments 
is critical if the management of the construction process is to be wholly monitored to 
ensure the sustainability of structures whilst taking advantage of private sector 
engagement in the low-income housing field. 
 
This study recognises that it is not an ideal situation when there are standards that are 
not followed. If the standards are maintained as they are, and development control is 
tightened there is a possibility that the final housing product may be out of reach of 
the target market or there will be a marked increase in corruption cases as developers 
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find ways of regulatory evasion which would also raise the cost of housing. Given that 
the effects of corruption are two-pronged- on one hand, informal channels enable 
developers to get things done faster, on the other hand, there are costs associated with 
corruption. The most visible cost is the money that is spent upfront over and above the 
development costs to ‘oil the system’. On the other hand, the need to engage/ invoke 
informal institutions where such activities take place essentially makes the low-income 
housing market a closed market, which can’t be navigated by other investors who 
might have access to capital but do not have the social capital necessary to engage in 
corrupt activities. The root causes of corruption in the development process emanate 
from issues that are beyond the control of developers such as planning failures, which 
result in time-consuming, costly and complicated processes and procedures to get 
planning permissions, and development standards that are perceived by developers to 
be too high for the target group. There is thus need for rectification of all issues that 
make it necessary for developers to resort to corruption. If all such issues can be 
addressed in such a way that all the current benefits that developers are getting through 
engaging in corrupt activities are maintained, there is likely to be an immediate 
reduction in development costs.  
 
This study recommends that there is a need for a platform for continuous dialogue 
between the government, developers and all other stakeholders directly involved in the 
housing development process. If standards, which are perceived to be too high by the 
developers are imposed, there is likely to be a proliferation of regulatory evasion as 
was shown in this study. If there is active involvement and dialogue amongst all 
stakeholders, some of the barriers that are listed above will be dealt with. The use of 
technology can also significantly reduce development control costs. A visible 
centralised system, which enables a digital footprint of all activities by the developers, 
details of which can take any shape, can enable the local authority to note quickly any 
anomalies or potential problems remotely and quickly arrange for physical inspections, 
thus reducing the need for manual inspections of all houses in all developments. Such 
a system would also equip the local authority with the ability to detect any unlawful 
activities and stop them before they get worse. Examples of things that can be captured 
in the system are permit application tracking modules, progress reports by the 
developers, record of inspections carried out in any, service requests by the developers 
to the local authority etc. Efficiency and transparency would be positive spinoffs of 
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such a system as it can also easily be used to prioritise permits which have taken too 
long to be approved, thus reducing the costs associated with bureaucratic delays and 
the need to engage in corrupt activities to get things done. 
 
All developers acknowledged gains that come with getting land that has been planned 
for and already title surveyed, and such gains could also be extended to material 
control. If the local authority directly sources materials that should be used for sewer 
pipes and water pipes that will then be coupled to the trunk infrastructure, and 
developers buy from the local authority or from approved suppliers, the local authority 
would have already indirectly started implementing development control at little cost.  
 
7.3.2 Land shortages  
The shortage of land ideal for low-income housing highlights that land is a finite 
resource. Resource constraints, which limit the ability of the local authority to buy land 
coupled with increasing urban population figures, indicate that it is likely that if 
available land is not managed judiciously, the land problem is likely to worsen in the 
near future. All the housing developments that were included in this study were 
standalone houses, and if this trend increases, there are likely to be problems of urban 
sprawl, which will also make development costs high. From a policy perspective, there 
is a need to consider the concept of low-income high-rise buildings as a more cost-
effective model. Sectional title is a viable tenure option compatible with the 
homeownership drive that guides the Zimbabwean housing policy. There is land that 
was set aside by local authorities in all cities that was meant for high-rise buildings, 
which land is called ‘flat sites’. Such land has not been utilised as local authorities cite 
the high cost of building associated with building up. This study thus recommends that 
the private sector be allowed to develop such areas as they have the capacity to do so 
at a lower cost. 
 
The shortage of land reinforces the culture of politicization of land, which further 
clouds up the development process, and makes the environment unconducive for some 
private sector players who might not be willing to play the political games that may 
unlock land for low-income housing. A capitalistic mode of land supply (Sivam, 2002) 
has emerged, as seen in this study through the developers having to scout for privately 
owned land in the periphery of the local authority areas with the intent to subdivide 
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and develop the land. This development is a symptom of the inability of the 
conventional land delivery process to meet the demand for land in this case by private 
developers. The conversion of land in the periphery of the local authority into urban 
land has turned out to be a highly politicized processed. Such political struggles for 
the control of Zimbabwe’s urban areas create an urban dilemma, characterized by a 
voiceless population living in settlements with no access to water and sanitation 
services as was noted in Housing Development 3. However, this is not unique to 
Zimbabwe, as similar findings have been reported in other countries such as India 
(Sivam, 2002). To deal with this, the Central Government can issue policy directives 
directed at resolving challenges that have been noted in this research, e.g. a directive 
requiring rural-urban councils to release gazetted land to urban councils. These 
directives were effective in China, which has seen over the years a significant 
involvement in private developers in solving the low-income housing challenge (Cao, 
Feng, & Tao, 2008). Local authorities should also be conscious of the need for a multi-
stakeholder approach to solving the low-income housing challenge and should align 
their objectives with that of the national housing policy.  
 
7.3.3 Targeting of low-income housing beneficiaries 
Although the housing delivery process acknowledges the importance of proper 
targeting of beneficiaries of the low-income housing developments, the 
operationalization of the targeting process as enshrined in the use of the housing 
waiting lists leaves a lot to be desired as all interview respondents in this study, 
including respondents from the local authority, have questioned its usefulness. 
Housing waiting lists as enshrined in the housing policy have continued to be the main 
allocation tool that is used and maintained by all local authorities (Mutembedzi, 2012). 
Though meant to enhance proper targeting, housing waiting lists are not a true 
reflection of how the allocation is done, in both public sector and private sector 
housing developments, which points to the official administrative tools of local 
government in the form of housing waiting lists being dysfunctional. It is not possible 
for beneficiaries to check how far up the list they have gone as the system in Bulawayo 
is still manually maintained, and the costly renewal fees have resulted in the process 
of registering and renewing the waiting list form being a constraint to the low-income 
group. The government and local authorities are not responsive to this, resulting in the 
house and land allocation process also being opaque and thus prone to politicking, 
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depending on whom the beneficiary knows if there are any development projects. The 
range of income that qualifies a beneficiary as a low-income earner is also not clear 
(Kamete, 1998).  
 
Private developers’ housing developments are open to anyone who can afford to buy 
land and housing. With proper support from the government, these housing 
developments can be leveraged on to reach the low-income group, if a proper targeting 
platform is availed. The one house per person rule in the high-density areas is a good 
policy, but the administrative burden of checking if a client owns another house cannot 
be pushed to the private developers as is currently happening. A searchable read-only 
database of homeowners can be made available on the local authority website to 
private developers, searchable for example by a person’s national identity number, to 
make the screening process easier without necessarily exposing the system to 
bureaucratic tendencies.  
 
7.4 Contribution to Knowledge 
The first contribution to knowledge acknowledged in this study is a contribution to 
theory. This was achieved by extending the reach of Structure-Agency theory to a 
different context. A conceptual framework that can be used to inform further work in 
the low-income housing field was developed. Using the variables from the Structure-
Agency theory, the study has refined the model, addressing the shortcoming that the 
model has been charged with. Coupled with a critical realist ontology, the study shows 
that the Structure-Agency model is a compelling theory that can be applied in different 
contexts and can be used to further housing research. Use of this conceptual framework 
will result in a more comparable body of knowledge that is not limited by contextual 
boundaries. 
 
This study also contributes to empirical literature. There has been a debate in literature 
on the feasibility of market solutions to the housing challenge, with clearly two 
dichotomous views among studies. This study has contributed to the debate by 
providing empirical evidence of market housing solutions targeted at low-income 
groups. Using Bulawayo as a case study, the study showed that the private sector has 
had the most impact in denting the low-income housing backlog. Appetite for more 
investment in low-income housing was noted, as seen through projects that are still 
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work in progress or still being planned, despite the difficult operating environment. 
This study thus shows that with adequate support from the government via institutional 
reforms, supported by political will, more private sector involvement can be cultivated. 
Although low-income housing development is a well-researched area, there is paucity 
in empirical studies that look at the strategies that developers employ to exploit 
structural enablers and to mitigate the constraints that are embedded in adverse 
economic conditions. The solution to the low-income housing challenge in Zimbabwe 
and other developing countries where the government has fiscal constraints lies in 
creating a conducive environment for private sector participation in low-income 
housing. This study noted constraints that are being faced by the developers, these 
being lack of access to land, bottlenecks in the planning process, lack of developer and 
end-user mortgage finance, rigid planning standards, high planning standards 
especially on road designs. If the government works on ironing out these constraints, 
even if the economic environment does not improve, there is likely to be an increase 
in private sector activity in the low-income housing sector. The main enabling factors 
for private sector participation in this study were a homeownership ideology that has 
been entrenched in the beneficiaries, a housing policy that is supportive of private 
sector engagement, and secure property rights. 
 
Another contribution to empirical literature relates to empirical data relating to private 
sector participation when certain key assumptions that have been taken for granted in 
the provision of low-income housing like the availability of subsidies are relaxed. A 
significant body of research work assumes states are typically in a position to provide 
subsidy support to both the low-income groups and the developers to bring down the 
cost of low-income housing and yet in developing countries, governments rarely have 
sufficient fiscal space to support subsidies, creating a lacuna in the literature. This 
study provided a canvas on which to test what happens if low-income housing 
development were to take place without subsidy support. Other contextual issues that 
were explored were the lack of end-user finance and loan capital for housing 
development. Private sector developers are innovative enough come up with 
customised solutions to contextual challenges as these as was shown in this study- with 
off the plan selling and developer provided finance tackling the unavailability of 
mortgage funds. The challenges that are faced by the private-sector developers and the 
strategies that are pursued to deal with these challenges demonstrate the resilience of 
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the private sector and the determination with which the private sector approaches 
business, even in the low-income housing sector. 
 
This study’s findings add on to the debate about the impact of regulations on urban 
housing markets in developing countries especially when the state is not able to 
enforce such regulations. The impact of unrealistic formal regulations drives 
developers into engaging in certain activities e.g. corruption, and there is need to 
question various planning and building regulations. From the study, it can be 
concluded that there is a trade-off between affordability and regulatory compliance. 
To reduce the cost of development, there is need to look carefully at the regulatory 
environment to check if affordable formal housing can be produced within the current 
regulatory environment. This study findings point to the contrary with settlements 
which have gone for years without access to water sewer, electricity, roads and 
drainage systems being symptoms of failure to enforce existing regulations.  
 
The final contribution to knowledge made by this study is a contribution to policy. 
Practical insights on how policy can be used to align the regulatory framework in such 
a way that challenges faced by developers active in the low-income housing provision 
are proffered under policy recommendations. Submissions towards the land 
developers bill are included which focus on policy levers that can be tweaked to 
address institutional and resource constraints faced by developers. The main highlights 
are an innovative use of technology to ameliorate development control challenges and 
to improve targeting of beneficiaries, targeted review of development standards and 
need for a platform for continuous dialogue between the government, developers and 
other stakeholders in the land development process 
 
7.5 Limitations of This Study and Suggestions For Further Research 
There are various agents in the property development sphere viz. landowners, public 
agency planning officers, politicians, community groups, investors in the form of 
financial institutions, shareholders etc. The conceptual framework that was developed 
in this study is robust enough to be used to analyse each of these actors. However, this 
research only concentrated on the perspective of low-income housing developers and 
therefore did not fully do justice to the developed conceptual framework. The actions 
of each of the actor in the low-income housing value chain can impose structural 
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barriers or enablers to low-income housing development, and research along this line 
of inquiry can help produce a fuller picture of the feasibility of market provided 
housing solutions for the low-income group. 
 
The study showed the negative impact of unrealistic and unenforced regulations on 
urban housing markets. These findings point to a need to shift the debate through 
further research to the following: if formal low-income housing cannot be produced 
within the law, can the law be changed to suit what the people can afford? This status 
quo raises another pertinent point for developing countries- given the inability to 
enforce regulations, how can enabling mechanisms for increased market-driven low-
income housing be framed to also ensure developer accountability and consumer 
acceptable delivery outcomes? 
 
The flouting of procedures by developers included in this study implies that not all 
beneficiaries in these developments can get title deeds to their properties. The 
developers feel that adherence to regulations slows down the housing delivery process, 
but these findings run counter a strand in literature, which touts the importance of 
security of tenure as the solution to urban poverty. Notable work in this field is 
Hernando DeSoto, who posits that a lot of the urban poor populace possesses dead 
capital. Compliance, from this study’s findings, might push up the cost of housing to 
unaffordable levels and delay project completion. Further research thus needs to be 
done to reconcile these two conflicting views. 
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APPENDIX 1: PRIVATE-SECTOR HOUSING PROJECTS 
APPLICATIONS DECLINED BY THE BULAWAYO LOCAL 
AUTHORITY 
 
Private 
Sector 
Player 
Date Issue Outcome 
Application 1 Feb 2011 
Application lodged in 
July 2010 to purchase 
virgin land suitable to 
service and build 200-
500 low-income 
housing units, with the 
local author carrying out 
stage inspections  
Application declined as 
the local authority 
preferred a partnership 
instead, with the local 
authority in charge of 
servicing the land. 
Reference made again to 
the private developers who 
had failed to complete 
developments during the 
hyperinflationary period.  
 
 
Application 2 
August 
2011 
Application lodged to 
develop flats for low-
income housing in 
Emganwini in April 
2011. The case had 
merits and the 
recommendation by the 
director Engineering 
services was that they 
accept the application 
Application declined. 
Reason: Some developers 
had in the past not 
completed their housing 
projects 
Application 3 
November 
2011 
Application for virgin 
land to service and 
develop residential 
stands (no date when the 
application was lodged). 
Applicant went through 
the prequalification 
process and the 
application had merits 
Application declined. 
Reason: Council no longer 
wanted to deal with private 
developers.  
Applicant 4 
November 
2014 
Application for land to 
build 4000 houses was 
discussed. Reference 
was made to July 
minutes where the same 
application was 
discussed, and the local 
authority was not 
comfortable  
Request for more 
information before 
decision can be made. 
approved subject to the 
company submitting a 
performance bond 
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Application 5 July 2017 
Application for a joint 
partnership with the 
Local authority to 
service 517 low-income 
residential land 
Application declined as 
the Local authority no 
longer wanted a 
partnership but preferred to 
get a mortgage loan itself 
for the servicing of the 
land.  
Source: Town Country and Planning Committee meeting minutes 
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APPENDIX 2: EXTRACT OF CONDITIONS FROM A 
TEMPORARY SUBDIVISION PERMIT 
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APPENDIX 3: SIGNED ETHICS CLEARANCE FORM 
Signatures Removed
271 
APPENDIX 4: PRIVATE DEVELOPERS INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Section A: Overall Business Strategy 
 This open-ended approach is hopefully going to give the researcher insights into the 
broad business around the low-income housing development business. The points 
under each question are just prompts that will help the researcher prompt the 
respondent in case the respondent does not have much to say in response to the 
question 
1. What motivated you to go into low-income housing?
2. Please define “low-income” as is applied in the housing schemes that you
have.
3. Did you face any barriers to entry in the property development arena?
• Access to land
• Access to finance
• Failure to satisfy the regulatory requirements
4. How do you fund low-income housing ventures?
• Own capital
• Loan finance
• Government subsidies
• Venture capitalist
• Partnerships
5. Your company vision and mission states that ………how does low-income 
housing fit into all this? 
6. What are your plans for the next 5 years in terms of:
• Product categories
• Market segments
• Geographic areas
• Core technologies
• Value creation strategies
7. Do you face a lot of competition in the low-income housing sector?
8. How do you differentiate yourself from your competitors?
• Image
• Customisation
• Price
• Styling
 272 
 
• Product quality 
• Targeting strategy 
 
 
9. Which vehicles do you rely on to achieve your objectives? 
• Internal developments 
• Joint ventures 
• Acquisitions 
• Licensing/franchising 
 
10. How do you get your returns, given that you are serving the low-income 
segment? I want to understand the economic logic of the business…i.e. where 
do your returns come from? 
• Economies of scale 
• Low costs through scope and replication advantages 
• Backward integration 
 
11. What are the major bottlenecks that you have faced in this business? 
• Access to land 
• Access to finance  
• Access to labour 
• Regulatory constraints 
• Corruption 
• Political interference 
 
12. How does the macro-economic environment pose a threat to the successful 
running of low-income housing schemes? And how do you handle these 
challenges? 
• Dollarization and the introduction of bond notes 
• Low liquidity levels in the country 
• High unemployment rates 
• Low GDP rates 
• Volatile regulatory environment e.g. intro of Statutory instrument 64 
of 2016 on the control of the importation of goods. 
• Corruption 
 
13. In other countries, there is a lot of literature which points to the difficulties 
associated with serving the low-income group e.g. low and unstable incomes, 
no credit history, lack of collateral and insufficient subsidy support 
What is it that you do differently that makes you succeed in serving this 
group despite these factors? 
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Section B –Questions on land servicing and construction  
Documents to ask for- general road plans and building plans for the housing 
schemes 
14. What are the dimensions of the houses that you build for the low-income 
group? 
15. The 2012 housing policy document states in section 5.4 Housing Policy and 
Legislative Framework “The legislative agenda flowing from this policy will 
include, but not be limited to, codification of the recent relaxation of standards 
associated with building materials and plot sizes, parallel and incremental 
development” 
 
Have these changes been operationalised? And have you adapted your house plans to 
be in line with these new relaxed standards? 
 
16. What is your role as a company in the value chain? 
• Land development 
• Superstructure construction 
• Superstructure and finishing 
• Marketing 
17. What are your key competencies in the role that you play as stated above? 
18. Which activities do u subcontract out? And which ones do you do in-house? 
19. With reference to figure 1 (see the last page), are there any regulatory 
constraints, that you feel, if relaxed would make you better able to serve the 
low-income group? 
• policies, legislation and institutional arrangements that relate to land 
development 
• housing development procedures  
• housing policy and allied legislation  
• urban settlement management policies 
20. How do you handle these regulatory challenges? 
 
 
Section c- marketing and selling of low-income housing. 
Documents to ask for- a copy of the agreement of sale, a brochure showing 
housing options for each scheme. 
 
21. Who qualifies for the low-income housing schemes? 
Consider the risks associated with serving the low-income housing group 
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(default risk, credit risk, liquidity risk) 
 
22. How do you screen the applicants? 
Risk management…this determines company exposure to risk associated with 
the low-income group 
• Unstable incomes 
• No credit history 
• Lack of collateral 
 
23. Do you use any credit reference bureaus to check on the applicant’s 
creditworthiness? 
24. How do you allocate housing? 
25. What are the payment terms? 
26. Do you work with financial institutions who provide mortgage loans to your 
clients? 
27. What is the uptake rate for the housing schemes? Or are all the schemes 
oversubscribed? 
28. In case of default. What action do you take? 
29. At what point do you give title deeds to the clients? 
30. Do you face any challenges in marketing or selling housing under the low-
income schemes? 
****End of interview**** 
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APPENDIX 5: LOCAL AUTHORITY INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
The latest plan document that is currently in effect for Bulawayo City Council is the 
2014-2018 strategic document. 
Questions from the strategic document 
On page 19: The Local authority intended to improve access to land through 
improving land delivery systems and engagement of landowners [see page 19].  
1. Which were the bottlenecks that had been noted in the land delivery system 
that the local authority intended to improve on? 
2. Which changes have been implemented in the land delivery systems so far? 
3. Has the council managed to acquire any land that was privately owned for 
housing purposes? 
4. What progress has been made so far with respect to the above objective in 
terms of  
a) Hectares purchased 
b) Number of stands planned and approved by the council and  
c) Number of areas incorporated [see page 19] 
 
The BCC also intends to improve housing affordability in the period 2014-2018 [see 
page 19] through minimising the percentage changes in plot prices, social housing 
rentals and housing construction costs. 
 
5. How significant is the stock of social housing units in Bulawayo? 
6. Has there been an increase in the number of these units since 2014? How 
much has been set aside for maintenance of these units in each year since 
2014? 
7. Who qualifies for housing within these social housing units? 
8. From 2014 to date, what has been the percentage change is social housing 
rentals? 
9. How does the local authority come up with a price for stands? Is there a 
standard rule that is followed if pricing for different income segments? 
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As of 2013, there were 100 000 people on the housing waiting list according to the 
BCC 5-year strategic plan, and the plan was to reduce the waiting list by 10% 
annually. 
10. May I know how the numbers have changed from 2013 to date? 
11. How many stands have been planned, approved and serviced by the city 
council and which areas per annum from 2014 to date? The target from the 
strategic plan was 130 000 stands per annum  
12. Of these stands, how many stands were allocated to people on the housing 
waiting lists?  
13. What criteria were used to determine recipients of the stands that were 
developed? 
14. If these targets have so far not been met, what have been the challenges 
faced? 
15. How is the local authority trying to mitigate these challenges if any? 
 
Page 31 
 The 5-year strategic plan also focuses on increasing the number of private housing 
developers that are approved by the Council in the city. 
16. Has there been an increase in the number of active private housing developers 
since 2013 where there were 23 approved? 
17. Can I get a list of these private housing developers? 
18. Does the City council engage in any partnerships with these private 
developers? If so, in which areas? 
19. If there are any private developers that are into low-income housing 
development, is there any support that they get from the local authority in 
terms of  
a) Access to land? - is there any quota/land that is set aside for low-income 
housing development 
b) Subsidy support? Maybe in the form of a lower cost of land? Or waiver of 
property taxes? 
20. How has the involvement of organisations such as UDCORP affected your 
ability to deliver land and / housing to the low-income groups? 
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Land servicing or development 
21. Which activities does the local authority subcontract out? 
 
 
Waiting list management 
 
22. Is this database a manual system or it has been computerised? 
23. How does the local authority use this list? Of what value is it? 
24. There are some private developers who say that their clients have to be 
registered on the housing list 1st before they can buy any housing on their 
schemes, what is the rationale for this? 
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APPENDIX 6: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
In the period 2009 to present, there have been a number of strategy documents that 
have been prepared by the Ministry of National Housing and Social Amenities, in a 
bid to address the housing shortage. These are listed below: 
• Ministry of National Housing and Social Amenities’ Strategic Plan for 2010 
to 2014; 
• 2012 National housing policy document 
• 2013 ZimAsset document and the supporting Home Ownership Scheme 
document 
 
 
Questions from the 2012 housing policy document  
[Page vii] Government will, however, when necessary be obliged to intervene and 
provide safety nets for the vulnerable groups amongst the society. 
1. Please define the term, vulnerable groups, as it is used in the housing policy?  
2. Which housing options are there for these vulnerable groups? 
3. How are these housing options funded? 
4. Which distribution channels are used? 
 [Page 5] 3.0 Policy Principles 
1d. Guaranteeing fiscal space for housing development.  
• How much has been set aside for housing for each of the consecutive years? I 
can get the figures from the ministry budget 
 
5. Why is the trend the way it is? If it’s decreasing why? 
 
 
[Page 5] A ‘continuum of options’ will be deployed taping into complementary 
market and non-market solutions. This will be pursued through;  
a. Strengthening the role of local authorities (decentralization).  
 
6. UDCORP has been tasked with servicing of state land. How has the 
involvement of a parastatal organisation such as UDCORP affecting the 
ability to deliver land and / housing to the low-income groups? 
 
7. Is this still in line with the decentralisation strategy that is set out in the 
housing policy? 
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[Page 6]4) Removing land and finance delivery bottlenecks using diverse 
instruments in a transparent and accountable manner. This will entail;  
c. Effective use of targeted instruments like subsidies.  
 
8. Are there any subsidies that are offered either to the target group or to private 
sector developers that are interested in serving the low-income group? If yes, 
please explain the types of subsidies that are there and how the intended 
recipients can access the subsidies. 
 
 
Pg. 13- The housing policy document states in section 5.4 Housing Policy and 
Legislative Framework “The legislative agenda flowing from this policy will include, 
but not be limited to, codification of the recent relaxation of standards associated 
with building materials and plot sizes, parallel and incremental development” 
 
9. Have there been any significant inroads towards the use of alternative 
materials for low-income housing here in Zimbabwe? And adjustment of 
housing standards for housing targeted at the low-income group? 
 
 
 
[page 15] 
 
The Policy adopts the following strategies:  
1) Regulate private sector housing development to reduce risks to investors and 
home seekers,  
2) Provide a registration framework for the private sector,  
3) Support with issues of access to land (the quota reserved for the private sector),  
4) Provide partnership guidelines and assist in conflict resolution,  
5) Facilitate access to resources as relevant, and  
6) Facilitate the establishment and implementation of an incentive regime that 
encourages diverse private sector participation  
 
10. Are there any particular regulatory instruments that govern property 
developers other than the existing regulatory instrument listed on page 20 – 
i.e. other than the constitution of Zimbabwe, Local government law, land law, 
Environmental management act, etc 
11. Please explain how the state plans to reduce risk to investors 
12. How far has the ministry gone with respect to compiling a register of active 
property developers? Last I checked, there was no comprehensive register [ 
see page 8 of the 2012 housing policy document] except for associations such 
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as CIFOZ and ZBCA and ZIPRODA, of which membership is not 
compulsory. 
13. There has been quite a number of reports in the press about a proposed “land 
developers bill”.  
a) What is the progress relating to the development of this bill? 
b) What are the highlights of this bill? 
 
14. On page 15, the housing policy mentions a quota of land that is reserved for 
the private sector. 
a)  How much land is set aside for private sector developers and over how 
often 
b) Who is the custodian of this land? i.e. Who administers it and what 
criteria is used to ensure that it is accessed by private low-income housing 
developers?  
c) What are the terms and conditions that are attached to this quota of land? 
 
15. Which other resources can the government assist with other than land? 
 
16.  Are there any other incentives that have been established and implemented to 
date in a bid to encourage private sector participation in low-income housing 
development? 
 
 
 [page 6] Increasing opportunities for state and non-state partnerships.  
[page 15] Provide partnership guidelines and assist in conflict resolution,  
 
17. Does the government engage in any partnerships with private developers in 
the provision of low-income housing? Can I get examples of such projects if 
they are there? 
 
18. From the ZimAsset document – the 5-year strategy document that’s meant to 
guide the country, the target that was set for the ministry responsible for 
national housing was the construction of 125 000 units in the period Oct 2013 
to Dec 2018. The strategies that are listed in the document include the 
recapitalisation of the National Housing and National Guarantee fund. 
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To what extent has this been successful? 
19. The Home Ownership Scheme, launched by the government in support of the 
Five Year National Housing Delivery Programme (NHDP) 2014-2018 details 
plans of the state to move out of the facilitatory role in housing provision, and 
start directly contributing towards housing development for low and medium-
income groups. 
 
a. How well was the scheme received by the targeted recipients? 
b. Which areas have been developed under the scheme? 
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APPENDIX 7: BUILDING SOCIETIES INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
Bulawayo as the second-largest city has representation in terms of all registered 
building societies in Zimbabwe namely CBZ Building Society, Central African 
Building Society (CABS), FBC building societies, ZB building society and National 
Building Society Limited.  
 
Questions for this interview guide were crafted after going through the Building 
Societies Act Chapter 24:02 
 
1. Do you offer mortgage loans? If yes, may I please have a look at the terms and 
conditions? 
2. Are there any other collective loan schemes for those who want to access 
housing via cooperatives or low-income housing developments? 
3. Do you offer any financial support to private developers who are running low-
income housing development schemes? If yes, what are the terms and 
conditions? 
 
Part 111 section 17 [page 12] of the Act states that local authorities are allowed 
to  
(t) to enter into joint ventures with the State, a local authority or any other person for 
the purpose of erecting buildings, roads, stormwater drains, water and sewerage 
systems and such facilities. 
4. Are there any projects to this effect that are being engaged in by building 
societies with Local Authorities? 
 
5. Please explain to me how mortgage loan amounts, repayment periods and 
amortizing amounts are calculated, given the following provisions as listed in 
the Building Societies act: 
Pg. 13 
22 Advances must be reducible or fixed-term advances  
(1) No society shall, on the security of a mortgage or hypothecation, make any advance 
other than a reducible advance or a fixed-term advance.  
(2) The terms of a reducible advance shall provide for the annual reduction of the 
capital amount outstanding and for the repayment of the total capital amount within 
a period of not more than thirty-five years. If any portion of the capital amount 
advanced has been repaid to the society and the society has re-advanced an amount not 
more than the portion so repaid, the capital amount of the original advance still 
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outstanding and the amount so re-advanced shall be repaid within a period of not more 
than thirty-five years calculated from the date of the re-advance. 
 
Pg. 14 
(6) A society shall not, in making a fixed-term advance on the security referred to in 
subsection (1), advance more than sixty-six and two-thirds per centum of the value 
reasonably determined of the property mortgaged or the lease hypothecated:  
Provided that if collateral security is furnished, it may advance an amount—  
(a) not exceeding the value so determined of the said property or lease; or  
(b) not exceeding the sum of sixty-six and two-thirds per centum of the value 
so determined of the said property or lease, plus the value of the 
collateral security calculated in the manner prescribed;  
whichever is the lower. 
 
 
6. How does the building society handle 2nd and 3rd mortgages given the 
provisions of section 24 on page 15 as detailed below: 
Page 15 
24 Advance on property already mortgaged prohibited  
No society shall advance money on the security of immovable property which is 
subject to an existing mortgage bond unless such existing mortgage bond is in favour 
of the society or unless preference under such existing bond is waived in favour of the 
society, is secured by the mortgage of such property, plus the aggregate amount of 
costs and preferent charges incurred by the society of such items as may be prescribed. 
 
7. Are there any incentives from the government that encourage you to extend 
mortgages to the low-income group? [The financial gazette reported on April 
10, 2014, that banks and building societies get exemptions from income tax to 
receipts and accruals on mortgage finance from January 1, 2014. 
 
8. How do u define low-income groups? 
 
9. Given the current economic environment, where there is high job insecurity 
after that landmark high court ruling which allowed employers to terminate job 
contracts as per the provision of the labour act, how do you protect yourself 
against default risk? 
 
10. Is there any other bureau other than the financial clearing bureau, set up in 
2015? 
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11. How do you deal with the possible introduction of the Zimbabwean dollar? Is 
it a significant risk factor that has to be managed from a lender’s perspective? 
 
12. According to literature, the low-income group are characterised by  
 
• Low incomes with little or no subsidy support 
• Unstable incomes – especially for those in the informal sector 
• No credit history 
• Lack of collateral 
• And sometimes lack of marketable title on land used for LIH projects 
As a building society, if you offer loans to this income group, how do you deal with 
this additional risk? 
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APPENDIX 8: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR HOUSING 
DEVELOPMENT BENEFICIARIES 
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